Bill Howard a écrit : > ----- Original Message ----- > From: John Clancy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Saturday, July 22, 2000 6:55 PM > Subject: [Cuba SI] TRIcont'l: Yankee military intervention in Colombia > > from: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: TRIcont'l: Yankee military intervention in Colombia > (subscriptiion by email <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Tricontinental . NUMBER 143, 1999 > > -- Yankee Military Intervention in Colombia -- > "Not the future tense" > By Heinz Dieterich Steffan, president of the Forum for the > Emancipation and Identity of Latin America > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > "A marriage for life".... That's how Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, chief > of the US Army Southern Command, defined his country's intervention > in the conflict in Colombia. > > In November 1998, the US Congress agreed to triple "security > assistance" to Colombia to the tune of 289 million dollars, > converting the Latin American country into the largest recipient of > such aid after Israel and Egypt. This is just the tip of the iceberg > of US military intervention in a region extending from Panama to > Ecuador, Peru, Guyana, and the Caribbean. > > Unpublished US government documents obtained by this analyst > and information published in the North American press reveal that the > Colombian conflict is a hemispheric problem for Washington; that > direct military intervention by Washington is already comparable to > that in El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984; and that the war > Washington is planing will be type waged in Kosovo. > > The Washington Post reported the first news of direct > military intervention by Washington in Colombia on May 25, 1998. The > prestigious daily announced that US soldiers were participating not > only in training and intelligence efforts, but also on the tactical > and strategic level of war efforts against the guerrillas of the Army > of National Liberation (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional - ELN) and > the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas > Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC). > > The training, carried out by US Army Special Forces - most of > them originating in Ft. Bragg, North Carolina - and Navy SEALS, > involves hundreds of counterinsurgency (dirty war) specialists > against popular movements each year. > > At any given moment, the Washington Post reported, there are some > 200 of Washington's soldiers in Colombia, 60 of whom are stationed at > three radar observation posts inside Colombia while the remainder > participate directly or indirectly in the repression against FARC and > the ELN. > > -- Washington organizes Colombian armed forces -- > > A week after the Washington Post story, the New York Times > amplified it, reporting on June 2 that the Clinton administration was > considering, among other measures increased military training for > Colombian forces, as well as sending more sophisticated weapons and a > high-tech intelligence center operated by US troops. > > The Southern Command, headquartered in Miami and with Gen. Charles > E. Wilhelm in charge, is a key force in this chess game of > Central American-style "pacification" that they intend to recreate in > the northern part of South America. > > For Wilhelm, military intervention in Colombia isn't a short-term > project, but a marriage for life." According to the general, "the > threat is intensifying" for Colombia's government and "we are seeing, > basically, an undermining of governance at the grassroots level." > > To exorcise the "threat", the US general is turning himself de > facto into the commander-in-chief of the Colombian armed forces > (Fuerzas Armadas Colombianas - FAC). In January, when the nominal > commander of FAC, Gen. Manuel J. Bonett, presented his strategic plan > for attacking the guerrilla forces, Wilhelm and his officers reviewed > it and "began picking it apart", in the words of the New York Times. > >From that point forward, Wilhelm has been reorganizing the FAC and > its training to get rid of the guerrilla forces. > > As in Central America, the reorganization and technical improvement > of the Colombian military on the strategic level goes hand in hand > with increased planning and tactical direction of the war on the > battlefield by the United States. After finishing a training course, > the US instructors graduate their "students" via an attack plan that > they carry out. > > Increasing sales of military equipment and flagrant violations of > human rights complement the customary picture of the dirty war, From > 1995 to 1997, Washington's "drug eradication" aid increased from 28.8 > million dollars to about 96 million, more than a 300% increase in two > years. In the same period, sales of military equipment rose from > 21.9 to 75 million. > > -- Gen. McCaffrey asks for 1 billion -- > > Together with the head of the Southern Command, the chief of the > Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Gen. Barry McCaffrey, > is the second architect of the intervention in the region. McCaffrey > has a double mission: to build, alongside Wilhelm, the logistics of > intervention and to create, with the State Department, the rhetoric > to justify intervention. > > On July 26 in Bogota, McCaffrey - previously the chief of the US > armed forces in Latin America - articulated Washington's official > excuse for intervention. There are 240,000 police and soldiers and 37 > million people facing the savage at tacks of 25,000 internal enemies > financed by hundreds of millions of dollars in drug money. This > speech complemented his argument the previous day that the guerrillas > are a threat to the citizens of Panama as well as the border > populations of Venezuela. Ecuador, and Brazil. This declaration by > McCaffrey was made a day after Pres. Pastrana said Colombia isn't and > will never be a threat to regional security. > > Meanwhile, the State Department joined the fray with another > virulent verbal attack on the guerrilla forces. The cynical > manipulations that FARC is carrying out in the peace process must end > immediately, said James Rubin, Madeleine Albright's spokesman, in > Washington. > > In relation to the war of weapons beyond the war of propaganda, on > July 16 McCaffrey requested 1 billion in "emergency drug > supplemental" assistance for the Pastrana government and other "drug- > producing" countries, arguing that it finds itself in a "near crisis" > situation. The money would go toward the purchase of helicopters, > intercept aircraft, and radar equipment; 30 million would be set > aside to improve the gathering and analysis of information obtained > by satellite, radar, and electronic intercepts; 200 million would be > for improving the US air and sea "interdiction efforts". Colombian > defense minister Luis Fernando Ramirez and Gen. Fernando Tapias, the > chief of the Colombian military, who accompanied McCaffrey > in Washington, also asked for the loan of equipment used by the > Southern Command at Howard Air Force Base in the Panama Canal Zone. > > -- The true dimension of intervention -- > > The crash of a US Havilland RC-7 military spy plane in the Putumayo > area of southern Colombia on July 23 supplied new facts about the > intervention. A month earlier a study by the Government Accounting > Office (GAO), the investigative arm of the US Congress, revealed that > the United States had started to supply military intelligence on > guerrilla activities to the Colombian armed forces beginning in March > 1999. > > On July 15, Gen. Charles Wilhelm admitted in a speech at the infamous > School of the Americas in Benning, Georgia, that during the last > guerrilla offensive in mid-July, the military forces of the United > States and Colombia were in "constant communication", confirming > indirectly that the guerrilla advance on Bogota was stopped by the > Colombian air force, directed by US officials and military > intelligence. > > The facts revealed as a result of the crash of the military aircraft > also help us to understand the hemispheric character of the > intervention. According to a source in Washington, speaking to the > Colombian newspaper El Espectador, "massive espionage" against the > Colombian guerrillas began two months earlier with the involvement of > the US Army Special Operations Air Regiment and about 250 US > technicians working in Colombia. > > Using high-tech electronic and infrared equipment, the RC-7 aircraft > - also used in Kosovo - can detect images of the guerrillas in the > jungle, on the one hand, and all of FARC's radio communications, on > the other: those made by their commanders, those made over the > Internet, and the radio programs aimed at the Colombian population. > > The plane - manned by five US soldiers based at Ft. Bliss in El > Paso, Texas, and two Colombians - must be accompanied by another > military reconnaissance aircraft like the EP-3 in order to be able to > localize the source of the signal that has been intercepted. And, in > fact, the moment the RC-7 disappeared, an EP-3 turned up at the > Ecuadorian air base at Coca, near the site of the crash. > Significantly rescue operations were coordinated from the Pentagon > and from Ecuador's Francisco Orellana army base. > > -- Three-pronged regional strategy -- > > The policy of intervention against Colombia can't be understood > outside a regional framework. US military withdrawal from the Panama > Canal at the end of the yea,, the policy of national sovereignty of > the Hugo Chavez government in Venezuela, and the popular advance in > Colombia endanger - from Washington's point of view - its entire > system of domination in this world strategic and oil-producing > region. > > Washington's answer is three-fold control Panama through an open > threat of military occupation; create the logistics for neutralizing > or, in this case, destroying the FARC and ELN in Colombia, and, after > having achieved "pacification" in Colombia, turn Venezuela back into > a traditionally submissive Latin America state. > > With regard to Panama, the military threat has already been > demonstrated. A month ago, the head of the US Southern Command, Gen. > Charles Wilhelm, publicly declared that Panama lacked the military > capacity to defend itself against the Colombian guerrilla forces. > For this reason, he said, the government of Pres. Bill Clinton > reserves the right to intervene unilaterally in the country if it > sees a threat to the security of the canal. > > -- Network of military bases in Ecuador with logistical facilities -- > > On April 1, 1999, the Ecuadorian government of President Mahuad > turned over logistical facilities at the Manta air base to the US air > force, Ecuador's motives for accepting this arrangement were > explained in the confidential "Report on the concession of logistical > facilities in Manta to the US air force for combating illegal > international narcotics traffic", issued in May 1999. The report > gave the following reasons: the need for the United States to replace > the air operations that it had conducted up until May 1, 1999, from > Howard air base in Panama; the financial benefits that Ecuador would > receive from Washington for fighting drug traffic; refusal might have > been interpreted by the United States and other developed countries > as a lack of political will on the part of the Ecuadorian government > to support the international war on narco-trafficking. > > The report also established that Washington chose Ecuador because > of its " strategic location and the security that it offers." > > The agreement between the two governments, in effect beginning > April 1, 1999, stipulates that the United States will assign a > restricted number of military and civilian personnel to the air base, > who will be charged with coordinating and facilitating the operation > of the aircraft. The number of people assigned to man the aircraft > will "be on the order of 200 people" who will rotate between the > United States and Ecuador for limited periods. > > The US air force will use eight aircraft in Manta with a maximum of > 140 sorties per month in order to carry out missions relating to > reconnaissance, tracking, marine patrol, communications intelligence, > imaging signals, aerial detection, early alert, vigilance and re- > supply. The security of these planes will be the responsibility of > North American personnel. An air traffic controller from the US > government will be authorized, in coordination with Ecuadorian > personnel, to give instructions from the control tower to the US > planes. > > The agreement will extend through September 30, 1999, but the > United States hopes that it will be given logistical facilities at > the same base for a period of eight to ten years, possibly investing > on the order of 30-40 million. > > Gen. Charles Wilhelm - who threatened Panama with direct > military intervention - is a frequent guest at this military base, > which will be the US center of operations against Colombia. On July > 5, the high-ranking officer arrived for an inspection tour that he > repeated on July 15. Given the recent events in Colombia, his hurry > is understandable. > > -- Aruba and Curacao, new alternatives with immunity -- > > A similar agreement was reached between the foreign relation's > minister of the Netherlands, J.J. Van Aartsen, and the US ambassador > in La Hague, Cynthia P Schneider, on April 13, 1999, with a duration > of one year but projecting a "more definitive accord". The objective > is to guarantee an ongoing US presence and cooperation in the Dutch > Antilles and Aruba. > > The Kingdom of the Netherlands, through this accord, grants both land > and aerial access and the use of certain airfields by US armed forces > and civilian government personnel in order to carry out missions to > detect and monitor drug trafficking and, when appropriate, missions > of interdiction. > > US personnel will, during their service, enjoy immunity from penal, > civil, and administrative justice in the Netherlands. In addition, > they are exempt from visa requirements and will be able to carry > weapons in specified areas. Vehicles owned by the US armed forces > will not need to be registered in the host country. > > -- Venezuela refuses to permit overflights -- > > In contrast to Ecuador and Holland, the Venezuelan government has > refused to authorize foreign bases in its country. In May 1999 it > denied a joint petition by Washington and La Hague requesting > permission to enter Venezuelan air space during anti-drug operations > carried out by planes based on Aruba and Curacao. > > The Venezuelan president seemed completely certain that the United > States and Holland would understand that Venezuela is a capable > sovereign country and has its own mechanisms for defense. All that > is left is for the United States to say "thank you" and go elsewhere > to try and solve the problem. Nevertheless, during a US mission last > July 16 led by Peter Romero, Assistant Secretary for Western > Hemisphere Affairs for the US Department of State, Caracas had to > agree to the installation of a third US radar in San Fernando de > Atabapo, located on the border with Colombia. about 700 kilometers > south of Caracas. > > Another two active radar stations are located in the north of the > country on the Paraguana peninsula and Margarita Island. During the > negotiations on those radar facilities it was agreed, according to a > member of the negotiating commission, that any intelligence sent to > Howard air base in Panama would be shared in a timely way wit ' h the > Venezuelan air force. With regard to the new station in Atabapo, > there is no information. > > -- Peru deploys troops to the border -- > > The government of President Fujimori obviously has no problems > joining a military ring around Colombia. In February of this year he > instructed Pres. Pastrana that it was a mistake to negotiate with the > guerrilla forces and characterized these forces as a danger to the > region. In addition, the recent truce between Peru and Ecuador over > the border problem between the countries in the Amazon certainly > takes on a different color in light of the Colombian conflict. > > According to Ecuadorian political sources, large numbers of troops > deployed on the Peruvian border were re-deployed, after the peace > treaty, to the border with Colombia, as were Peruvian troops. > Likewise, the report affirms that Peru is considering granting the > United States a military base in Iquitos or Chiclayo. According to > Lima analyst Oscar Ugarteche, the scales are leaning toward Iquitos, > where the US military base in the Huallaga valley would be moved. > > -- Other countries as a possible inter-American force -- > > In Guyana, the United States was able to lease a "special base" and > one can assume that Washington is also negotiating with the Costa > Rican government for a military base. If the air bases mentioned are > linked together, it is clear there is a growing network of aerial > intelligence that complements satellite intelligence and creates the > military infrastructure for aerial intervention and, eventually, for > an inter-American land force. > > McCaffrey has already talked about the need for an international > force to observe the drug traffic in Putumayo. Two important > Argentine news media reported last week that the United States > intends to investigate Argentine sentiments about a possible military > intervention in Colombia. The Peronist presidential candidate, > Eduardo Duhalde, said from Rome that what happens in Colombia is tied > to the narco-guerrillas and that, given the very tense present > situation, he would "have to analyze" the theme of intervention > 3 This position is very close to the intentions of President Menem to > make Argentina an associate member of NATO. > > -- The future of the region -- > > The preceding facts show that US military intervention in Colombia > is already comparable to the level of its intervention against the > Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador > between 1983 and 1984, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua during > the same years, and in Vietnam in 1963. > > The logic of intervention also follows the same historic pattern: > training of native troops on site by military advisors; delivery of > tactical and strategic intelligence to these troops; tactical conduct > of belligerent operations; modernization and strategic reorganization > of the native armed forces, particularly the air force; and financing > and propaganda coverage on a world scale. > > Finally, the US policy of "pacification" in the region will have > a predictable evolution. Just as in the Rambouillet negotiations > over Kosovo, Washington will present conditions for peace that are > acceptable to its interests. It FARC and the ELN refuse to ratify > them, they will be bombarded until they conform to the "Pax > Americana", just as happened to Milosevic in Serbia and the FMLN in > El Salvador. > > The depth of cooperation between the US government and the > Colombian military under the JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training) > program is demonstrated by the following Pentagon statistics: During > the 1996 fiscal year, 10 training exercises involving 114 US soldiers > and 651 Colombians took place. During 1997, there were three > exercises involving 143 US soldiers. > > US Southern Command statistics indicate, however, that > Washington's intervention was even greater than the Pentagon admits. > During 1996 there were 28 Special Forces operations. In 1997, 28 > exercises took place involving 319 US soldiers and, in 1998, 24 > exercises involving 274 Special Forces troops were planned." JC > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Wish you had something rad to add to your email? > We do at www.supersig.com. > http://click.egroups.com/1/6810/0/_/30563/_/964227378/ > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Cuba SI - Imperialism NO! > Information and discussion about Cuba. > Socialism or death! Patria o muerte! 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