>Subject: [cari] fwd;unmasking Indonesian interests behind ......... >Date: Saturday, September 11, 1999 11:35 AM > >Unmasking the Indonesian interests behind the pro-Jakarta militias >By George J. Aditjondro > >On Wednesday, 5 May 1999 the autonomy proposal of Indonesia for East Timor >was signed in Jakarta and Lissabon. In three months time, the East Timorese >will cast their votes in a UN-supervised 'direct ballot' whether to accept >or reject that proposal. A rejection, will automatically return control >over the territory to Portugal, to continue the decolonisation process >aborted by the Indonesian invasion, more than 23 years ago. > >Unfortunately, thousands of Indonesian troops and Indonesian-armed militia >forces are currently roaming the streets in the towns and villages of East >Timor, to force the people to accept that autonomy proposal, after killing >hundreds of villagers and refugees in Alas, Liquica, Dili, and other places >during the last six months, and injuring hundreds others. > >During the Bali summit with Acting President, B.J. Habibie, Prime Minister >John Howard failed to emphasise to his counterpart the urgency to disarm >those thugs and to withdraw the Indonesian troops, to create the necessary >conditions for the UN-supervised ballot. Or, for that matter, to guarantee >the safety of the UN personnel on the ground,which will include at least >fifty Australian police agents. > >On the subject of these militias, our media tend to provide an image,as if >the presence of these military-backed militias, simply reflect some splits >within the ranks of the Indonesian government. Namely, between the >good-willing Indonesian civilian president, Dr. B.J. Habibie, and the >difficult-to-read Indonesian armed forces commander, General Wiranto. Or, >deriving from Foreign Minister Alexander Downer's famous comment, divisions >between "rogue elements" among the Indonesian army in East Timor, and >General Wiranto who seems to be 100% behind the transitional president. >This image is, I believe, very inaccurate. It completely overlooks the >economic interests of the Jakarta oligarchy on the island of Timor, which >cause this closely knit clique of former and active army generals and their >families to abuse the fears of a handful of East Timorese leaders, who >themselves have stuffed their pockets during their more than two decades of >collaboration with Jakarta. Let me now briefly outline those business >interests. > >First of all, East Timor is the Indonesian "province" with the second >largest landholdings under control of the Soeharto family, namely >564,867 hectares. CNRT, the umbrella organisation of the East Timorese >resistance, has made it clear, last March, that they plan to seize the >millions of dollars worth of these properties, after independence has been >obtained (Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March). > >These landholdings stretch from the Western border to the Eastern tip of >East Timor, consisting of a 50,000 hectares timber plantation allocated to >Bob Hasan, one of the Soeharto family's business operators, to tens of >thousands of hectares of sugarcane plantations awarded to the kids on the >Southern coast, stretching from Suai to Viqueque and to Los Palosin the >district of Lautem. In addition, the best marble deposits in Manatuto, as >been awarded to Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana,Soeharto's eldest daughter, who also >has a monopoly over coffee production and export from East Timor, through a >company of hers in Dili. These Soeharto interests are closely intertwined >with the business interests of other generals who had served under Soeharto, >both during the Seroja Operation to invade and annex East Timor, as well as >in other military operations. Batara Indra, an Indonesian conglomerate >backed by Ret. Generals Benny Moerdani and Dading Kalbuadi, the mastermind >behind the killings of Australian-based journalists in Balibo and Dili, >controls the sandalwood forests of East Timor, and the production of >sandalwood oil for export to produce sandalwood perfumed soap in France and >sandalwood powder for incense sticks for export to East Asia. > >Batara Indra also exports Buddhist statues to Taiwan and Catholic statues to >Italy, made from East Timorese sandalwood and marble. Most of the hotels >and the only cinema in Dili, are owned by Batara Indra, while all the large >construction firms in Dili, which are involved in all the large >infrastructure projects, including building the irrigation canals and >ditches for Indonesian "transmigrants",either belong to Benny Moerdani's >Batara Indra Group, or to the Anak Liambau Group of the Jakarta-appointed >governor, Jose Abilio Osorio-Soares. > >Supply of cement is now problem to all those contractors. >Because two companies close to the Soehartos are their main suppliers: the >Djajanti Group cement factory on the island of Seram, north of Timor, which >is headed by a son of Ret. General Try Sutrisno, Soeharto's former vice >president, and the cement factory near Kupang on West Timor, which is owned >by Ret. General Arnold Baramuli, whose son co-owns the alcohol sticker >company of Soeharto's grand-son, Ari Haryo Wibowo.> The governor's family is >also closely intertwined with the Soeharto family's businesses. Gil Alves, >a brother-in-law of Governor Abilio, operates the alcohol sticker monopoly >of Ari Haryo Wibowo, also known as Ari Sigit. In addition, as the >chairperson of Yayasan Hati, a charity of former East Timorese collaborators >during the Seroja Operation, Gil Alves is also involved in a drinking water >company, Aquamor, and a textile company, PT Dilitex, which are closely >linked with Siti Hediati Haryadi, Soeharto's middle daughter who is married >to the sacked General Prabowo Subianto. > >Now, looking at the who-is-who of the pro-integration militia and their >leaders in East Timor, it is not difficult to find their links to the >Soeharto family, or, to their own land-grabbing practices in EastTimor. > >On top of the list is certainly Governor Abilio Osorio-Soares himself, >formerly a protegee of General Prabowo Subianto, when the latter was still >the top person in the Indonesian army's special forces, Kopassus. >Then you have Basilio Araujo, the spokeperson of the pro-integration forces, >who graduated from the U.K. and is the deputy head of the provincial >investment board (BKPMD), the body which makes the decision on who is >allowed to invest in what field and where in East Timor. > >Next follows to former district heads in the border area, Joao Tavares, who >had been involved in the border raids under then Colonel Dading Kalbuadi, >and who as bupati (district head) of Maliana, took over many landholdings >vacated by East Timorese who fled to Australia and Portugal. On the same >level is Rui Lopes, the former district head of Covalima, whose hobby, apart >from collecting landholdings, is also to collect horses and cattle. On a >visit of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana to Suai, the capital of Covalima, Rui Lopes >took Mrs. Rukmana to see the old oil wells in Suai Loro, south of the >capital, near the coast and near one of Rui Lopes' horse stables.> Even the >current army commander of East Timor, Colonel Tono Suratman (born in 1952), >smacks of Soeharto connections. His family are the co-owners of a pearling >company, PT Kima Surya Lestari Mutiara, with General Prabowo Subianto's >wife. This company has pearl diving operations offshore Flores and Lombok, >west of Timor. Due to its high-level connections, this Suratman-Prabowo >joint venture was allowed to operate within the boundaries of the Komodo >national park, without even paying any royalties to the Nusa Tenggara Timur >province.> Lest we forget, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, the head of the new >"Timor Lorosae Front" is also not free from Soeharto family connections. >Two years ago, together with another East Timorese collaborator, the >Lissabon-based former Fretilin leader, Abilio Araujo, he has been promised >to become a shareholder of a new cement factory to be built in Los Palos, >using the electricity from a new hydropower plant to be built in the >vicinities. The Indonesian counterpart of this cement factory is Budi >Prakoso, whose brother, Setiawan Djody, was involved in Tommy Suharto's >Lamborghini deal. The patron of this proposed cement factory is Mrs. >Rukmana herself, Soeharto's former de facto foreign minister. In other >words, the entire top brass of the Indonesian army and civilian bureaucracy >in East Timor are closely interlinked with the former inner circle of >Soeharto, which has in turn be taken over by his successor, Habibie. Even >Wiranto is not free from Soeharto connections, since all the army charities >which are now under his patronage, are co-shareholders of many of the >Soeharto family's timber concessions and telecommunication companies.> One >may ask, though, isn't East Timor such a small piece of the economic pie, >compared with all the other Indonesian provinces? >The answer is yes, because the Soeharto family still control nine million >hectares of landholdings all over Indonesia, as large as the island of Java. >The bottom-line is, that the landholdings in East Timor overlap with the >three known oil wells from the Portuguese time, namely Suai Loro in >Covalima, Aliambata in Viqueque, and Pualaca in Manatuto. And between those >three wells lie vast untapped oil reserves as well.> The Soeharto family had >also made their preparations to venture into the Timor Sea reserves. Last >year, a new oil company was set up in Perth, called Genindo Western >Petroleum Pty. Ltd., which is partly owned but directed by Bambang >Trihatmodjo, Soeharto's middle son. >Bambang and his younger brother Tommy also own two Singapore-based oil and >gas tanker fleets, who are plying the seas between Indonesia and Northeast >Asia, and who would eagerly be involved in a similar trade between the Timor >Gap and those rich Asian customers. In addition, Bambang is also co-owner >of PT Elnusa, which is involved in building a base camp for the oil >companies and related petro-chemical industries on either West or East >Timor. > >Tommy, in addition to his tanker fleet, has his own aircharter company which >has been waiting to chip into the Timor Gap wealth, where three wells-Elang, >Kakatua, and Kakatua North-have already been producing >33,000 barrels of oil per day since July, last year. And many of the >Soeharto clan business partners in Indonesia's oil and gas fields,such as >Mobil Oil, are also active in the Timor Sea, which could lead them into >further joint ventures in this part of the world.> This is why the Jakarta >oligarchy-with the strong support from their East Timorese collaborators-are >so keen in undermining a free and fair vote to determine East Timor's future >political status. >After signing the autonomy package, the Habibie-Wiranto government has >received a further boost to support the militias, in a more official way. >Under the pretext of "socialising the autonomy package", the >Jakarta-appointed governor has already allocated Rp 6 billion (roughly A$ 12 >0000 000) for each district. Now, the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and >Defense Departments have received a further blessing from Habibie to >allocate funds to the pro-integration factions in East Timor, and turn a >blind-eye in how they are going to "socialise" that autonomy package. > >Learning probably from Milosevic's stubborn tactic to partition Kosovo, I >believe that behind the militia tactics in East Timor there seems to hide a >strategy to partition East Timor into a western half which support continued >links with Indonesia and an eastern part that would be allowed to become >independent. A partition, that would roughly follow the lines of the >'oil-rich' and 'oil-poor' parts of East Timor. Or, a strategy that would >allow the entire territory to obtain its political independence, as long as >the landholdings of the Soeharto family and their East Timorese >collaborators would be respected by an independent East Timor state, and not >be seized by the new governmentor by those properties rightful, traditional >landowners.> So, without a strong UN peace keeping force, and without the >disarming of pro-Jakarta militias and the complete withdrawal of Indonesian >troops, I am afraid that one of those scenarios may be materialised. > > >Dr. George J. Aditjondro is a lecturer at the Department of Sociology and >Anthropology at the University of Newcastle. >His new book, "Is Oil Thicker than Blood? A Study of Oil Companies >Interests and Western Complicity in Indonesia's Annexation of East Timor" >is going to be published by Nova Science in the USA, this month. > > >
