In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within are, bhr, egy, irn, irq, jor, kwt, lbn, omn, pse, qat, sau, syr, tur, yem. Inferred improvements during Jan 2021: ASN Name Fixed-By 207459 TEKNOSOS 2021-01-21 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jan 2021: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 8452 TE 2016-09-23 2021-01-17 5384 EMIRATES-INTERNET 2017-02-17 2021-01-06 34296 MILLENICOM 2017-04-28 2021-01-26 51559 NETINTERNET 2017-05-30 2021-01-23 9121 TTNet 2017-07-14 2021-01-29 202365 Chronos 2019-07-10 2021-01-31 8966 Etisalat 2019-08-08 2021-01-06 43242 extend 2020-12-21 2021-01-15 202254 LDL 2021-01-03 2021-01-30 207459 TEKNOSOS 2021-01-20 2021-01-20 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=are,bhr,egy,irn,irq,jor,kwt,lbn,omn,pse,qat,sau,syr,tur,yem&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org _______________________________________________ Menog mailing list Menog@lists.menog.org http://lists.menog.org/mailman/listinfo/menog