UPDATE ON NTSB INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRASH OF COMAIR FLIGHT 5191 

 On August 27, 2006, about 6:07 a.m., Comair flight 5191, a Bombardier 
CRJ-100, (N431CA) crashed upon takeoff from Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, 
Kentucky. Of the 47 passengers and 3 crewmembers onboard, 49 were fatally 
injured and 
one (the first officer) survived in critical condition. The following is an 
update of factual information developed during the Safety Board's 
investigation.
 Washington, DC --The Safety Board has completed the on-scene portion of the 
investigation. All of the investigative groups will be completing factual 
reports, which will be released to the public when the public docket is opened 
in 
the next several months.

 Accident Sequence
 Flight 5191, from Lexington, Kentucky to Atlanta, Georgia, was the third of 
three airplanes scheduled to take off in the early morning. The previous two 
departures took off without incident from runway 22. Flight 5191 was also 
cleared to taxi to runway 22 and subsequently cleared for takeoff; however, the 
airplane attempted to take off from runway 26. According to recorded 
information, 
the aircraft began its takeoff roll, accelerated to a maximum of about 137 
knots, ran off the end of the runway through the airport perimeter fence, and 
impacted trees on an adjacent horse farm. The entire sequence took about 36 
seconds. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire.
 Aircraft Wreckage

Witness marks on scene indicate that all three landing gear were on the 
ground as the airplane exited the runway. The main wreckage was located 
approximately 1,800 feet from the end of the runway. Both engines were examined 
at the 
accident site and no evidence of pre-impact failure was noted and the thrust 
reversers were stowed. The flaps were found in the takeoff position and no 
problems were noted with any other airplane system or structure. The wreckage 
from 
flight 5191 has been moved to a storage facility in Georgia.

 Recorders
 The flight data recorder (FDR) and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were 
recovered immediately and have provided valuable information. Investigators are 
continuing to extract data from the flight recorders, the air traffic control 
tape recordings and airport video surveillance cameras. FDR data indicate that 
the airplane stopped near the end of runway 26 for about 45 seconds before the 
flight was cleared for takeoff. The airplane was cleared for takeoff and 6 
seconds later started to taxi onto runway 26. It took about 36 seconds for the 
airplane to taxi onto runway 26 and complete the turn before power was 
increased to initiate the takeoff. FDR vertical accelerometer data indicate 
that the 
airplane departed the end of the runway about 32 seconds after the takeoff was 
initiated. The FDR recording ended about 4 seconds later. Time correlation of 
those data continues.

 Operations/Human Performance

 Operations/Human Performance group has completed initial follow-up 
interviews at Comair headquarters in Covington, KY. The group conducted airport 
observations under day and night conditions; a simulator observation of Comair 
taxi 
and takeoff procedures; and interviews with multiple persons including: ramp 
personnel, flight instructors, check airmen, and several pilots who had flown 
with the accident flight crew. These interviews provided investigators with 
information about procedures and techniques used by pilots for taxi and takeoff 
runway identification and information about the accident flightcrew. 
Additionally, the Director of Corporate Safety for Comair and FAA personnel 
responsible 
for oversight of the Comair certificate were interviewed. The group gathered 
relevant documents pertaining to the accident flight, flight crew training and 
evaluation, operations of the CRJ100, and oversight of the airline. 
Investigators are now reviewing interviewsummaries and documentation to 
identify areas 
for further investigation and evaluation. The group continues to evaluate the 
pilot actions that led to the attempted takeoff on runway 26.

 Airport Information/Survival Factors
 Runway 22 is 7003 feet long, 150 feet wide, and is lighted for nighttime 
use. Runway 26 is 3500 feet long, 150 feet wide but marked to 75 feet wide, and 
is not lighted and is restricted to daytime use only. In order to take off from 
runway 22 it is necessary to taxi across the end of runway 26. An airport 
construction project, begun in 2004, was still underway at LEX at the time of 
the 
accident. The project was intended to mill and repave runway 4-22 and upgrade 
the safety areas at both ends of runway 4-22, the main runway. This project 
necessitated changes to some of the taxiways and signage. The group continues 
to evaluate the airport taxiway and runway markings, lighting and signage as 
well as additional information that was available to pilots. The 
Airport/Survival Factors Group will also be documenting the factors that may 
have contributed 
to the loss of lives in this accident.

 Air Traffic Control
 At the time of the accident, there was one air traffic controller in the 
tower. After handling several aircraft at the beginning of his shift, there 
were 
several hours without aircraft movements. In the 20 minutes leading up to the 
accident, there were three departures, including Comair 5191, from LEX under 
his control. The ATC group has interviewed several Lexington control tower 
personnel and FAA air traffic personnel. The controller on duty at the time of 
the 
accident relayed the following information to investigators: he cleared the 
accident flight crew to take off (from runway 22) and to fly runway heading 
(220 degrees); after providing takeoff clearance for flight 5191, he turned 
away 
from the window to perform an administrative task (traffic count); he did not 
witness the accident, but heard the crash, turned around and saw fire, and 
immediately activated the emergency response. As in all investigations, the 
group 
will review the controller's workload and duty schedule and the tower 
staffing level.

 Toxicological Test
 Toxicology testing performed on specimens from both pilots did not detect 
any illicit substances or alcohol. An over the counter decongestant, 
pseudoephedrine, was detected at a low level in the first officer's blood.

Post Accident FAA Action
 On September 1, 2006, the FAA issued a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO), 
titled, "Flight Crew Techniques and Procedures that Enhance Pre-takeoff and 
Takeoff Safety." This alert highlights existing FAA aircraft ground operation 
guidance and reminds flightcrews that maximum attention should be placed upon 
maintaining situational awareness during taxi operations.

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