OK Tom, everybody. It's a holiday week here in Zurich, so I'll have lunch with my colleague next week to discuss. Any final thoughts, include before then, and I'll get back with a thought about what we need to make this project happen in practice. If she's interested, I'll go ahead and invite her to the github and suggest we continue discussion there.
> > Christine > > On Sun, Apr 20, 2014 at 2:35 AM, Tom Ritter <[email protected]> wrote: >> Hey Christine, I haven't heard anyone speak up, so I would say give it >> a day or two to let people voice last thoughts on it >> (https://github.com/tomrittervg/crypto-usability-study) and then pass >> it to your colleague =) Based on their comments, we can retool >> things, and then the next stage will be writing code and generating >> test cases. >> >> -tom >> >> On 8 April 2014 11:35, Christine Corbett Moran >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> Just an update from my end, I'll be leaving my University in September >>> so getting this well underway by then would be ideal, as the local >>> researcher I'd be interfacing with would need some help and advice in >>> the experimental design. >>> >>> So just let me know when we have the basics ready for me to start, >>> unfortunately with all the TextSecure work I'm not able to contribute >>> much to this stage, but the interfacing stage should be a series of >>> enjoyable coffees with my colleague =0, and probably helping out with >>> administering the experiment itself. >>> >>> C >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 5:29 PM, Michael Rogers <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>>> Hash: SHA256 >>>> >>>> On 08/04/14 12:59, Tom Ritter wrote: >>>>> A mistake. =) I've updated it with a 25/75% split between 2^80 >>>>> flaw chosen specifically and chosen at random for each type. >>>> >>>> Ideally we'd start with random flaws and determine empirically what >>>> flaws are least noticeable for each encoding method. Then we'd be able >>>> to do a proper comparison across encodings for flaws chosen by the >>>> attacker within a given budget. Right now it doesn't seem to me that >>>> we can separate the empirical detection rate of attacker-chosen flaws >>>> from our intuition about what flaws an attacker would choose. So I >>>> suggest that we start simple and leave out the non-random flaws in the >>>> first instance. >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> Michael >>>> >>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >>>> Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) >>>> >>>> iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJTRBW+AAoJEBEET9GfxSfMvTwIALMBNN1wFUspi5AkPMJTqK5i >>>> S9ybLJFxPbVr4JZoOKLSnVLkhFtcx8fJ8NAtDjjx+o5U9/5iC3QclTI9Z0vuEEoI >>>> vPoFZoeEokHH/x9TKNEQhBi5lmM3TcCOotCuRiMb/t1T2SITACD1hms6jY0hmodA >>>> hBUAok/7Xh4kp+FqFO3zcHpmTFXLX8EcVzhW3fMTkffHtzGpBkltnc7JRqMJP1g/ >>>> FdYV3pwkvxEY5kVXNmeFZDpb54EgqAgYjwDGLtm6/aGXJcTTWrYr1hB2he6mgOIX >>>> OJTKcSpjsE7gmu3Lf4AFoPv6g5zFTjsi3rbVRD3W+ClEskrcGFGYi9GFXTdnOP8= >>>> =xiAV >>>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Messaging mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Christine Corbett Moran >>> [email protected] >>> +1 (617) 398-0452 >>> www.christinecorbettmoran.com > > > > -- > Christine Corbett Moran > [email protected] > +1 (617) 398-0452 > www.christinecorbettmoran.com
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