One clarification: Ending conversations in OTR does have everything to do with deniability and specifically forgeabilitty, since the end algorithm publishes information that makes the ended conversation forgeable (and thus 'deniable').
Forward secrecy in OTR is not thanks to the end step, but rather is provided through a perpetual re-agreement on new session keys as part of the regular messages sent by the two OTR chat participants. NK Sent from my BlackBerry Original Message From: Nikita Borisov Sent: Thursday, December 11, 2014 9:54 AM Cc: messaging Subject: Re: [messaging] Value of deniability On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 6:50 PM, Eleanor Saitta <[email protected]> wrote: > Ending conversations in OTR is specifically a piece of user > interaction that is only required due to the deniability component, > correct? If I recall correctly, this is actually important for forward secrecy, not deniability, since ending a conversation allows you to discard decryption keys. - Nikita -- Nikita Borisov - http://hatswitch.org/~nikita/ Associate Professor, Electrical and Computer Engineering Tel: +1 (217) 244-5385, Office: 460 CSL _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging _______________________________________________ Messaging mailing list [email protected] https://moderncrypto.org/mailman/listinfo/messaging
