On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 9:05 PM, noah pugsley <noah.pugs...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 12:40 PM, Theo de Raadt <dera...@cvs.openbsd.org
> >wrote:
>
> > > On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 15:09, Mike Small wrote:
> > > > nobody <openbsd.as.a.desk...@gmail.com> writes:
> > > >
> > > >> "read overrun, so ASLR won't save you"
> > > >
> > > > What if malloc's "G" option were turned on? You know, assuming the
> > > > subset of the worlds' programs you use is good enough to run with
> that.
> > >
> > > No. OpenSSL has exploit mitigation countermeasures to make sure it's
> > > exploitable.
> >
> > What Ted is saying may sound like a joke...
> >
> > So years ago we added exploit mitigations counter measures to libc
> > malloc and mmap, so that a variety of bugs can be exposed.  Such
> > memory accesses will cause an immediate crash, or even a core dump,
> > then the bug can be analyed, and fixed forever.
> >
> > Some other debugging toolkits get them too.  To a large extent these
> > come with almost no performance cost.
> >
> > But around that time OpenSSL adds a wrapper around malloc & free so
> > that the library will cache memory on it's own, and not free it to the
> > protective malloc.
> >
> > You can find the comment in their sources ...
> >
> > #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
> >  /* On some platforms, malloc() performance is bad enough that you can't
> > just
> >
> >
> > OH, because SOME platforms have slow performance, it means even if you
> > build protective technology into malloc() and free(), it will be
> > ineffective.  On ALL PLATFORMS, because that option is the default,
> > and Ted's tests show you can't turn it off because they haven't tested
> > without it in ages.
> >
> > So then a bug shows up which leaks the content of memory mishandled by
> > that layer.  If the memoory had been properly returned via free, it
> > would likely have been handed to munmap, and triggered a daemon crash
> > instead of leaking your keys.
> >
> > OpenSSL is not developed by a responsible team.
> >
> >
> >
> Perhaps it's a great time to kickstart an OpenOpenSSL replacement, a la
> bgpd, ospfd, smtpd et al? Now, I don't have the skills or the guts, but I
> do have $5 on it. Anybody else?
>
>
i which this : https://polarssl.org was open and inside the base

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