Ted Unangst:
> If an adversary gains possession of your hard drive and gives it back to you,
> throw it away.

li...@wrant.com:
> The advice Ted gives is much more than simply correct, it can further
> be extended to "do NOT accept electronics from people you don't know":

Now think about the electronic devices that you bought from people you
don't know, produced by people you don't know using design that is known
only by people you don't know [maybe s/know/trust/g].
At the moment we have only small bits of verifiable hardware/OSHW so
it's impossible to have "one solution" that covers all the threat
models, unfortunately. One should consider their threat models
exaggerating their "depth" to allow the moving towards free hardware.

Moving your bootloader away from semi-trusted encrypted drive is going
to defend you against EvilMaid and friends by *some adversaries* and
within *some threat models*.

--
Ivan Markin

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