Ted Unangst: > If an adversary gains possession of your hard drive and gives it back to you, > throw it away.
li...@wrant.com: > The advice Ted gives is much more than simply correct, it can further > be extended to "do NOT accept electronics from people you don't know": Now think about the electronic devices that you bought from people you don't know, produced by people you don't know using design that is known only by people you don't know [maybe s/know/trust/g]. At the moment we have only small bits of verifiable hardware/OSHW so it's impossible to have "one solution" that covers all the threat models, unfortunately. One should consider their threat models exaggerating their "depth" to allow the moving towards free hardware. Moving your bootloader away from semi-trusted encrypted drive is going to defend you against EvilMaid and friends by *some adversaries* and within *some threat models*. -- Ivan Markin