Just a quick one, as I really don't think we're all conflicting that much. The winning shot needs changing by the addition of a simple word:
"The Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgements are essentially assertions of [social] value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the world, then moral judgements are the fundamental ground-stuff of the world."  (Lila Ch. 12--end)
 
And there you have it. The Metaphysics doesn't help us make ethical decisions, the Quality does. And it's a Metaphysics of Quality, not a Metaphysics of Morality. Perhaps a brief example will help - it is of biologically high quality that I eat more than just bread and water, although I can survive on bread and water. It is of socially high quality that I don't kill people. Morals only applies to the latter example. So, and this was my original point, although it may have got lost in my overheatedness, application of the Metaphysics of Quality doesn't help in ethical discussions, he doesn't say anything new in this field.
 
Perhaps you can show me how this affects my acceptance that QUALITY is reality, or my acceptance of the Dynamic-static cut over the subject-object one. I can't see how subjects or objects comes into this. And yes, making Quality reality was different and new, but as I think Pirsig says in Lila, the Metaphysics of Quality just gives a better way of phrasing things (as in the whole quantum atoms description)
 
Regards,
Simon
 
ps. I actually do need some new sunglases, my lenses need changing. Ironic?

----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, May 30, 2001 5:23 PM
Subject: Re: MD md death penalty

Platt, it's not just you.

Simon:

I'm, well, completely flabergasted.  I guess that's the only word for it.  I didn't know someone could so entirely ride the fence of completely understanding something and totally not getting it, but here we are.

I guess my advice would be to throw out everything you think you know about the MOQ and Pirsig and start all over from the beginning.  Because you're right, your understanding of the MOQ doesn't help anybody.

The thing that Pirsig does that's "new" and Dynamic, if I had to name one thing, is his placement of Quality as Reality.  Quality is reality.  That's it.  Game over.  That's the coolest thing I've ever seen done in metaphysics.

What this does is make values create reality.  (Or at least objects. Lila Ch 8--beginning)  Quality and values.  We sense Quality all around us and our values interpret the way we sense Quality.  Now here's the kicker; here's the home run over the fence and apparently the paragraph you missed:
"The Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgements are essentially assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the world, then moral judgements are the fundamental ground-stuff of the world."  (Lila Ch. 12--end)

Pirsig is not trying to fundamentally change what morality/ethics means.  He's showing that what they fuandamentally mean (assertions of value) is interpreted differently and better than the conventional, full-blown definition of morality/ethics (socio-bio code).

I'm sorry if I'm coming across harsh or mean.  The problem is that you've missed Pirsig's whole point, even the point of ZAMM:  subjects and objects are just one way to cut up reality.  You've got to take off the sunglasses that society has given you (and that you, like all of us, admit to wearing) and start looking at the world in a different way.  Each way is arbitrary.  Yes, that is what I'm saying.  The Dynamic-static division is just as arbitrary as the subject-object.  "The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience, and economy of explanation." (Ch. 8--beginning)

The only "real" thing that we can be sure of is Quality.  We know it's there.  We can sense it.  We experience it.

In the Humility of One Who Knows (With His Tongue in His Cheek),

Matt

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