Are there adequate assurances that some pretender cannot cause
another person's cert to be revoked?
I disagree with this criterion. This type of attack does not permit the attacker to mislead the user of Mozilla, so should not be considered in deciding whether or not to trust the CA. It is only appropriate to consider when deciding which CA to use to obtain one's own certs.
6. Will the revocation information be available in a timely fashion to
people who depend on these certificates?
How is revocation information made available?
- Are Certificate Revocation Lists available for web servers?
- Are OCSP servers available for use by web clients?
Until Mozilla enables OCSP and/or automatic CRL downloads by default, these criteria are not particularly relevant.
7. Are the revocation servers available 24 x 7 x 365 ?
Do they keep running even when the city's public utility stops
delivering power?
Do they have a UPS that can keep them up 24 hours or more?
Will they survive an earthquake or a tsunami?
This doesn't seem to be a very likely attack. One has to obtain a compromised cert/key, wait for a disaster, then attack. Or somehow compromise the cert during the disaster.
There are much easier ways to attack the PKI. Requiring earthquake-proof revocation servers is a bit over the top.
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