Requiring earthquake-proof revocation servers is a bit over the top.
I agree with that statement.
I wouldn't expect every CA to score 100% on all questions I asked, but scoring zero on most or all is clearly not acceptable.
At least SOME form of revocation is necessary. Mozilla will fetch CRLs or OCSP if you enable it.
And a CA whose root private key is sitting in a PEM file or PKCS8 file on some server's disk is just begging for attack. That may be acceptable risk for an SSL server whose cert is revocable, but not for a root CA's private key.
The think many readers of this discussion may have never before considered some of the security issues I raised. I hope this will at least make them think a bit.
-- Nelson B
_______________________________________________ mozilla-crypto mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-crypto
