On Sat, 4 May 2002, Forrest W. Christian wrote:
> Anyone who thinks that government can pass a law and this will go away is > hopelessly naieve. The spammers will go overseas. Besides, if you look The spammers already use non-US machines in various ways to disguise their (still predominately) US origin. > been reported to the razor. rbldns lists are effective only against the > worst offenders, as the rest don't get reported until it is too late. > and so on. Hrm, I'm thinking that the focus is slightly off (ie, rejection doesn't have to occur solely at the message delivery stage); assuming that you had custom software, you could conceiveably get a real time feed of spam/open relays/other criteria and periodically check your mail that-you-have-received-but-not-yet-read against any new updates to further get rid of more spam. If you've got a few million subscribers who would be further annoyed at spam/your abuse desk in receiving spam, this would possibly be productive. > I think the only other methods I can think of are best described as some > sort of "web of trust" type method. These are essentially whitelist > systems. In order to send me mail you have to *do* something. How long before mailing list exploders are forced to only accept pgp-signed/encrypted mail from its subscribers, and re-pgp-sign/encrypt it when sending to subscribers ? --==-- Bruce.