> On Sep 18, 2018, at 11:06 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.li...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 10:36 AM Job Snijders <j...@ntt.net > <mailto:j...@ntt.net>> wrote: > Owen, > > On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 10:23:42AM -0700, Owen DeLong wrote: > > Personally, since all RPKI accomplishes is providing a > > cryptographically signed notation of origin ASNs that hijackers should > > prepend to their announcements in order to create an aura of > > credibility, I think we should stop throwing resources down this > > rathole. > I think you underestimate how valuable RPKI based Origin Validation > (even just by itself) is in today's Internet landscape. > > If you are aware of other efforts or more fruitful approaches please let > us know. > > > Perhaps said another way: > > "How would you figure out what prefixes your bgp peer(s) should be sending > you?" > (in an automatable, and verifiable manner) > > -chris
In theory, that’s what IRRs are for. In practice, while they offer better theoretical capabilities if stronger authentication were added, the current implementation and acceptance leaves much to be desired. However, even in theory, RPKI offers nothing of particular benefit even in its best case of widespread implementation. Owen
