> On Sep 18, 2018, at 3:04 PM, Owen DeLong <o...@delong.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>> On Sep 18, 2018, at 11:06 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.li...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 10:36 AM Job Snijders <j...@ntt.net> wrote:
>> Owen,
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 10:23:42AM -0700, Owen DeLong wrote:
>> > Personally, since all RPKI accomplishes is providing a
>> > cryptographically signed notation of origin ASNs that hijackers should
>> > prepend to their announcements in order to create an aura of
>> > credibility, I think we should stop throwing resources down this
>> > rathole.
>> I think you underestimate how valuable RPKI based Origin Validation
>> (even just by itself) is in today's Internet landscape.
>>
>> If you are aware of other efforts or more fruitful approaches please let
>> us know.
>>
>>
>> Perhaps said another way:
>>
>> "How would you figure out what prefixes your bgp peer(s) should be sending
>> you?"
>> (in an automatable, and verifiable manner)
>>
>> -chris
>
> In theory, that’s what IRRs are for.
>
> In practice, while they offer better theoretical capabilities if stronger
> authentication were added, the current implementation and acceptance leaves
> much to be desired.
Judging a global ecosystem just by what ARIN does is perhaps some of the issue.
ARIN seems to be the outlier here as has been measured. An ARIN prefix ROA is
less valuable than the other regions and this is IMO deliberate on the part of
ARIN.
> However, even in theory, RPKI offers nothing of particular benefit even in
> its best case of widespread implementation.
Disagree, but that’s ok. I know at $dayJob I’m preparing the way, but it’s
much harder than it should be due to the nature of our business.
- Jared
