While we're at it, a couple of things. I remember visiting Minsky at his house once; his kids were on roller-skates in the kitchen. More to the point, the formal neuron theory he developed led to a lot of bad politics, and I'm pretty sure the model was abandoned. That was a long time ago... Society of Mind also reminds me of Howard Gardner's multiple intelligences theory - and strangely enough he went to the same highschool I did, Wyoming Seminary in Kingston, PA. Weird worlds within and without the computer -
Best, Alan On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 11:21 PM Paul Hertz via NetBehaviour < netbehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org> wrote: > Somewhat in haste... > > AI in the late 80s, when Brooks wrote his essay, was apparently in crisis. > The efficacy of the models promoted by Marvin Minksy and other researchers > pursuing the sort of data-driven "expert systems" were already being > questioned. There were other models, as Alan mentions. Then too there were > subsystems that worked pretty well, out of which such fields as computer > vision and neural networks developed. N. Katherine Hayles examines some of > the history of AI and "artificial life" in her book How We Became > Post-Human, a mix of history of science and literary critique. She makes > the point, anent the confusion as to what "artificial intelligence" means, > that it was particularly intended as a phrase to pull in money for > research, as was "artificial life". Which isn't to say that a great deal of > research didn't get done, some of it very successful in the long run. Just > that the resounding phrase was never meant to be definitive. > > Minsky's book The Society of Mind may be worth reading. I had the pleasure > of hearing him lecture many years ago. He may have been wrong about the > nature of the mind--he thought a mind could be stored on a hard drive--but > the nature of research is that it's frequently wrong. > > -- Paul > > > > On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 10:01 PM Alan Sondheim via NetBehaviour < > netbehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org> wrote: > >> >> Just briefly, want to point out that this was the same or similar idea >> that Terry Winograd had in relation to natural language processing, that >> the computer needed something to talk about, hence Blocksworld (if I >> remember correctly). Winograd is extremely interesting through this early >> work but also his later holistic thinking - >> See 1972. *Understanding Natural Language* Academic Press, New York, as >> well as >> 1986. *Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for >> Design* (with Fernando Flores >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fernando_Flores>) Ablex Publ Corp. >> Note the dates. AI thinking, one way or another, circulates among the >> tropes of reality, real, imaginary, machinic, machinic desire, cyborgs, and >> so forth; this continues all the way to the present. >> Best Alan >> >> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 9:51 PM Max Herman via NetBehaviour < >> netbehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org> wrote: >> >>> >>> Hi Paul, >>> >>> Interesting essay! It sounds like the author thinks the AI entity or >>> "creature" as he calls it needs to navigate a real environment and performs >>> tasks in it in order to "learn," rather than make a detailed map or >>> representation then logically deduce solutions from that. That makes sense >>> to me but I have no idea how it relates to the AI field overall; is it >>> still a current approach now 30+ years later? It sounds like the Morris >>> film would illuminate the matter so I will check it out, but moreso I'd be >>> interested to hear what others who know and work with AI might think. >>> >>> One interesting point Brooks makes is about the necessity of visual >>> perception as a basic ingredient of a learning intelligence. Leonardo >>> wrote about how knowledge and learning took form in humans by a mix of >>> visual perception, processing of the visual data by imagination (that can >>> include verbal imagination) and the "sensus communis" that blends inbound >>> modes of perception like hearing, sight, smell, etc. together, then storage >>> of the processed information in memory for later use or disuse. A crude >>> schema to be sure but it reflects something like the see/assess/act cycle >>> Brooks suggests. >>> >>> Just from an art standpoint (as perhaps one could call it) I can see the >>> relevance of blending for visual and verbal imagination as something like a >>> "braided" flow of analogy in real time. This is kind of what Hofstadter >>> alluded to in his book's subtitle "*Godel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal >>> Golden Braid*," and what perhaps Mitchell is suggesting in the Quanta >>> article. Calvino saw visual and verbal imagination intertwined both as the >>> information is perceived and as it is created or expressed. This would >>> also make sense if you think of a primate or hominin group seeing things, >>> comparing the information to memory, discussing what they saw, pointing at >>> comparable things to communicate visual imagery or even drawing in the sand >>> with a twig or finger, on a stone with charcoal, etc., with simple drawings >>> eventually morphing into words or letters, everything permutating all the >>> time and all driven by the necessary and physical acts of finding water, >>> finding food, escaping predators, migrating, grooming, reproducing, i.e. >>> continual physical movement interrupted occasionally by sleep which is also >>> a kind of movement I guess. >>> >>> It's almost certainly a mirage, but I see this cyclical idea of seeing >>> and doing as the fundamental structure of the painting I used to call the >>> *Mona >>> Lisa* but now am experimenting with calling *Esperienza *(as I >>> speculate Leonardo may have titled it to himself, but chose to leave >>> unspoken and unwritten so as to "require work" of a specific sort from >>> later viewers). >>> >>> "Esperienza" means experience, as in the noun meaning stored >>> information, and the verb meaning to be aware of something in the present. >>> However it also means "experiment" as in science and arguably art, a >>> premeditated yet improvisational action designed to do or see something not >>> previously understood. These dual meanings illustrate the more passive >>> process of seeing, hearing, or otherwise absorbing information and the >>> active process of expressing, testing, or applying information on a partly >>> improvised basis. Things are blurred of course but there is a parallel >>> cycle of seeing/doing, seeing/doing, and so forth. Graziano's mention of >>> necessity also may relate to Brooks'. Not sure if this diagram of where >>> and how "representation" should occur conforms to what Brooks is saying but >>> it seems it might. >>> >>> As to "natural" versus "artificial" intelligence my lack of education >>> about the field makes me want to avoid the question by asking if a >>> naturally evolved organism may evolve to make art, or engage in artifice as >>> a behavior, or have an artificing intelligence. If so, what then? >>> Leonardo writes in confusing aphorisms about the relationships among Art, >>> Nature, and Humanity, sort of knotting them all together dynamically >>> without saying they are the same. Humans are part of Nature, but we also >>> make Art; in our Art we can sometimes choose to either follow the guidance >>> of Nature or reject it; our Art choices can cause horrific waste and >>> destruction or support human and other natural ecosystems. He built robots >>> that did things like give people flowers, and I'm sure he had a sense of >>> how the robot looks like it is giving the person flowers but really is just >>> a collection of gears and pulleys running their courses. >>> >>> "Artificial" intelligence implies that the intelligence is a product of >>> artifice, that it has been artificed, not that it is an artificer or >>> "Artificing Intelligence," though the Daedalus AI event mentioned recently >>> may see it both ways. I do get confused whether words are being used >>> misleadingly about AI, and whether what is really meant by AI is "an >>> artificed non-intelligent machine that does or makes things that look like >>> the products of an intelligence but actually are not." In which case, why >>> not call it "artificial artificing," or "machines that make information," >>> or "machines that make machines that make information," rather than >>> "artificial intelligence"? All in all I find it too tiring to really >>> understand in any depth! 🙂 Should we even distinguish between >>> "Conscious Intelligence" and "Non-Conscious Intelligence"? Seems a waste. >>> >>> I do actually think Leonardo cared about such questions and may even >>> have considered the eventual possibility of machines that make >>> information. He had serious reservations about the printing press for >>> example, which separated the written word from the body that wrote it and >>> in a sense destroyed an essential aspect of its information. >>> (Coincidentally, he tried to invent a way of printing a page with >>> handwriting and drawing on it, but didn't succeed, and it wasn't until >>> Blake that such a tech was found.) Leonardo distrusted the value of >>> automation, and saw informational institutions (like the academy, political >>> entities, etc.) as in some ways gigantic photocopiers that reproduced >>> duplicate information without having any awareness whether the information >>> was real, true, relevant, or even what it was. He described this as >>> "authorities who can only repeat what they have read in books but cannot >>> create or discover anything directly themselves" (I paraphrase), or really, >>> even "see" anything. Would such people be, in the practical sense, a form >>> of Artificial Intelligence? >>> >>> It seems to me that as a highly practical person by necessity, i.e. a >>> free-lancer wherever he could make something useful, Leonardo often tried >>> to "cut to the chase" rather than explain ad infinitum. So, I find it >>> entirely plausible that he may have encapsulated his take on all this in >>> his allegory of *Esperienza, *which he wrote down in story form, as the >>> source and guide he used to "make his own clothes" -- his metaphor -- >>> artistically and scientifically speaking rather than just wearing what was >>> handed down as his critics did. Might he not have also tried to paint such >>> an allegory, after having written it, of a human intelligence in a >>> technological environment following principles of nature to create its own >>> garment? This is what I see in Esperienza's ever-so-slightly pointing >>> right index finger: a pen or brush creating image or symbol, or even just >>> drawing a line in dust without an instrument as the earliest writers and >>> artists may have done, the simplest synapse of human artifice. >>> >>> Leonardo did write that all the arts and sciences -- math, engineering, >>> painting, drawing, music, writing -- derive from the making of line, and he >>> defined the very first art ever created using the traditional legend of a >>> person tracing the line of their shadow. This may be a kind of analogy, or >>> analogue, or analog "line that makes an image" and not much at all like >>> what computer or digital intelligence does. Unfortunately "digit" means >>> finger, so maybe "binary digital intelligence" is the necessary term! >>> >>> I think that may actually be a much better term from my >>> not-at-all-expert point of view: Computer Intelligence, CI, or Digital >>> Intelligence, DI, not Artificial Intelligence. Maybe the whole mess is >>> just a result of a typo or verbal tic! After all, birds artifice their >>> songs and their nests but we would never dream of calling them Artificial >>> Intelligence. And kind of by definition, intelligence is that which >>> artifices and not that which can be passively artificed, so artificial is >>> grammatically flawed (maybe too impulsively borrowed from "artificial >>> color" and "artificial flavor" which were very prevalent terms back in >>> those days). Paintings are artificial, to be sure, and replicate >>> information, but do we call what they do "Artificial Intelligence"? Maybe >>> we could, I don't know. If we did though it would soon become panpsychism >>> perhaps where emails have their own intelligence, CD's, newspapers, etc.; >>> we kind of already ascribe this to our phones automatically. "Pencil >>> Intelligence"? "Paper Intelligence"? >>> >>> Furthermore, we know not all that artifices is intelligent, like a >>> coffee maker. Organic Intelligence? Inorganic Intelligence? And if there >>> ever were a Brooks-type machine that interacted with the world and became >>> able to do everything human intelligence can do might we not have to call >>> such an entity a natural form of intelligence? Confusinger and >>> confusinger. Norbert Wiener declared a distinction between human and >>> machine intelligence though and I think that's fair enough. >>> >>> All best, >>> >>> Max >>> >>> >>> PS -- I'm sure I've made 27 complete errors in the above, please feel >>> free to point out! 🙂 >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* Paul Hertz <igno...@gmail.com> >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, July 14, 2021 2:36 PM >>> *To:* NetBehaviour for networked distributed creativity < >>> netbehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org> >>> *Cc:* Max Herman <maxnmher...@hotmail.com> >>> *Subject:* Re: [NetBehaviour] analogy and AI poetry >>> >>> There's an essay, "Intelligence Without Representation" that Brooks >>> wrote in 1987, >>> http://people.csail.mit.edu/brooks/papers/representation.pdf, that >>> offered what was then a new point of view on how to consider AI. >>> >>> // Paul >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 2:10 PM Paul Hertz <igno...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Max, >>> >>> The robotics researcher Rodney Brooks back in the late 1980s argued the >>> AI based on the construction of a "knowledge base" was bound to fail. He >>> made the case that a robot adapting to an environment was far more likely >>> to achieve intelligence of the sort that humans demonstrate precisely >>> because it was embodied. Some of his ideas are presented in the movie Fast, >>> Cheap, and Out of Control, directed ISTR by Errol Morris. If you haven't >>> seen it yet, I can recommend it. >>> >>> -- Paul >>> >>> On Wed, Jul 14, 2021, 1:38 PM Max Herman via NetBehaviour < >>> netbehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> I know virtually nothing about AI, beyond what the letters stand for, >>> but noticed this new article in Quanta Magazine. Does it pertain at all? >>> Interestingly it concludes that in order for AI to be human-like it will >>> need to understand analogy, the basis of abstraction, which may require it >>> to have a body! 🙂 >>> >>> >>> https://www.quantamagazine.org/melanie-mitchell-trains-ai-to-think-with-analogies-20210714/?mc_cid=362710ae88&mc_eid=df8a5187d9 >>> >>> I have been interested in the book *GEB *by Hofstadter for some time, >>> and have been researching how it was referenced (specifically its Chapter >>> IV "Consistency, Completeness, and Geometry" and its Introduction) by Italo >>> Calvino in *Six Memos for the Next Millennium*, so Mitchell's >>> connection to Hofstadter and *GEB *is interesting on a general level. >>> >>> Coincidentally I contacted her a year ago to ask about the Calvino >>> connection but she replied she hadn't read any Calvino or the *Six >>> Memos*. However, his titles for the six memos -- Lightness, Quickness, >>> Exactitude, Visibility, Multiplicity, and Consistency -- might be exactly >>> the kinds of "bodily" senses AI will need to have! >>> >>> All best, >>> >>> Max >>> >>> https://www.etymonline.com/word/analogy >>> https://www.etymonline.com/word/analogue >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> NetBehaviour mailing list >>> NetBehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org >>> https://lists.netbehaviour.org/mailman/listinfo/netbehaviour >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> ----- |(*,+,#,=)(#,=,*,+)(=,#,+,*)(+,*,=,#)| --- >>> http://paulhertz.net/ >>> _______________________________________________ >>> NetBehaviour mailing list >>> NetBehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org >>> https://lists.netbehaviour.org/mailman/listinfo/netbehaviour >>> >> >> >> -- >> *=====================================================* >> >> *directory http://www.alansondheim.org <http://www.alansondheim.org> tel >> 718-813-3285**email sondheim ut panix.com <http://panix.com>, sondheim >> ut gmail.com <http://gmail.com>* >> *=====================================================* >> _______________________________________________ >> NetBehaviour mailing list >> NetBehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org >> https://lists.netbehaviour.org/mailman/listinfo/netbehaviour >> > > > -- > ----- |(*,+,#,=)(#,=,*,+)(=,#,+,*)(+,*,=,#)| --- > http://paulhertz.net/ > _______________________________________________ > NetBehaviour mailing list > NetBehaviour@lists.netbehaviour.org > https://lists.netbehaviour.org/mailman/listinfo/netbehaviour > -- *=====================================================* *directory http://www.alansondheim.org <http://www.alansondheim.org> tel 718-813-3285**email sondheim ut panix.com <http://panix.com>, sondheim ut gmail.com <http://gmail.com>* *=====================================================*
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