Hi, Roman: Please review the diff and see if your comments are addressed and your DISCUSS can be cleared. https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-15 Thanks!
-Qin -----邮件原件----- 发件人: Qin Wu 发送时间: 2020年4月26日 11:00 收件人: 'Rob Wilton (rwilton)' <rwil...@cisco.com>; Roman Danyliw <r...@cert.org> 抄送: netmod-cha...@ietf.org; Kent Watsen <kent+i...@watsen.net>; draft-ietf-netmod-factory-defa...@ietf.org; netmod@ietf.org; The IESG <i...@ietf.org> 主题: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) -----邮件原件----- 发件人: Rob Wilton (rwilton) [mailto:rwil...@cisco.com] 发送时间: 2020年4月25日 0:54 收件人: Qin Wu <bill...@huawei.com>; Roman Danyliw <r...@cert.org> 抄送: netmod-cha...@ietf.org; Kent Watsen <kent+i...@watsen.net>; draft-ietf-netmod-factory-defa...@ietf.org; netmod@ietf.org; The IESG <i...@ietf.org> 主题: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) Hi Qin, This document was discussed today. I think that Roman plans to follow up regarding the security considerations discuss. From the discussion today, and reading the Discuss, my understanding is that Roman has two concerns that are more about the specific text than the use of the template: 1) Concerns read access to the factory-default datastore which could contain sensitive information. Perhaps read access to that datastore should default to nacm:default-deny-all? If so, then this should probably be documented in section 3, with a sentence in section 6 to explain that is how it is protected. [Qin]: Please See Jurgen and Andy's comment in this thread, I agree with Jurgen we should treat factory in the same way as running and other datastores. If any text is needed, I could add a few text in the section 6 based on the discussion in this thread: " Access to the "factory-reset" RPC operation and factory default values of all configuration data nodes within "factory-default" datastore is considered sensitive and therefore has been restricted using the "default-deny-all" access control defined in [RFC8341]. " 2) The second point is asking to expand this paragraph: The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory default contents varies greatly depending on the implementation and current config. Such that the description also covers "Please note that a default configuration could be insecure or not have security controls enabled whereby exposing the network to compromise." [Qin]:So we will see exposing factory default configuration to the network to compromise also as one kind of operational disruption, if this is true, here is the proposed change: OLD TEXT: " The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory default contents varies greatly depending on the implementation and current config. " NEW TEXT: " The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory default contents or lacking appropriate security control on factory default configuration varies greatly depending on the implementation and current config. " If not, please advise. I see that you are already addressing the other comments that have been raised. Regards, Rob > -----Original Message----- > From: iesg <iesg-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Qin Wu > Sent: 21 April 2020 14:20 > To: Roman Danyliw <r...@cert.org>; The IESG <i...@ietf.org> > Cc: netmod-cha...@ietf.org; Kent Watsen <kent+i...@watsen.net>; draft- > ietf-netmod-factory-defa...@ietf.org; netmod@ietf.org > Subject: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on > draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default- > 14: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > Hi, Roman: > A few clarification inline below. > -----邮件原件----- > 发件人: Roman Danyliw via Datatracker [mailto:nore...@ietf.org] > 发送时间: 2020年4月21日 20:52 > 收件人: The IESG <i...@ietf.org> > 抄送: draft-ietf-netmod-factory-defa...@ietf.org; > netmod-cha...@ietf.org; netmod@ietf.org; Kent Watsen > <kent+i...@watsen.net>; kent+i...@watsen.net > 主题: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: > (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: Discuss > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut > this introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > DISCUSS: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Please use YANG security considerations template from > https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-security-guidelines. > Specifically (as a DISCUSS item): > > ** (Per the template questions “for all YANG modules you must evaluate > whether any readable data”) Would factory-default contain any > sensitive information in certain network environments where the ACLs > should be more restrictive that world readable for everyone? > [Qin]: It does follows yang-security-guidelines but there is no > readable data node defined within rpc, that's why we don't use third > paragraph boilerplate and fourth paragraph boilerplate of > yang-security-guidelines. > YANG-security-guidelines are more applicable to YANG data model with > more readable/writable data nodes. > In addition, as clarified in the second paragraph, section 6 of this > draft, NACM can be used to restrict access for particular NETCONF or > RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or > RESTCONF protocol operations (i.e., factory-reset rpc) > > Per “The operational disruption caused by setting the config to > factory default contents varies greatly depending on the > implementation and current config”, it seems like it could be worse > than just an operational disruption. Please note that a default > configuration could be insecure or not have security controls enabled > whereby exposing the network to compromise. > > [Qin]: As described in the second paragraph of section 6 it by default > restrict access for everyone by using the "default-deny-all" access > control defined [RFC8341], what else does it need to address this > security concern? > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Please use YANG security considerations template from > https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-security-guidelines. > Specifically (as a COMMENT item): > > ** Add “The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) > [RFC8341] provides the means to …” > > [Qin]: We did follow this template, I am wondering how it is different > from the second paragraph of section 6? I see they are equivalent but > with more fine granularity security measures, if my understanding is correct. _______________________________________________ netmod mailing list netmod@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netmod
