Prem, it is good to hear from you. It's obvious you have a lot to say about all this. I would like to hear more on some points.
First I totally get it that the Pax Americana is a cover for US hegemony and how it has become a glaring fact. You say that to overcome it "we would need a frank and realistic accounting for the history of hegemony since World War II." I'm totally curious about that and wonder if you perceive a particularly strong narrative like that in India, or beyond, in Asia or in other transnational circuits? As I imagine you know there are mountains of books about that here in USA (I'm an aficionado of such literature) and the antiwar left has a readymade read of that history; but I know from traveling and speaking other languages that people on the receiving end of empire often understand it better than those who willingly or unwillingly do the giving. Could US/Western hegemony become the theme of a social movement? Well, so far in the US there is a big move to understand how colonialism and slavery shaped social relations and even the landscape. That movement is led by Black, Indigenous and Latinx intellectuals, and no one knows how far it is going to go. Having the big newspapers report which of the "founding fathers" of the "land of the free" owned slaves is no small thing, a war in itself. But what could be on the table, and isn't yet, is the understanding of US foreign policy and economic power over the last century, what they do, how they shape the world. I think the misuse of power by the US, since WWII and more specifically since the Nineties, is a direct reflection and integral part of unjust and poisonous class/race relations in the domestic sphere. So there is a potential to go very far with that critique. However no viewpoint of that sort makes it out into the broad public sphere, which is structured to exclude any outside reference. So I understand your lack of optimism. Going further into your argument, Prem, I have a for and an against. I am for the recognition that Nato and "the West" cannot rule anymore by edict, there is no legitimacy for that, no one will bear it. Reading between the lines, I sense you may be saying that great Asian or Eurasian societies such as China, India and Russia have to be recognized as such, on a par with Europe and separately with America, I mean as civilizations that chart a unique course and can't be compelled by force, but instead need to engage with each other through some kind of diplomacy. I am for that too, it's the idea that there is no one superpower -- or rather, to some extent there still is, and it's unjust and dangerous. In the present instance, one would have to account for things such as the very real financial devastation unleashed by the so-called "Asian Crisis" of 1997-98, which people in Russia experienced as the one-two punch of the capitalist system, coming right after the "reforms" of the early Nineties. As I recall, that crisis wiped out all sorts of fixed-capital formation in South Korea, Russia and Brazil especially, but it had basically no impact on the US itself, nor particularly in Europe. There is a kind of violence, emanating from the US but also the EU, that is real and people in the old imperial centers need to know it, so that they can change their politics. Here's the thing though. Should Nato really have denied entry to all those Eastern European states that requested it? Remember that most of those states, they had been taken over but not absorbed by the Soviet Union. They lived for decades under significant degrees of political repression. Did they have a valid reason to want to join Nato after 1989? Looking at the brutality of the current war, it seems suddenly obvious to me that they did -- and by the same token, I have suddenly become less certain of what I always used to say, that Nato is an imperialist war machine that should be disbanded. Russia is also an imperialist war machine, for sure (and the two owe each other a lot). But maybe China is also an imperial war machine? And India, maybe not yet? Well, at this point I have no idea and would all the more like to hear your insights, Prem. The big question for me is how to get a rules-based international order out of a glut of imperial war machines. It's a serious one, and since the glorious leaders of our glorious empires aren't talking about it, we should. warmly, Brian On Wed, Mar 9, 2022 at 12:40 AM Prem Chandavarkar <prem....@gmail.com> wrote: > The fearful scenarios you lay out are all highly plausible, and will > dominate till Putin is given greater options by considering a wider history > of hegemony in which the US is highly complicit: > > - In 1990, shortly after the Berlin Wall had fallen, and the Soviet > Union was beginning to disintegrate, US Secretary of State James Baker had > a conversation with Gorbachev in which he suggested the Soviet Union should > support German unification in return for a guarantee that NATO would not > expand an inch eastward. On Baker’s return to the US, this option was > rejected by George H.W. Bush. > - NATO’s eastward expansion is bound to be a sensitive matter for > Russia’s security. The Cold War established the history of Russia having a > hostile frontier to the east, a vulnerability that increased once the > buffer of the Warsaw Pact counties disintegrated in the early 90’s. Russia, > on its eastern front, is one large plain with no natural defence features > such as a mountain range or ocean, so the buffer between its heartland and > this hostile frontier is a major concern. > - Since the 1990’s, NATO has been on a major expansion spree > eastwards, adding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, > Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, North Macedonia, > Albania and Montenegro. > - This was bound to evoke a reaction from Russia, with Ukraine likely > to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. This was foreseen 12 years ago > by William Burns (then US Ambassador to Russia and current CIA Director) > who wrote in a confidential cable (released by WikiLeaks), *"**Ukraine > and Georgia’s NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they > engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the > region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to > undermine Russia’s influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable > and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security > interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the > strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the > ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, > involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia > would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want > to have to face.”* > - As Siddharth Varadarajan pointed out in The Wire (a digital media > publication in India), *“If Ukraine is to Russia today what Cuba was > to the US during the missile crisis of 1962 (when it allowed the stationing > of Russian nuclear weapons on its soil), then its resort to force – > reprehensible though it undoubtedly is – should not surprise us. Putin’s > ‘special military operation’ is as much the handiwork of a deranged leader > as Kennedy’s illegal ‘quarantine’ of Cuban ports was."* > - NATO’s eastward expansion is driven by the Pax Americana project: a > global peace underpinned by global economic, political, and military > dominance of the US. This project is validated by Western governments by > the argument that “we are the good guys”, the ones supporting the quest for > a rule-based international order that has been the aspiration after World > War II. This validation is supported by Western mainstream media, and > largely accepted by the Western public. > - This “we are the good guys” perception is not one that is shared by > most other parts of the world, which sees the US as one of the major > violators of the rule-based International order. Some examples are the > invasion of Iraq in the Second Gulf War, NATO’s bombing of > Yugoslavia, support to Israel’s ruthless annexation of Palestinian > territory, interventions affecting regime change in many parts of Latin > America, long-standing economic sanctions against Cuba; and there are many > more. > - The Pax Americana project is perceived by most of the world as > nothing more than a US quest for global hegemony. This would be felt with > greater acuity by Russia. > - We have now returned to the value-free and rules-free international > environment that existed before World War II, with the addition of a game > changing element of nuclear armed nations. > - Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal under International law, a > violation of the assurances that Russia gave Ukraine as part of the 1994 > Budapest Memorandum, and must be condemned and resisted. But a way out of > the conflict depends on a stronger assurance of a > rule-based International order, > - A precondition for a implementing this is the acceptance that no > single superpower should possess global hegemony. To achieve this, we would > need a frank and realistic accounting for the history of hegemony since > World War II. > - Due to domestic political concerns, it is unlikely that any Western > government will foreground, or even articulate, such a reading of history. > Change is only possible with a people’s movement within the West. Sadly, > one sees little ground for optimism on this count. > > > > On 08-Mar-2022, at 5:50 PM, patrice riemens <patr...@xs4all.nl> wrote: > > ... has already arrived . > > Aloha, > > Even though the last two posts on the list are mine, I have no intention > to become (again) nettime's #1 poster! So this will be my last one for now. > > This said I still wanted to share my thoughts - was it only to be > relieved of them - about 'the situation' with fellow nettimers. > > ExecSum: I think that war in Western Europe is now inevitable, and it will > descend on us sooner than we all would wish for. > > > > In my mind, there are three options about when NATO will actually go to, > or be dragged into a war against Putin's Russia. > > Option Zero: There will be no war. Putin will enslave Ukraine after having > laid it to waste, annex part of it, and transform the rest in a vassal > state, or whatever 'solution' he has in mind after achieving 'victory'. > And 'we' in the West, will accommodate with the new situation and try to > make the best of it, even if it won't be fun at all on many front. And yet > I would feel insanely optimistic if I gave it half a chance of happening - > or even less than that. > > Having put his war machinery in movement, there is no turning back for > Vladimir Putin, save a number of scenarios for his demise that have been > discussed here and there and which are all entirely speculative. So by > keeping it strictly to the current state of the situation, I see only three > possible outcomes, all based on the assumption that the political and > military deciders in the Western alliance (but also outside of it) have by > now concluded that a war can no longer be averted, the only question being > when it will start 'for real'. > > So there are in my mind three 'moments' when NATO will become involved in > an armed conflict with Putin's Russia: > > Moment 1: The situation in Ukraine becomes so dire, the 'Grosnyfication' > of Ukrainian cities so blatant, the masses of refugees into Ukraine's > neighbours, fleeing the violence under the bombs so colossal, that 'in the > West', populations, politicians, media, and even the military brass get so > agitated as to decide that enough is enough - and that 'we will be next' > any way. So there will be more and more support pouring into Ukraine that > will less and less distinguishable from direct military intervention, a > stage that in the eyes of Putin has been passed long ago in any case. > > Moment 2 happens if Putin indeed achieve his goals in Ukraine, at whatever > cost to the Russian and to the Ukrainian people without NATO actually > intervening, it having be paralysed by the fear of consequences Putin has > repeatedly, and unequivocally threatened with. In which case there is no > reason whatsoever to assume he will stop at that and now will go to menace, > and, if unsuccessful, attack both ex-Soviet, but not NATO members Moldova > and Georgia. Russia annexing Moldova will make Romania very angry and very > anxious, doing the same with Georgia will rattle Turkey to an even larger > extent, and greater consequences. And both Romania and Turkey are NATO > members. At which stage the same 'we'll anyway be next' conclusion might > prevail after all ... > > ... or not. Moldova and far-from-Europe (if not from Turkey) Georgia will > be left to their fate of post-Soviet & pre-Imperial vassal states, whether > they have resisted invasion (& be destroyed in the process) or not. Moment > 2 in any case represents a 'between-in' scenario that could be triggered > by the outcome of Moment 1, ... or not, or might just as well merge with > ... > > Moment 3 which will happen when Putin's Russia will directly threaten NATO > countries, arguing yet again that NATO, not Russia, is the 'structural' > aggressor. Unfortunately, the trigger to make it is there, in plain sight, > on the map: it is called the 'Suvalky gap' and it consist in the 90km long > borderline between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian > (semi-)exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast from Russia's vassal Belarus - by now, > and surely by then, a nation in name only. No doubt Putin will demand a > 'corridor' to put an end to this insufferable situation, itself the result > from the evenmore insufferable existence of the formerly Soviet Baltic > states as independent countries. And all NATO members, just as Poland. > > There will be no Czechoslovakia 1939. Having gone that far, the analogy > with the precedent of Nazi Germany will have become too stark. NATO will go > at war. What happens next is for any one and everyone to imagine. > > I am aware that there are a lot of holes that can (and will) be shot in my > presentation. The most obvious one being whether Putin can hold Russia > together as it is dragging it into a fratricidal annihilation war with > Ukraine - with the economic disaster that it entails. And whether he can > hold his power (and even his life) in the face of possible (probable?) > mounting discontent, both of the Russian people and of his own clique. > Beware of the Ides of March (in 6 days time!) and the 'Tu quoque' bit they > say ... but this wishful thinking is surely part of my sentiment, but not > of my reasoning. > > Conclusion: We - and this time without speech marks - are toast. Sorry. > > Cheers all the same, > p+7D! > > > > > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > > > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
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