that's the point. On Sat, 12 Mar 2022 at 08:13, Brian Holmes <bhcontinentaldr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> What is Eurasianism? > > And why should you care about it? > > The short answer is that Eurasianism is the set of strategic questions and > partial answers that have arisen since the center of global economic > gravity shifted away from the Atlantic Ocean, but not toward the > American-dominated Pacific. Today, economic growth is centered somewhere in > the middle of the earth's greatest landmass, what Mackinder called the > "World Island," Eurasia. China occupies the eastern coast of this landmass; > Europe, the western one. The middle is where the questions of Eurasianism > lie. > > OK, presumably you still don't care about it. But consider this: Since > 2015, Russia has established a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) comprising > itself, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Russia has given > direct and significant military support to three of these member states > (with a much less significant incursion into Kyrgyzstan). Ukraine, Moldova > and Georgia were invited to join the EAEU during the planning phase, and > each has attended meetings with observer status; indeed, under pressure > from Russia, the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych suddenly > decided to bring Ukraine into the EAEU in late 2013, before the EuroMaidan > protesters said no. By the time the EAEU got off the ground, Ukraine, > Moldova and Georgia were already dealing with separatist Russian-speaking > enclaves, which had already been supported militarily by Russia, with the > exception (so far as I know) of Transnistria in Moldova. > > Now look at the EAEU on the map (bit.ly/36cejNI): it is a vast space with > enormous mineral and agricultural resources, bridging Europe and China. > Notice the big gap on its western flank: that's Ukraine. The EAEU is the > logical, economically rational version of the mystical quest to revive the > Russky Mir (or of Aleksandr Dugin's equally mystical White Russian > geopolitics). Check out the video of Putin inaugurating a new railroad > bridge to Crimea (bit.ly/366YnfH): this is the pragmatic, methodical > version of what the Western press presents as a fevered medieval dream. The > aim is to constitute an enlarged economic space with internal security > cooperation, able to profit from Chinese high technology and markets, and > willing to support China's positions vis-a-vis the Euro-American world -- > not least by ensuring the flow of energy and mineral resources to the > Middle Kingdom. For sure, the EAEU is not a done deal. Ukraine is the grand > prize that would complete the Eurasian Economic Union. Or would have > completed it, I think/hope one can say. > > If all you're thinking about is Russia's war on Ukraine and if you > believe, like me, that it will ultimately fail at Ukraine's great cost, > then you still may not care about Eurasianism. Yet Putin's rather desperate > bid for Eurasia is made possible by the alliance with China, which has > launched a serious and feasible strategy for Eurasian hegemony, the Belt > and Road initiative. An incredible civilization-building campaign, the Belt > and Road aims to link the development of China's vast West with industrial > modernization programs running throughout Central Asia and into the > maritime region known as "the Indo Pacific." Crucial to this plan is access > to the gigantic European market; and for European countries, Chinese growth > also provides the crucial market. In both cases, that's a > business-to-business market, ie producer sector, and not only a market for > consumer goods (which it also is). The world is tooling up for a new round > of development, maybe its last one, we'll see. The issue at hand, right > now, is not whether Eurasian integration will happen (it's underway), but > how and according to which rule-sets. > > Returning to the war, China has not yet disavowed its recent rapprochement > with Russia and it likely will not, for reasons of economic strategy and > security vis-a-vis "the West." However China's Eurasian strategy is subtle, > far-reaching and largely based on economic cooperation, with (putatively) > win-win outcomes. No one can doubt that China will be the major actor of > Eurasian development, and that it will be the key partner/competitor/enemy > of Europe, the United States, and perhaps first of all, India, whose > significance is also expected to rise dramatically as this century > progresses. This friendly competition between enemies is likely to continue > during war, just as right now, Russian oil and gas keep flowing to the > European Union. > > The above realities mean that in the upcoming global crisis provoked by > energy price inflation - and even more crucially, by shortages of wheat - > "the West" will find itself in complex and crucial negotiations with China, > and with breadbasket Russia, via China. The big question now and in the > future is, who does the negotiation? The US? "The West"? The EU? According > to which (or whose) principles? And who else will be included? > > The rules-based international order to which Prem Chandavarkar alluded has > been vitiated by the historical hangover of colonialism/imperialism (just > try talking with people outside Europe if you think that doesn't matter > anymore). More importantly though, it has been rendered illegitimate in the > present tense by the failure of larger states to abide by the rules they > set, not only militarily but also economically. This makes it difficult to > just patch things up and "get back to normal." As long as Europe refuses to > assure its own defense and depends on the US to set the goals and organize > the forces, then the European version of a rules-based order will have no > enduring credibility - it will sink or swim with the (sinking) US. But if > the EU does start to pay for and assure its own defense, then it will find > its own power-politics under extreme scrutiny - especially if famine hits > North Africa and the Middle East. It is very hard to look good, beautiful > and true when everyone around you is suffering from the rules-based order > you are claiming to uphold. > > In fact, neither the European or the American version of world order will > last - because China has already shown that it will expand into Eurasia and > beyond, following its own principles. It is already developing specific > concepts of sovereignty, international relations, distributive justice, and > - very soon - ecological justice. The Russian version of Eurasianism is > brutal, regressive and unfeasible, but you can't say that about China's. To > non-Western elites, it presents a pathway to modernization unburdened of > huge ideological asks and bitter tastes of past betrayal. > > Meanwhile, the European version of Eurasianism is opportunistic at best, > or simply non-existent. The American version has been wildly opportunistic > (Nixon's ping-pong diplomacy) and it now shows threatening signs of turning > bellicose. India has gone through a recent border skirmish with China, and > that tends to throw it into Russia's arms (in the double sense of the > word). We all deserve a better future than the one these considerations > forebode. > > The liberal-humanist world state envisioned, and partially instituted, > after the Second World War raised the hopes of people everywhere (even in > the communist countries). More recently, though, the post-89 promise of > transforming the grand rules-based ideal into substantial > political-economic reality has yielded nothing other than neoliberal > globalization, and that has failed to solve the distributive problem, the > ecological problem, or even the war problem. What it's been really good at > is creating oligarchies on the one hand, and mass alienation on the other, > with accelerated ecological decay in the bargain. As a result, "the West" > can no longer hold a monopoly on world order. And yet the EU can no longer > disavow its own power and responsibility (Ukraine is the proof), nor should > it simply give up on its own concepts of justice. As for the US - which, as > Fiona Hill remarks, has become all too much like Russia in recent years - > we have to solve the problem of white nationalist populism before any new > contribution to world order can be made. > > That's no excuse to put off thinking about it though. If Russian > revanchism has been handled very badly indeed by "the West," then people on > both sides of the Atlantic had better develop a much better approach to the > multifaceted Eurasian Question. > > Concerning all the above, the most informative and provocative author I > have found so far is Bruno Macaes, author of The Dawn of Eurasia (2018) as > well as the more technical followup, Belt and Road (2019). A former > Portuguese diplomat, Macaes was in the room when Yanukovych pulled the plug > on the early phases of EU accession, triggering both EuroMaidan and the > first Russian invasion. He has a lot to say about Russia, although none of > it very good. Basically he sees Putin's policies as an extremely bad answer > to the Eurasian question - although that question, in his account, is far > more real for Russia than for any other state except China itself. Reading > his book, you understand why the current war was inevitable. > > That's not exactly a compliment. Macaes offers no concrete response to the > questions of Eurasianism that he has the signal merit of posing. A > multipolar global order based on divergent rule-sets is a recipe for world > war. What's missing from the cookbook of power is a logic of coexistence. > To claim that it already exists, that it is enshrined in "the West," is to > go out on the battlefield firing blind - while in other arenas, the deeper > problems of global society just get deeper. Since 1989, the European left > has focused on questions of distributive justice, and the American left, on > racial justice. Considerable progress has been made in both arenas. But if > you think the mainstream parties with their analysts, strategists and > philosophers can handle contemporary international relations, or that good > old leftist anti-imperialism figured out all the answers seventy years ago, > you've got another think coming. It takes the form of an economic > juggernaut, a political Rubik's cube and an ecological nightmare all at > once. What you're trying not to think about are the wildly multiple, and so > far, uniformly ill-conceived versions of Eurasianism. > > Brian Holmes > # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission > # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
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