The Balkans were free from victimization during the Ottoman Empire - "for the
Balkans that was the 'golden era'," that Ankara would now like to revive.
Date: Saturday, October 30, 2010, 12:11 PM
The New Partners in Ankara (II)
2010/10/22
ANKARA/BERLIN
(Own report) - Berlin wants to continue to use Turkey as the "bridge" to
Central Asia and the Middle East. This was emphasized by the German President,
Christian Wulff, during his visit to that country, which ends today. In its
role as a "bridge between the Occident and the Orient," according to Wulff, it
is "an asset to Europe." This is why Germany continues to be "particularly
interested in the ties between Turkey and the European Union." Wulff's
declaration reflects the irritation, being heard since some time in the West,
over the growing independence Ankara is demonstrating in its foreign policy.
While continuing to maintain its close cooperation with the EU, the government
that came to office in Turkey in 2002 is following another doctrine aimed at
reinforcing Turkey's influence in the former regions of the Ottoman Empire.
According to advisors in Berlin, the West could use this to strengthen its own
position in the Middle East, but must be on guard to remain in a position of
control. Conflicts loom in German-Turkish foreign policy in regions of
Southeast Europe, where Ankara seeks to reinforce its influence among the
Muslim sectors of the populations.
"Strategic Depth" Concept
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Adullah Gül's foreign policy
doctrine was the underlying theme of German President Wulff's foreign policy
discussions in Ankara this week. The prime minister and president are from the
"Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi" (AKP), which came to power in 2002. The doctrine
had been developed at the end of the 1990s by the Ahmet Davutoglu, at the time,
professor for international relations at the Beykent University in Istanbul.
Immediately following inauguration of the AKP government, Davutoglu, who comes
from the Central Anatolian city of Konya and is considered a member of the new
Turkish traditionalist, Islamic orientated elite, (german-foreign-policy.com
reported [1]) put this concept into effect, first as Erdogan's main foreign
policy advisor and subsequently, since May 2009, as Turkey's foreign minister.
The concept, known as "strategic depth" has, since some time, been thoroughly
discussed in western think tanks and has been receiving much attention in
Berlin.
Neo-Ottomanism
Davutoglu's "strategic depth" concept [2] represents a rupture with the foreign
policy of the Kemalist elites, to the extent that Turkey is not exclusively
oriented toward ties to Western alliances. While still pursuing the objective
of Turkey's becoming a member of the EU, it is also intending to win new
influence in all nations bordering on Turkey, a region that had once been part
of the Ottoman Empire, which is why the AKP doctrine is also referred to as
"neo-Ottomanism". Ankara is seeking to expand its political, economic and
cultural influence to all of its neighboring countries. It is particularly
focusing on the North African and Middle Eastern Arab countries. Islam is a
very useful means for reinforcing these contacts. Since 2005 Ankara has had
permanent observer status at the African Union, and, since 2006, the Turkish
prime minister has been regularly invited to the Arab League summit meetings.
The AKP government is also using the old pan-Turkism to expand its sphere of
influence toward the Caucasus and Central Asia. In mid-September, the Turkish
government founded a "Cooperation Council of Turkish-Speaking Nations" with
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to strengthen its standing
in the East.
Concordant Interests
Particularly Ankara's efforts to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus and
Central Asia are in Berlin's interests. Germany needs Turkey also as a land
bridge for trade with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. According
to Berlin's plans, especially Caspian Basin oil and natural gas supplies
should, to a growing extent, be transited through Anatolia to reduce dependence
on Russian pipelines. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[3]) The AKP
government's efforts to achieve reconciliation with Armenia are also in
Germany's interests. A successful convergence of these two countries would
allow Berlin and the EU to establish stronger ties binding the Southern
Caucasus to the West, while, in the long run, weakening the region's ties to
Russia.[4] In addition, a pan-Turkish, in some aspects, also Islamic based
policy, is convenient for stirring up Islamic secessionism in Western China
("East Turkistan"). For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany has been
holding such options open in its own policy arsenal.[5]
Disputed
There is a dispute in Berlin over how much the German government will be able
to benefit from Ankara's growing cooperation with Arab countries and Iran.
Examples are the AKP government's efforts to help resolve the nuclear conflict
with Iran and to establish contact to Hamas. Transatlantic oriented forces
reject these Turkish efforts - and advise Ankara, to devote again more
attention to Israel. Those forces, seeking to see Germany's importance in the
Middle East grow in comparison to that of the United States, plead, on the
other hand, for reinforcing ties to Turkey, to be able to enhance Germany's
relations to Islamic countries. "The community of interests must be stressed
and the opportunities for seeking regional cooperation between the EU and
Turkey explored," proposes the Director of the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP), Volker Perthes.[6]
Golden Era
The prospect of German-Turkish conflicts, particularly in Southeast Europe, is
beginning to become apparent, in particular among the Muslim segments of the
populations in Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia. But Ankara is also systematically
extending its influence to other countries by means of Turkish radio and
television programs, building Turkish schools and cultural centers, opening
branches of Turkish banks and with the construction of super highways leading
toward Turkey. Ankara is simultaneously developing "a growing number of
independent initiatives that are not conceived as extensions to Brussels'
initiatives", warns the SWP, and points to a conference held in October 2009 in
Sarajevo, on the theme "The Ottoman Heritage and Today's Muslim Communities in
the Balkans", where Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu gave the opening
address.[7] "The only historical era, in which the Balkans were free from
victimization" said Davutoglu according to SWP, had been during the centuries
of the Ottoman Empire - "for the Balkans that was the 'golden era'," that
Ankara would now like to revive. This could lead to serious conflicts with the
European hegemonic power.
Possible Conflicts
In general, the SWP proposes that the new Turkish neo-Ottomanist foreign policy
"should be examined very carefully" - in spite of all of Ankara's willingness
to cooperate with the EU. At the same time, the domestic development of the
country must be taken into consideration, especially the changes in public
opinion toward the West. Until now, Berlin has benefited from the AKP's
becoming stronger as well as from the political Islam, it represents, which had
also counteracted the old Kemalist elites' opposition to taking over the EU's
regulatory framework, harvesting applause from Germany. That this approbation
can switch to rejection at the drop of a hat, can be gleaned from an indication
furnished by SWP, according to which "the new policy (in Ankara - gfp) -
together with the surge of religious-conservative sentiment in domestic and
social questions - have clearly led to the growth of the latent anti-Western
sentiments in Turkish public opinion."[8] In the case that the AKP government
does not comprehensively orient its policies on German-European interests - as
is already happening in Southeast Europe -serious conflicts could arise.
[1] see also Die neuen Partner in Ankara (I)
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/57928>
[2] Heinz Kramer: Die neue Außenpolitik-Konzeption der Türkei. Mögliche
Konsequenzen für den EU-Beitrittsprozess, SWP-Aktuell 25, März 2010
[3] see also Nabucco <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/57042> ,
Southern Corridor <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56241> and
Eine Dreiecksbeziehung <http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/57812>
[4] see also Revolutionäre Wirkungen
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/52724> and Transitgebiet
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/56753>
[5] see also Strategies of Attrition (IV)
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56104> and The Future of
<http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56262> "East-Turkestan"
[6] Volker Perthes: Turkey's Role in the Middle East: An Outsider's
Perspective; Presentation at the Transatlantic Academy Conference in Ankara,
June 10, 2010
[7] Dušan Reljić: Die Türkei weckt alte Lieben und Feindschaften im Westbalkan;
SWP-Aktuell 69, September 2010
[8] Heinz Kramer: Die neue Außenpolitik-Konzeption der Türkei. Mögliche
Konsequenzen für den EU-Beitrittsprozess, SWP-Aktuell 25, März 2010
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