ceki edited a comment on pull request #608: URL: https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608#issuecomment-991730650
**If the attacker can modify the config file on some system S, then that S can be assumed to be already penetrated to a large extent.** If the attacker can modify log4j.properties (log4j 1.x), she she does not need to download malicious code, she can just as easily place malicious class files in the classpath and have them executed > @ceki @remkop - it is not exactly true that it doesn't suffer from lookup issue though. > > If you look at how jndi works in 1.x you will find that there are two places where lookups are done - that is JMSAppender.java:207 and JMSAppender.java:222 - if you set TopicBindingName or TopicConnectionFactoryBindingName to something that JNDI can handle - for example "ldap://host:port/a"; JNDI will do exactly the same thing it does for 2.x - so 1.x is vulnerable, just attack vector is "safer" as it depends on configuration rather than user input -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: notifications-unsubscr...@logging.apache.org For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: us...@infra.apache.org
