This attack is why the flow requires the client to present the callback it used again when getting the token.
EHL From: Evan Gilbert [mailto:uid...@google.com] Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 5:17 PM To: Eran Hammer-Lahav Cc: OAuth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 10:58 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <e...@hueniverse.com<mailto:e...@hueniverse.com>> wrote: Thanks. That makes sense. My concern is that the client will ask for a specific username but an attacker will change that request before it hits the server. The server then asks the (wrong) user to authenticate and returns a token. The client has no way of knowing it got an access token for the wrong user. Does requiring that the server returns the token with the username solves this? Is this a real issue? This particular attack wasn't of concern to me, for a few of reasons: - The request is HTTPS, hard to modify the request before it hits the server - There are probably other, more dangerous attacks if you can modify request parameters (for example, you can modify the client_id and get the user to authorize the wrong app) I'm willing to be convinced otherwise I have no objections to this proposal but wanted to see some discussion and support from others before adding it to the spec. EHL From: Evan Gilbert [mailto:uid...@google.com<mailto:uid...@google.com>] Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 10:06 AM To: Eran Hammer-Lahav Cc: OAuth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal User 1 is logged into Client site User 2 is logged into IDP site This can happen quite frequently, as client sites often have long-lived cookies and may only be visited by one user on a shared computer. Right now client site has no way to ask for a token for User 1, and end result will be that User 1 starts seeing User 2's data. On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <e...@hueniverse.com<mailto:e...@hueniverse.com>> wrote: How can they both be logged in? I have never seen a case where two users can be both logged into to the same service at the same time... EHL On 4/19/10 8:33 AM, "Evan Gilbert" <uid...@google.com<http://uid...@google.com>> wrote: More details on this enhancement. Goal: Make sure you get an access token for the right user in immediate mode. Use case where we have problems if we don't have username parameter: 1. Bob is logged into a web site as b...@idp.com<http://b...@idp.com>. 2. Mary (his wife) is logged into IDP on the same computer as m...@idp.com<http://m...@idp.com> 3. A request is made to get an access token via the User-Agent flow in immediate mode (or with any redirect without prompting the user) 4. -ob now has an access token for Mary and (posts activities, schedules events, gets contacts) as Mary 5. Hilarity ensues Secondary goal: Provide a hint for non-immediate mode On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 11:55 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <e...@hueniverse.com<http://e...@hueniverse.com>> wrote: Evan Gilbert proposed a 'username' request parameter to allow the client to limit the end user to authenticate using the provided authorization server identifier. The proposal has not been discussed or supported by others, and has not received a security review. Proposal: Obtain further discussion and support from others, as well as a security review of the proposal. Otherwise, do nothing. EHL _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<http://OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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