On 02/06/2011, at 1:00 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: > This was suggested before, but are there really attack vectors for this?
If not having a current, working attack to demonstrate is a valid way to shrug off a security concern, that's great; it'll be a useful approach to many of the discussions I have. :) > The problem is that content-type is a pretty flexible header, which means > normalization of the header will be required (case, parameter order, white > space, etc.). The media type is the important part, and it's much more constrained. > I would argue that if you are using MAC with body hash and an attacker > changing the media type can cause harm, you should use additional methods to > secure the content-type (such as making the body self-describing). That seems like a step backwards, considering all of the work that Adam has put into limiting the use of sniffing. Cheers, -- Mark Nottingham http://www.mnot.net/ _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
