OK, so it still runs the signature over HTTP elements (query, url,
headers, etc) but all of the structured components are *communicated*
via a JWT/JOSE structure. That makes sense to me, on the surface at least.
-- Justin
On 02/28/2013 12:43 PM, William Mills wrote:
1) AS issues JWT + secret to client.
2) Client decides to access resource, creates the JWT MAC JSON object
which contains stuff about the signature and the signature itself.
3) client appends that base64 encoded thing to the JWT
1) Server gets a JWTMAC token, takes apart the JWT part to get the
signing key
2) Server looks at the JWTMAC to figure out what all it has to do to
create the signature base string
3) server constructs the SBS computes and checks the sig.
The only hairy bit right now is an arbitrary HTTP header list that may
be included in the signature.
No data in the JWTMAC is duplicated from anywhere else.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org>
*To:* William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com>
*Cc:* Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>; "oauth@ietf.org"
<oauth@ietf.org>
*Sent:* Thursday, February 28, 2013 9:08 AM
*Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-03.txt
What I don't quite get is what exactly would be presented and
processed at each step. Who needs to know what piece? We don't want to
have to push everything into JSON for the signing to take place (that
much is clear), and we don't want the client to be pushing the MAC
secret to the RS every time (that would make it a lot less secret,
after all). But if we can reuse JWT, JWS, and other JOSE mechanisms to
make some parts of the MAC pattern easier for programmers, I'm for it.
-- Justin
On 02/28/2013 08:14 AM, William Mills wrote:
I'm actually advocating that we change MAC to be a JWT extension.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>
<mailto:hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>
*To:* William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com>
<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>
*Cc:* Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>
<mailto:hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>; "oauth@ietf.org"
<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> <oauth@ietf.org> <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
*Sent:* Thursday, February 28, 2013 2:28 AM
*Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-03.txt
Hi Bill,
I believe you are misreading the document. In
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac the client still uses the MAC when it
accesses a protected resource.
The only place where the JWT comes into the picture is with the
description of the access token. This matters from a key distribution
point of view. The session key for the MAC is included in the
encrypted JWT. The JWT is encrypted by the authorization server and
decrypted by the resource server.
Information about how header fields get included in the MAC is
described in Section 5.
The nonce isn't killed it is just called differently: seq-nr. The
stuff in the original MAC specification actually wasn't a nonce (from
the semantic point of view).
The extension parameter is there implicitly by allowing additional
header fields to be included in the MAC computation.
I need to look at the port number field again.
Ciao
Hannes
On Feb 27, 2013, at 11:12 AM, William Mills wrote:
> Just read the draft quickly.
>
> Since we're now leaning on JWT do we need to include the token in
this? Why not just make an additional "Envelope MAC" thing and have
the signature include the 3 JWT parts in the signature base string?
That object then just becomes a JSON container for the kid,
timestamp, signature method, signature etc. That thing then is a 4th
base64 encoded JSON thing in the auth header.
>
> How header fields get included in the signature needs definition.
>
> Why did you kill the port number, nonce, and extension parameter
out of the signature base string?
>
> The BNF appears to have no separators between values.
>
> -bill
>
>
> From: "internet-dra...@ietf.org <mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>"
<internet-dra...@ietf.org <mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>>
> To: i-d-annou...@ietf.org <mailto:i-d-annou...@ietf.org>
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 4:46 AM
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-03.txt
>
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol Working
Group of the IETF.
>
> Title : OAuth 2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens
> Author(s) : Justin Richer
> William Mills
> Hannes Tschofenig
> Filename : draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-03.txt
> Pages : 26
> Date : 2013-02-25
>
> Abstract:
> This specification describes how to use MAC Tokens in HTTP requests
> to access OAuth 2.0 protected resources. An OAuth client willing to
> access a protected resource needs to demonstrate possession of a
> crytographic key by using it with a keyed message digest function to
> the request.
>
> The document also defines a key distribution protocol for obtaining a
> fresh session key.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-03
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-03
>
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
