I stand corrected, the RFC does give specific time recommendations such as 10 minutes authorization code recommendation here https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.2 but I think my overall point is still valid. :)

Aloha,
Jim




On 8/28/15 11:36 AM, Jim Manico wrote:
Again, I would state that this is all contextual to the application being built - which is why the RFC never gives specific times other than "short lived" or "long lived". I would suggest giving a series of recommendations relative to a few different risk profiles (low risk, social media, banking, enterprise, etc) as opposed to one recommendation.

With respect,
Jim Manico

On 8/28/15 10:41 AM, John Bradley wrote:
I would use a 5 min AT and roll the refresh token per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#page-47 with a 1 month expiry if that is what you want for a inactivity timeout after which the user must authenticate again. The user can always revoke the refresh token.

Rolling the refresh token also has the advantage that if the token leaks or is stollen then you will detect the second use of the expired refresh token and invalidate both, so the user needs to loggin.

In general I think rolling the refresh token is a good idea though it is not popular, I think it is more secure.

John B.



On Aug 28, 2015, at 11:21 AM, Donghwan Kim <flowersinthes...@gmail.com <mailto:flowersinthes...@gmail.com>> wrote:

I'm sorry to introduce a common topic.

As John has suggested, I'm going to design that

* An access token should be short lived e.g. 5 minutes (not to hit the AS to verify the token or 1 hour (to hit the AS to verify the token). I'm inclined to 5 minutes for stateless architecture of RSs. * A refresh token should have 1 month of expiration time by default. If it turns out that some access token expired, its refresh token should refresh the token. Then, so called persistent login can be implemented regardless of the form of authentication. Only if it fails for some reason e.g. token revocation or inactivity for 1 month, a user is logged out automatically and should log in again. * A refresh token should be able to be revoked somehow. With 5 minutes approach, it will invalidate only the refresh token (Yes the attacker can have 5 minutes at most), and with 1 hour approach, it will invalidate the refresh token as well as the corresponding access token.

Thanks,

-- Donghwan

On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 5:43 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote:

    Refresh tokens are also used by public clients, e.g. native
    apps. OIDC allows to acquire a new id token from a refresh token
    as well. Note: this does not mean a fresh authentication but a
    refreshed id token containing the data of the original
    authentication transaction.

    Am 24. August 2015 17:08:21 MESZ, schrieb John Bradley
    <ve7...@ve7jtb.com>:

        I think Nat’s diagram about the problems of doing pseudo
        authentication with OAuth is being taken out of context.

        The refresh token dosen’t expire, it is revoked by the user
        or system.  In some cases refresh tokens are automatically
        revoked if the users session to the AS ends.  I think AOL
        typically revokes refresh tokens when sessions terminate.

        OpenID Connect provides a separate id_token with a
        independent lifetime from the refresh token.  A client may
        keep a refresh token for a much longer time than the user
        has a login session with the AS.

        Refresh tokens are typically used by confidential clients
        that are using a client secret in combination with the
        refresh token for getting a new access token.

        By design access tokens should be short lived as the AS is
        expected to have a way of revoking refresh tokens but not
        access tokens.
        A access token that dosen't expire , and can’t be revoked is
        not a good idea.

        John B.


        On Aug 24, 2015, at 2:41 AM, Donghwan Kim
        <flowersinthes...@gmail.com> wrote:

        Hi,

        According to Figure 2 from
        http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.5, refresh
        token can be used to refresh an expired access token
        without requesting resource owner to sign in again
        (uncomfortable experience). However, if it's true, isn't it
        that refresh token might be used to request a new access
        token even years later? and then isn't refresh token the
        same with access token which never expires?

        I intended to use refresh token to implement persistent
        login by sending a refresh request before issued access
        token expires (expires_in runs out). But if refresh token
        works even if access token expired already, sending a
        refresh request on application start up would be enough.

        So I'm not sure what I'm missing about refresh token as
        well as how to implement persistent login using it (you can
        regard authentication here pseudo-authentication
        illustrated in
        
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/OpenIDvs.Pseudo-AuthenticationusingOAuth.svg).
        What is the lifetime of refresh token?

        Thanks,

        -- Donghwan
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Manicode Security
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Jim Manico
Manicode Security
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