When the RP acting as the client issues a authorize redirect to the UA it has to make it with TLS
Phil > On Jan 25, 2016, at 17:53, Nov Matake <mat...@gmail.com> wrote: > > It doen't say anything about the first request which initiate the login flow. > It is still a reasonable assumption that RP puts a "login with FB" button on > a non TLS-protected page. > > nov > >> On Jan 26, 2016, at 10:45, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >> >> I would find it hard to believe that is true. >> >> From 6749 Sec 3.1 >> Since requests to the authorization endpoint result in user >> authentication and the transmission of clear-text credentials (in the >> HTTP response), the authorization server MUST require the use of TLS >> as described in Section 1.6 when sending requests to the >> authorization endpoint. >> >> Sec 3.1.2.1 >> The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described >> in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token", >> or when the redirection request will result in the transmission of >> sensitive credentials over an open network. This specification does >> not mandate the use of TLS because at the time of this writing, >> requiring clients to deploy TLS is a significant hurdle for many >> client developers. If TLS is not available, the authorization server >> SHOULD warn the resource owner about the insecure endpoint prior to >> redirection (e.g., display a message during the authorization >> request). >> >> Lack of transport-layer security can have a severe impact on the >> security of the client and the protected resources it is authorized >> to access. The use of transport-layer security is particularly >> critical when the authorization process is used as a form of >> delegated end-user authentication by the client (e.g., third-party >> sign-in service). >> >> Section 10.5 talks about transmission of authorization codes in connection >> with redirects. >> >> Also see 6819, Sec 4.4.1.1 regarding eavesdropping or leaking of authz codes. >> >> >> Phil >> >> @independentid >> www.independentid.com >> phil.h...@oracle.com >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Jan 25, 2016, at 4:52 PM, nov matake <mat...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> The first assumption is coming from the original security report at >>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229. >>> RFC 6749 requires TLS between RS and AS, and also between UA and AS, but >>> not between UA and RS. >>> >>> The blog post is based on my Japanese post, and it describes multi-AS case. >>> Nat's another post describes the case which can affect single-AS case too. >>> http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/22/code-phishing-attack-on-oauth-2-0-rfc6749/ >>> >>> nov >>> >>>> On Jan 26, 2016, at 08:22, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Sorry, meant to reply-all. >>>> >>>> Phil >>>> >>>> @independentid >>>> www.independentid.com >>>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Begin forwarded message: >>>>> >>>>> From: Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> >>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption: OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation >>>>> Date: January 25, 2016 at 3:20:19 PM PST >>>>> To: Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> >>>>> >>>>> I am having trouble with the very first assumption. The user-agent sets >>>>> up a non TLS protected connection to the RP? That’s a fundamental >>>>> violation of 6749. >>>>> >>>>> Also, the second statement says the RP (assuming it acts as OAuth client) >>>>> is talking to two IDPs. That’s still a multi-AS case is it not? >>>>> >>>>> Phil >>>>> >>>>> @independentid >>>>> www.independentid.com >>>>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jan 25, 2016, at 2:58 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Phil, >>>>>> >>>>>> Since I was not in Darmstadt, I really do not know what was discussed >>>>>> there, but with the compromised developer documentation described in >>>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/2016/01/15/idp-mix-up-attack-on-oauth-rfc6749/, >>>>>> all RFC6749 clients with a naive implementer will be affected. The >>>>>> client does not need to be talking to multiple IdPs. >>>>>> >>>>>> Nat >>>>>> >>>>>> 2016年1月26日(火) 3:58 Phil Hunt (IDM) <phil.h...@oracle.com>: >>>>>>> I recall making this point in Germany. 99% of existing use is fine. >>>>>>> OIDC is probably the largest community that *might* have an issue. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I recall proposing a new security document that covers oauth security >>>>>>> for dynamic scenarios. "Dynamic" being broadly defined to mean: >>>>>>> * clients who have configured at runtime or install time (including >>>>>>> clients that do discovery) >>>>>>> * clients that communicate with more than one endpoint >>>>>>> * clients that are deployed in large volume and may update frequently >>>>>>> (more discussion of "public" cases) >>>>>>> * clients that are script based (loaded into browser on the fly) >>>>>>> * others? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Phil >>>>>>> >>>>>>> > On Jan 25, 2016, at 10:39, George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com> wrote: >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > would >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>
_______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
