That said, I'm not against the AS informing the client that the token
can be used at the MailResource, ContactResource and MessagingResource
to help the client know not to send the token to a BlogResource.
However, identifying the actual endpoint seems overly complex when what
is really trying to be protected is a token from being used where it
shouldn't be (which is solved by Pop)
Thanks,
George
On 2/25/16 10:25 AM, George Fletcher wrote:
Interesting... this is not at all my current experience:) If a RS goes
from v2 of it's API to v3 and that RS uses the current standard of
putting a "v2" or"v3" in it's API path... then a token issued for v2
of the API can not be sent to v3 of the API, because v3 wasn't wasn't
registered/deployed when the token was issued.
The constant management of scopes to URI endpoints seems like a
complexity that will quickly get out of hand.
Thanks,
George
On 2/25/16 2:22 AM, Vladimir Dzhuvinov wrote:
On 25/02/16 09:02, Manger, James wrote:
I'm concerned that forcing the AS to know about all RS's endpoints that will
accept it's tokens creates a very brittle deployment architecture
The AS is issuing temporary credentials (access_tokens) to clients but doesn’t
know where those credentials will work? That’s broken.
An AS should absolutely indicate where an access_token can be used.
draft-sakimura-oauth-meta suggests indicating this with 1 or more “ruri”
(resource URI) values in an HTTP Link header. A better approach would be
including a list of web origins in the token response beside the access_token
field.
+1
This will appear more consistent with the current experience, and
OAuth does allow the token response JSON object to be extended with
additional members (as it's done in OpenID Connect already).
Cheers,
Vladimir
--
James Manger
From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of George Fletcher
Sent: Thursday, 25 February 2016 6:17 AM
To: Phil Hunt<phil.h...@oracle.com>; Nat Sakimura<sakim...@gmail.com>
Cc:<oauth@ietf.org> <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.0 Discovery Location
I'm concerned that forcing the AS to know about all RS's endpoints that will
accept it's tokens creates a very brittle deployment architecture. What if a RS
moves to a new endpoint? All clients would be required to get new tokens (if I
understand correctly). And the RS move would have to coordinate with the AS to
make sure all the timing is perfect in the switch over of endpoints.
I suspect a common deployment architecture today is that each RS requires one
or more scopes to access it's resources. The client then asks the user to
authorize a token with a requested list of scopes. The client can then send the
token to the appropriate RS endpoint. The RS will not authorize access unless
the token has the required scopes.
If the concern is that the client may accidentally send the token to a "bad" RS
which will then replay the token, then I'd rather use a PoP mechanism because the point
is that you want to ensure the correct client is presenting the token. Trying to ensure
the client doesn't send the token to the wrong endpoint seems fraught with problems.
Thanks,
George
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