In this type of deployment, as far as OAuth is concerned, isn't the backend web server a confidential client? Is there even anything unique to this situation as far as OAuth security goes?
I wouldn't have expected an Angular app that talks to its own server backend that's managing OAuth credentials to fall under the umbrella of this BCP. ---- Aaron Parecki aaronparecki.com On Sat, Dec 1, 2018 at 11:31 PM Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote: > the UI is rendered in the frontend, UI control flow is in the frontend. > just a different cut through the web app’s layering > > All Angular apps I have seen so far work that way. And it makes a lot of > sense to me. The backend can aggregate and optimize access to the > underlying services without the need to fully expose them. > > Am 02.12.2018 um 00:44 schrieb John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com>: > > How is that different from a regular server client with a web interface if > the backed is doing the API calls to the RS? > > > On 12/1/2018 12:25 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote: > > I forgot to mention another (architectural) option: split an application > into frontend provided by JS in the browser and a backend, which takes care > of the business logic and handles tokens and API access. Replay detection > at the interface between SPA and backend can utilize standard web > techniques (see OWASP). The backend in turn can use mTLS for sender > constraining. > > Am 01.12.2018 um 15:34 schrieb Torsten Lodderstedt < > tors...@lodderstedt.net>: > > IMHO the best mechanism at hand currently to cope with token > leakage/replay in SPAs is to use refresh tokens (rotating w/ replay > detection) and issue short living and privilege restricted access tokens. > > Sender constrained access tokens in SPAs need adoption of token binding or > alternative mechanism. mtls could potentially work in deployments with > automated cert rollout but browser UX and interplay with fetch needs some > work. We potentially must consider to warm up application level PoP > mechanisms in conjunction with web crypto. Another path to be evaluated > could be web auth. > > Am 01.12.2018 um 10:15 schrieb Hannes Tschofenig < > hannes.tschofe...@arm.com>: > > I share the concern Brian has, which is also the conclusion I came up with > in my other email sent a few minutes ago. > > > > *From:* OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Brian Campbell > *Sent:* Friday, November 30, 2018 11:43 PM > *To:* Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> > *Cc:* oauth <oauth@ietf.org> > *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] draft-parecki-oauth-browser-based-apps-00 > > > > > > On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 4:07 AM Torsten Lodderstedt < > tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote: > > > Am 15.11.2018 um 23:01 schrieb Brock Allen <brockal...@gmail.com>: > > > > So you mean at the resource server ensuring the token was really issued > to the client? Isn't that an inherent limitation of all bearer tokens > (modulo HTTP token binding, which is still some time off)? > > Sure. That’s why the Security BCP recommends use of TLS-based methods for > sender constraining access tokens ( > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-09#section-2...2). > Token Binding for OAuth ( > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding-08 > <https://tools..ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding-08>) as well > as Mutual TLS for OAuth ( > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-12) are the options > available. > > > > Unfortunately even when using the token endpoint, for SPA / in-browser > client applications, the potential mechanisms for sender/key-constraining > access tokens don't work very well or maybe don't work at all. So I don't > know that the recommendation is very realistic. > > > > > *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and > privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any > review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited... > If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender > immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from > your computer. Thank you.* > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the > information in any medium. Thank you. > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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