The slides that Brian presented, and the minutes with a link to the recording of the meeting are now available on the following link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2020-oauth-02/session/oauth
Regards, Rifaat On Tue, Mar 17, 2020 at 8:12 AM Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@arm.com> wrote: > Participants: > > > > - Roman Danyliw > > - Torsten Lodderstedt > > - Travis Spencer > > - Aaron Parecki > > - Ben Kaduk > > - Brian Campbell > > - Cigdem Sengul > > - Daniel Fett > > - David Waite > > - Filip > > - Jim Schaad > > - Justin Richer > > - Marco Tiloca > > - Matthew de Haast > > - Michael Peck > > - Mike Jones > > - Phil Hunt > > - Hannes Tschofenig > > - Joseph Heenan > > - David Waite > > - Bjorn Hjelm > > - Cristofer Gonzales > > - Tony Nadalin > > - Vittori > > - Rifaat > > > > Notes: > > > > Rifaat showed the list of documents relevant for the discussion > > > > > > Several documents are relevant to this discussion, including > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-08 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-signed-http-request-03 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-richanna-oauth-http-signature-pop-00 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cavage-http-signatures-12 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8613 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7800 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-33 > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-17 > > > > Brian went through his presentation. > > > > Hannes notes that OSCORE, a solution presented from the ACE group, is > missing in the list. > > > > Brian responds that nobody in the OAuth world cares about OSCORE. > > > > Discussion about whether the ACE group uses the key distribution > parameters for use with HTTP. Jim believes it does. > > > > Justin explained the work Annabelle was doing. > > > > Rifaat asked whether PoP + HTTP signing will solve his problem. > > > > Brian does not believe that HTTP signing solves anything and if it gets > done then it will take a long time. It also does not cover the refresh > token case. > > > > HTTP Signing is a lot about HTTP canonicalization. It will allow for > signing and HMAC computation over the resulting string. > > > > Roman: For some HTTP signing may still be too expensive? > > > > Justin: Yes, we are starting with the cavage-http-signatures draft. There > are some big problems with it. For example, what parts are signed. Depends > on we sign it will be necessary to re-create the signature with every > request. > > We need a profile for OAuth use to indicate where to send the token and > what to include in the signature. > > > > Brian: I believe that every request should require a new signature. > Finding out whether a signature can be omitted will be prohibitive. > > > > Justin: DPOP signs only a small number of elements and does not require > HTTP signing. > > > > Justin: For the HTTP signature solution we are planning to offer a > symmetric and an asymmetric key version. > > > > Justin: DPOP is a key presentation for single page application and it can > probably be used with other apps too. We are going to have a PoP solution > with an generic HTTP message mechanism. > > > > Torsten: How many deployable solutions do we have? > > > > Brian: We have probably 3 or 4 solutions. > > > > Justin: In terms of implementations we have 3. > > > > ?: What if we split the key distribution from the HTTP signing? > > > > Justin: That's how we wanted to do the generic approach. It is how we do > it with HTTP signing. > > > > ?: What are you signing in the HTTP message? > > > > Justin: I believe if we have generic HTTP signing then we could re-use it > with DPOP. > > > > Mike: Microsoft is internally deployed the old HTTP signing. The reason is > that it is stable (although abandoned). Our product groups that is simple, > like DPOP. John and I talked at the last IETF on how we wanted to do > symmetric DPOP. Inherently you have to do a key distribution step. I would > like to see the DPOP draft adopted as a WG draft (recognizing that it may > be revised to include a symmetric key solution). > > > > The working group needs to make a decision on how to add symmetric key > distribution. > > > > Filip: We would also like to see adoption. > > > > Roman: three options > > > > 1) Stay with POP key distribution > > 2) DPOP (as is) > > 3) Use ECDHE exchange from Neil > > > > Brian: We could add (3) to (2) but it would be difficult and prohibitively > difficult. (3) should its own thing. Or maybe if the push for performance > improvements is so big that we need to jump straight to (3). There is the > risk of too many options. > > > > Torsten: Is the concern that (2) is too slow? > > > > Filip: At the last meeting there was a concern from AWS that signing of > each request is prohibitively complex. But (2) works in my deployment. > > > > Mike: It depends on the use case. > > > > Phil: How does TLS 1.3 alter some of the requirements? What about the HTTP > group doing the work on signing? > > > > Brian: I don't think there is any dependency. > > > > Justin: I do think that there is room for both. I don't think DPOP should > be stretched to a generic solution and it isn't. It is a clever hack for a > specific use case. > > > > Brian: I wouldn't agree on the term "hack".. > > > > Phil: I am concerned that the market tries to apply a limited solution to > everything. > > > > Justin: That's why we need to standardize many solutions. DPOP makes a lot > of sense as it is today. If you can layer a symmetric key solution then > that's fine too. I think AWS should not use DPOP. > > > > Phil: I think we need to make clear that PoP is orthogonal to message > signing. Saying that those things are separate going forward. I am worried > that we are repeating the cycle for the 3rd or 4th time in 10 years. > > > > Mike: The market left OAuth 1.0 because of HTTP signing interoperability > problems. > > > > Phil: When I was looking at MTLS there was a similar perception about > whether it is actually needed. There are two extreme: (1) sign everything > and encrypt everything and then (2) just use the existing stuff. > > > > Mike: I like DPOP because it does very little. It just as little as > possible to demonstrate PoP for the token. > > > > Phil: Yes, I like that. > > > > Brian: There is certainly opportunity in the draft to make the draft > clear. It is certainly for more use cases than for SPA-type apps. > > > > Rifaat: Any other comments? > > > > Next step is to take it to the list. There is also another question about > the use of symmetric key in addition to asymmetric key. > > > > Roman: We will only do a call for adoption of the DPOP solution and not > for any other option. > > > > Rifaat: Yes. > > > > Rifaat: Neither I nor Hannes will be at the Vancouver IETF meeting. > > > > The following participants are planning to be there: Justin, Aaron, Mike, > Brian, David, Spencer, Tony, Matthew. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the > information in any medium. Thank you. > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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