I have a lot of security concerns about this draft. The draft alludes to security issues associated with handling access tokens in the frontend but never really spells them out. From the Security Considerations it seems that the primary concern is with theft of access tokens from local storage. To do this you’d need an XSS attack. But in that case, wouldn’t the attacker simply use the XSS to make a call to the bff-token endpoint instead?
The combination of the bff-token endpoint recommending the use of GET requests together with the hint to use cookie-based authentication is likely going to punch a hole in most CSRF defenses, which assume that GETs are safe. The only thing preventing this being exploitable is Cross-Origin Read Blocking (https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/services/network/cross_origin_read_blocking_explainer.md) due to the JSON content-type. That makes me really nervous. We should at least mandate X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on that response. I’d feel more comfortable if this was a POST request only. As Stoycho Sleptsov mentioned in the other email, the lack of front-channel communication between the AS and the RO seems odd. If the backend is already implicitly trusted then couldn’t you skip OAuth and just get the backend to issue short-lived JWTs to the frontend that it can use for API access? If you want to allow auth code flow etc then perhaps the bff-token endpoint can return a standard error code with an authorization endpoint URI that the SPA then navigates the user to. (Eg the backend can do a PAR request first and return a URI that references that so that authorization details aren’t passed through the frontend). — Neil > On 12 Feb 2021, at 20:46, Vittorio Bertocci > <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > Dear all, > Brian and yours truly are proposing a new specification that shows how the > user agent frontend of a web app can delegate token acquisition and > persistence to its backend, and request such tokens when needed for direct > access of protected resources from the frontend code. > > The pattern is already in use, in proprietary form, by various modern > development stacks, such as Next.JS. Variants of the pattern, often discussed > under the catch-all term BFF (backend for frontend), have been often > mentioned in this workgroup’s activity, but always left all implementation > details to the reader. > We believe the pattern has merit, as corroborated by its growing adoption. By > delegating access token acquisition to the backend, we avoid many of the > often brittle moving parts (and implied attack surface) required to acquire > access tokens from a user agent. The topology also relieves the frontend from > the need of persisting tokens in local storage, a well known sore point of > using OAuth directly in JavaScript, by relying on its backend storage and > session to preserve tokens. > > Although the specification is very simple, providing explicit guidance on the > scenario offers many advantages. > - It makes it possible to create interoperable SDKs, where frontend dev > stacks (any JS flavor) can be mixed and matched with compliant backend stacks > (middlewares in node, java, ASP.NET, PHP etc) > - It allows us to provide guidance on how to properly tackle the scenario and > warn implementers against security risks (scope escalations, using IDtokens > instead of access tokens, etc) > - It allows us to discuss (and when appropriate, promote) this pattern as > part of the browser apps security guidance, and position the scenario where > frontend only calls API on its own backed (hence doesn’t need access tokens) > simply as a special case of this more general pattern > - This approach makes mocking and testing apps very easy, possibly preventing > developers from weakening the security of their system (eg turning on ROPG > options) or turning to risky practices like scraping > > Needless to say, this specification doesn’t entirely eliminate the risks > inherent to direct use of access tokens from a browser. But reality is that > the pattern is in widespread use, and the circumstances leading to that (eg > developers on a particular project only work with frontend stacks; components > like reverse proxies might not always be viable; etc) aren’t going away any > time soon. By providing simple guidance on this pattern, we can simplify the > life of many developers while enshrining basic security hygiene in scenarios > that would have otherwise be left to their own device. > > Looking forward for your feedback! > > B&V > > On 2/12/21, 12:41, "internet-dra...@ietf.org" <internet-dra...@ietf.org> > wrote: > > > A new version of I-D, draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00.txt > has been successfully submitted by Vittorio Bertocci and posted to the > IETF repository. > > Name: draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff > Revision: 00 > Title: Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend > Document date: 2021-02-12 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 16 > URL: > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00.txt > Status: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/ > Html: > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00.html > Htmlized: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00 > > > Abstract: > This document describes how a JavaScript frontend can delegate access > token acquisition to a backend component. In so doing, the frontend > can access resource servers directly without taking on the burden of > communicating with the authorization server, persisting tokens, and > performing operations that are fraught with security challenges when > executed in a user agent, but are safe and well proven when executed > by a confidential client running on a backend. > > > > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of > submission > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > > The IETF Secretariat > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- ForgeRock values your Privacy <https://www.forgerock.com/your-privacy>
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