Correct, the access token ends up in the JavaScript – the outcome is the same 
as code+PKCE, the access token end up in the user agent. The main difference is 
that some of the functionality is now outsourced to the backend but the calls 
to the RS still take place from the user agent.

From: Dominick Baier <dba...@leastprivilege.com>
Date: Sunday, February 14, 2021 at 04:06
To: Vittorio Bertocci <vittorio.berto...@auth0.com>, Brian Campbell 
<bcampb...@pingidentity.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Token Mediating and session Information Backend For 
Frontend (TMI BFF)

Hi,

Just making sure I understand - in your protocol flow diagram step D it looks 
like that the BFF is returning the access token to the front-end. Is that 
correct?

My biggest concern with browser-based applications is that the JavaScript / 
browser has access to the access token (don’t care if it is in-memory or local 
storage) - but this exactly seems to happen in D.

Thanks
———
Dominick Baier


On 12. February 2021 at 21:46:20, Vittorio Bertocci 
(vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org>)
 wrote:
Dear all,
Brian and yours truly are proposing a new specification that shows how the user 
agent frontend of a web app can delegate token acquisition and persistence to 
its backend, and request such tokens when needed for direct access of protected 
resources from the frontend code.

The pattern is already in use, in proprietary form, by various modern 
development stacks, such as Next.JS. Variants of the pattern, often discussed 
under the catch-all term BFF (backend for frontend), have been often mentioned 
in this workgroup’s activity, but always left all implementation details to the 
reader.
We believe the pattern has merit, as corroborated by its growing adoption. By 
delegating access token acquisition to the backend, we avoid many of the often 
brittle moving parts (and implied attack surface) required to acquire access 
tokens from a user agent. The topology also relieves the frontend from the need 
of persisting tokens in local storage, a well known sore point of using OAuth 
directly in JavaScript, by relying on its backend storage and session to 
preserve tokens.

Although the specification is very simple, providing explicit guidance on the 
scenario offers many advantages.
- It makes it possible to create interoperable SDKs, where frontend dev stacks 
(any JS flavor) can be mixed and matched with compliant backend stacks 
(middlewares in node, java, ASP.NET<http://ASP.NET>, PHP etc)
- It allows us to provide guidance on how to properly tackle the scenario and 
warn implementers against security risks (scope escalations, using IDtokens 
instead of access tokens, etc)
- It allows us to discuss (and when appropriate, promote) this pattern as part 
of the browser apps security guidance, and position the scenario where frontend 
only calls API on its own backed (hence doesn’t need access tokens) simply as a 
special case of this more general pattern
- This approach makes mocking and testing apps very easy, possibly preventing 
developers from weakening the security of their system (eg turning on ROPG 
options) or turning to risky practices like scraping

Needless to say, this specification doesn’t entirely eliminate the risks 
inherent to direct use of access tokens from a browser. But reality is that the 
pattern is in widespread use, and the circumstances leading to that (eg 
developers on a particular project only work with frontend stacks; components 
like reverse proxies might not always be viable; etc) aren’t going away any 
time soon. By providing simple guidance on this pattern, we can simplify the 
life of many developers while enshrining basic security hygiene in scenarios 
that would have otherwise be left to their own device.

Looking forward for your feedback!

B&V

On 2/12/21, 12:41, "internet-dra...@ietf.org<mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>" 
<internet-dra...@ietf.org<mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>> wrote:


A new version of I-D, draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Vittorio Bertocci and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name: draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff
Revision: 00
Title: Token Mediating and session Information Backend For Frontend
Document date: 2021-02-12
Group: Individual Submission
Pages: 16
URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00.txt
Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff/
Html: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00.html
Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bertocci-oauth2-tmi-bff-00


Abstract:
This document describes how a JavaScript frontend can delegate access
token acquisition to a backend component. In so doing, the frontend
can access resource servers directly without taking on the burden of
communicating with the authorization server, persisting tokens, and
performing operations that are fraught with security challenges when
executed in a user agent, but are safe and well proven when executed
by a confidential client running on a backend.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at 
tools.ietf.org<http://tools.ietf.org>.

The IETF Secretariat



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