I think Signed JWK sets are useful and would like to see them used in more use cases so separating out the specifications seems like a good idea. We will have to be careful specify what security and deployment properties you are trying to achieve in different use cases.
On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 11:36 AM Watson Ladd <watsonbl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Sun, Mar 17, 2024 at 5:32 PM Richard Barnes <r...@ipv.sx> wrote: > > > > Hi Watson, > > > > I appreciate the concerns with regard to re-using Web PKI certs for > cases such as these. Care is required, but I think there is a path here. > > > > 1. Clearly there are cross-protocol concerns. I expect that most usage > here in reality would be based on ECDSA / EdDSA, not RSA, which helps. I > would be comfortable with security considerations recommending that a key > pair / certificate used for signing these things be used for no other > purpose. > > > [Joe] I think there may also be a consideration in some environments that problems could arise if keys not intended for signing JWK sets could be used to sign JWK sets. > > 2. Validity times are definitely a challenge for the container signing > use case, but from the conversations I've had with that community, they are > taking an orthogonal approach. As I tried to sketch in the document, they > are establishing authorities that will vouch that a signed thing existed at > a given time, so that a relying party can safely rewind their clock and > validate as if it were that time. See, e.g., SigStore < > https://www.sigstore.dev/>, which has roughly this shape if you squint > right. > > That should work out: might want a security considerations saying this. > > > > > 3. I don't think there's actually any disconnect between HTTPS > authentication and proof of authority. The Web PKI is about authenticating > domain names, which is what both use cases require. > > Only with certain validation methods. Others like agreed upon change > to site content have a narrower scope and the BRs reflect this > subtlety. To be honest you're probably safe and I am not the expert > here. > [Joe] I think this can work and be useful in many cases, but there may be some subtleties here that should be considered. All the more reason to document this. > Sincerely, > Watson > > -- > Astra mortemque praestare gradatim > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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