On 29/12/2013 10:15, Mauro Pirata wrote:
> Ma questo che data ha?

quella del 30c3?

> Il 29/dic/2013 09:46 "mutek" <[email protected]> ha scritto:
> 
>> Cypherpunk  movement started as a mailing list in 1992. In 1993 Eric
>> Hughes publishes a “A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto” [1]. In 1994 Timothy C. May
>> publishes “Cypherpunks FAQ” [2].
>>
>> Here’s an excerpt from the FAQ:
>>
>> 2.3. “What’s the ‘Big Picture’?”
>>
>> Strong crypto is here. It is widely available. It implies many changes in
>> the way the world works. Private channels between parties who have never
>> met and who never will meet are possible. Totally anonymous, unsinkable,
>> untraceable communications and exchanges are possible.
>>
>> Transactions can only be voluntary, since the parties are untraceable and
>> unknown and can withdraw at any time. This has profound implications for
>> the conventional approach of using the threat of force, directed against
>> parties by governments or by others. In particular, threats of force will
>> fail.
>>
>> What emerges from this is unclear, but I think it will be a form of
>> anarcho-capitalist market system I call “crypto anarchy.” (Voluntary
>> communications only, with no third parties butting in.)
>>
>> In 1998 Wei Dai publishes a proposal of “b-money”, a practical way to
>> enforce contractual agreements between anonymous actors [3]. He captured
>> the essence of the movement in an immortal quote:
>>
>> I am fascinated by Tim May’s crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities
>> traditionally associated with the word “anarchy”, in a crypto-anarchy the
>> government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and
>> permanently unnecessary. It’s a community where the threat of violence is
>> impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible because
>> its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical locations.
>>
>> In 2005 Nick Szabo publishes a proposal for “Bit gold” [4], a purely
>> digital collectible based on a proof-of-work algorithm borrowing ideas from
>> RPOW server (“Reusable proof of work”) by Hal Finney [5]. Proposal does not
>> mention contract enforcement mechanism, but Nick Szabo himself already
>> proposed several ideas about smart contracts back in the nineties [6].
>>
>> In late 2008 Satoshi Nakamoto publishes an overview of Bitcoin [7] and on
>> January 3rd, 2009 releases the code and begins the blockchain.
>>
>> Bitcoin is an exact implementation of the system envisioned by Tim C. May,
>> Wei Dai and Nick Szabo. The only requirement is for transacting parties to
>> remain anonymous. If there’s no trace to physical persons, there is no
>> place for the violent intervention and thus the contracts can only be
>> enforced according to the voluntarily agreed-upon rules between the
>> parties. Bitcoin allows encoding these rules right in the transactions so
>> they are automatically enforced by the whole network.
>>
>> In practice, we cannot imagine living in full anonymity. Human beings live
>> in a physical world and enjoy a lot of physical things. Anonymity is not
>> something you can easily manage like a single encryption key. It must be
>> maintained via careful dissemination of one’s actions among actions of
>> others. And since the network activity is easily recordable, one mistake is
>> enough to reveal oneself. In other words, the cost of anonymity is rather
>> high compared to the benefits. Does this mean crypto-anarchy is an utopia?
>>
>> I would argue, it’s far from it. Cypherpunks being rigorous scientists
>> made a much stronger assumption than needed in practice. For transacting
>> parties it is enough to have costs of cheating meaningfully higher than the
>> cost of following the contract. If that condition holds for the majority of
>> the interactions in society, there will be a great incentive for people to
>> protect themselves against remaining rare cases of cheating thus keeping
>> the system sustainable. Anonymity is simply one of the ways to raise the
>> cost of the attack.
>>
>> Bitcoin raises the cost of many kinds of attacks, going far beyond
>> protecting against central banks meddling with money supply.
>>
>> First, all sorts of computational services will flourish. Machines never
>> need to disclose their physical locations and can freely automate both
>> payment verification and payments themselves. Denial-of-service and spam
>> can be largely eliminated by simply requiring a smallish payment for every
>> request.
>>
>> Second, personal services can be protected by peer-to-peer insurance
>> deposits [8] that quite literally raise the cost of cheating by making both
>> parties agree to a greater sacrifice.
>>
>> Third, in a similar manner, crowdfunding can be fully insured by allowing
>> raised funds to be reverted if the majority of shareholders decides to do
>> so.
>>
>> Finally, systemic predation by the state becomes economically impossible.
>> Most modern states get their funding from debasing money supply (also known
>> as “bond issuance”, “budget deficit”, “inflation”, “quantitative easing”,
>> “stimulus package”). Bitcoin-based economy simply does not allow this as it
>> is very cheap to store bitcoins and verify transactions yourself and
>> completely avoid all kinds of fraud associated with modern banking. As
>> central banking disappears from the state’s arsenal, federal government
>> activities including wars become unfunded and quickly come to an end.
>>
>> Local governments may continue their operations funded by local taxes, but
>> that would become increasingly voluntary. Extracting bitcoins costs much
>> more than protecting them. There is no highly centralized and monitored
>> banking network, so it’s much harder to track taxable transactions. Every
>> additional tax evader defunds the local police department and makes it
>> safer for the next person to underreport earnings if he wishes to do so.
>> Considering that the law enforcement is paid only a small portion of the
>> total budget to be extracted (50% goes to bureaucrats and the rest to other
>> public services), consistently extracting bits of information from millions
>> of individuals is unsustainable in the long run. If anyone is good at
>> stealing bitcoins, they are much better off doing it alone and taking all
>> profits for themselves.
>>
>> Governments, of course, can also tax in kind (like your underreported
>> Ferrari or a house), but this would be even costlier than seizing any kind
>> of money and those costs must be paid by the state in bitcoins that it does
>> not have to start with.
>>
>> If this speculation does not sound to you like a complete lunacy yet, here
>> is the fun part. Most governments are completely broke and can only pay
>> with the IOUs they print. When people start a massive run for bitcoins to
>> protect their wealth, everyone will be able to earn bitcoins for their
>> work, except those who work for the government. Policemen, public school
>> teachers and alike will be the first ones to notice prices rising faster
>> than their salaries. They will the first to change jobs or become largely
>> corrupt on all levels (like it was in Russia after the fall of the Soviet
>> Union). Bureaucrats will smell the approaching panic and, instead of trying
>> to retain control over the employees, will privatize as much public goods
>> as possible, again, exactly like during the fall of the Soviet Union.
>> People will see how all promised public services are either abandoned or
>> stolen, and this time everyone will have a method to protect their own
>> property and do business voluntarily and in an even safer and cheaper way
>> than before. Crypto-anarchy will quickly become a boring reality without
>> the need for anyone to remain fully anonymous.
>>
>> [1]http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html
>>
>> [2]http://www.cypherpunks.to/faq/cyphernomicron/cyphernomicon.txt
>>
>> [3]http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt
>>
>> [4]http://unenumerated.blogspot.co.uk/2005/12/bit-gold.html
>>
>> [5]http://cryptome.org/rpow.htm
>>
>> [6]http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html
>>
>> [7] http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
>>
>> [8]
>> http://blog.oleganza.com/post/58240549599/contracts-without-trust-or-third-parties
>>
>>
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http://wiki.debian.org/LILO
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