ho trovato il post di Oleg Andreev http://blog.oleganza.com/post/71410377996/crypto-anarchy-does-not-require-anonymity è del 28 dicembre, ieri. Da una prima lettura sembrava più vecchio, e non riuscivo a collocarlo temporalmente ... siamo già nel 30c3
2013/12/29 lilo <[email protected]> > On 29/12/2013 10:15, Mauro Pirata wrote: > > Ma questo che data ha? > > quella del 30c3? > > > Il 29/dic/2013 09:46 "mutek" <[email protected]> ha scritto: > > > >> Cypherpunk movement started as a mailing list in 1992. In 1993 Eric > >> Hughes publishes a “A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto” [1]. In 1994 Timothy C. > May > >> publishes “Cypherpunks FAQ” [2]. > >> > >> Here’s an excerpt from the FAQ: > >> > >> 2.3. “What’s the ‘Big Picture’?” > >> > >> Strong crypto is here. It is widely available. It implies many changes > in > >> the way the world works. Private channels between parties who have never > >> met and who never will meet are possible. Totally anonymous, unsinkable, > >> untraceable communications and exchanges are possible. > >> > >> Transactions can only be voluntary, since the parties are untraceable > and > >> unknown and can withdraw at any time. This has profound implications for > >> the conventional approach of using the threat of force, directed against > >> parties by governments or by others. In particular, threats of force > will > >> fail. > >> > >> What emerges from this is unclear, but I think it will be a form of > >> anarcho-capitalist market system I call “crypto anarchy.” (Voluntary > >> communications only, with no third parties butting in.) > >> > >> In 1998 Wei Dai publishes a proposal of “b-money”, a practical way to > >> enforce contractual agreements between anonymous actors [3]. He captured > >> the essence of the movement in an immortal quote: > >> > >> I am fascinated by Tim May’s crypto-anarchy. Unlike the communities > >> traditionally associated with the word “anarchy”, in a crypto-anarchy > the > >> government is not temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and > >> permanently unnecessary. It’s a community where the threat of violence > is > >> impotent because violence is impossible, and violence is impossible > because > >> its participants cannot be linked to their true names or physical > locations. > >> > >> In 2005 Nick Szabo publishes a proposal for “Bit gold” [4], a purely > >> digital collectible based on a proof-of-work algorithm borrowing ideas > from > >> RPOW server (“Reusable proof of work”) by Hal Finney [5]. Proposal does > not > >> mention contract enforcement mechanism, but Nick Szabo himself already > >> proposed several ideas about smart contracts back in the nineties [6]. > >> > >> In late 2008 Satoshi Nakamoto publishes an overview of Bitcoin [7] and > on > >> January 3rd, 2009 releases the code and begins the blockchain. > >> > >> Bitcoin is an exact implementation of the system envisioned by Tim C. > May, > >> Wei Dai and Nick Szabo. The only requirement is for transacting parties > to > >> remain anonymous. If there’s no trace to physical persons, there is no > >> place for the violent intervention and thus the contracts can only be > >> enforced according to the voluntarily agreed-upon rules between the > >> parties. Bitcoin allows encoding these rules right in the transactions > so > >> they are automatically enforced by the whole network. > >> > >> In practice, we cannot imagine living in full anonymity. Human beings > live > >> in a physical world and enjoy a lot of physical things. Anonymity is not > >> something you can easily manage like a single encryption key. It must be > >> maintained via careful dissemination of one’s actions among actions of > >> others. And since the network activity is easily recordable, one > mistake is > >> enough to reveal oneself. In other words, the cost of anonymity is > rather > >> high compared to the benefits. Does this mean crypto-anarchy is an > utopia? > >> > >> I would argue, it’s far from it. Cypherpunks being rigorous scientists > >> made a much stronger assumption than needed in practice. For transacting > >> parties it is enough to have costs of cheating meaningfully higher than > the > >> cost of following the contract. If that condition holds for the > majority of > >> the interactions in society, there will be a great incentive for people > to > >> protect themselves against remaining rare cases of cheating thus keeping > >> the system sustainable. Anonymity is simply one of the ways to raise the > >> cost of the attack. > >> > >> Bitcoin raises the cost of many kinds of attacks, going far beyond > >> protecting against central banks meddling with money supply. > >> > >> First, all sorts of computational services will flourish. Machines never > >> need to disclose their physical locations and can freely automate both > >> payment verification and payments themselves. Denial-of-service and spam > >> can be largely eliminated by simply requiring a smallish payment for > every > >> request. > >> > >> Second, personal services can be protected by peer-to-peer insurance > >> deposits [8] that quite literally raise the cost of cheating by making > both > >> parties agree to a greater sacrifice. > >> > >> Third, in a similar manner, crowdfunding can be fully insured by > allowing > >> raised funds to be reverted if the majority of shareholders decides to > do > >> so. > >> > >> Finally, systemic predation by the state becomes economically > impossible. > >> Most modern states get their funding from debasing money supply (also > known > >> as “bond issuance”, “budget deficit”, “inflation”, “quantitative > easing”, > >> “stimulus package”). Bitcoin-based economy simply does not allow this > as it > >> is very cheap to store bitcoins and verify transactions yourself and > >> completely avoid all kinds of fraud associated with modern banking. As > >> central banking disappears from the state’s arsenal, federal government > >> activities including wars become unfunded and quickly come to an end. > >> > >> Local governments may continue their operations funded by local taxes, > but > >> that would become increasingly voluntary. Extracting bitcoins costs much > >> more than protecting them. There is no highly centralized and monitored > >> banking network, so it’s much harder to track taxable transactions. > Every > >> additional tax evader defunds the local police department and makes it > >> safer for the next person to underreport earnings if he wishes to do so. > >> Considering that the law enforcement is paid only a small portion of the > >> total budget to be extracted (50% goes to bureaucrats and the rest to > other > >> public services), consistently extracting bits of information from > millions > >> of individuals is unsustainable in the long run. If anyone is good at > >> stealing bitcoins, they are much better off doing it alone and taking > all > >> profits for themselves. > >> > >> Governments, of course, can also tax in kind (like your underreported > >> Ferrari or a house), but this would be even costlier than seizing any > kind > >> of money and those costs must be paid by the state in bitcoins that it > does > >> not have to start with. > >> > >> If this speculation does not sound to you like a complete lunacy yet, > here > >> is the fun part. Most governments are completely broke and can only pay > >> with the IOUs they print. When people start a massive run for bitcoins > to > >> protect their wealth, everyone will be able to earn bitcoins for their > >> work, except those who work for the government. Policemen, public school > >> teachers and alike will be the first ones to notice prices rising faster > >> than their salaries. They will the first to change jobs or become > largely > >> corrupt on all levels (like it was in Russia after the fall of the > Soviet > >> Union). Bureaucrats will smell the approaching panic and, instead of > trying > >> to retain control over the employees, will privatize as much public > goods > >> as possible, again, exactly like during the fall of the Soviet Union. > >> People will see how all promised public services are either abandoned or > >> stolen, and this time everyone will have a method to protect their own > >> property and do business voluntarily and in an even safer and cheaper > way > >> than before. Crypto-anarchy will quickly become a boring reality without > >> the need for anyone to remain fully anonymous. > >> > >> [1]http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html > >> > >> [2]http://www.cypherpunks.to/faq/cyphernomicron/cyphernomicon.txt > >> > >> [3]http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt > >> > >> [4]http://unenumerated.blogspot.co.uk/2005/12/bit-gold.html > >> > >> [5]http://cryptome.org/rpow.htm > >> > >> [6]http://szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_idea.html > >> > >> [7] http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf > >> > >> [8] > >> > http://blog.oleganza.com/post/58240549599/contracts-without-trust-or-third-parties > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Open > >> https://lists.partito-pirata.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/open > >> > > _______________________________________________ > > Open > > https://lists.partito-pirata.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/open > > > > > -- > lilo > http://wiki.debian.org/LILO > #### > -Da grande faro' il cattivo esempio, questo e' uno stage formativo- > bit in rebels > GnuPG/PGP Key-Id: 0x5D172559 > FINGERPRINT: AB62 DC0E 3CB3 2B83 6333 5DF4 9674 A4B3 5D17 2559 > server: pgp.mit.edu > > > -------------- parte successiva -------------- > Un allegato non testuale è stato rimosso.... > Nome: 0x5D172559.asc > Tipo: application/pgp-keys > Dimensione: 8101 bytes > Descrizione: non disponibile > URL: < > https://lists.partito-pirata.it/pipermail/open/attachments/20131229/06c10c10/attachment.key > > > _______________________________________________ > Open > https://lists.partito-pirata.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/open > -- fermiamo le stragi in mare, firma la petizione https://secure.avaaz.org/it/petition/ai_Presidenti_di_Camera_e_Senato_Italia_che_aprano_unindagine_parlamentare_sul_naufragio_nave_profughi_siriani/ _______________________________________________ Open https://lists.partito-pirata.it/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/open
