Hi Ives,

It should be mentioned in the documention - if not, we should fix this:
The idea ist the following:

        - the key is protected by its pin
          (which is given at request time or set by the ca)
        - if you download you have to give the key-pin as credential to
          get access to the key and for decryption

the problem with this workflow is the following:

        - the key-pin is exposed to brute-force attacs on the web
          this would be like, putting the key (even encrypted) somewhere
          and waiving - hey poeple come and try yourself ;)

You can fix that if your users only submit PKCS#10 requests. Then, the private key is never exposed on the web. It works well with Firefox and IE, as far as I tested.

therefore we decided to protect the key-pin with a separate download-pin
which has to be set from the ra-officer

        - so a possible mallicous user would first have to 'crack' the
          download pin to get any useful information about the
          correctness of the key-pin used at the webpage
        - in other words, he can't do a simple 'brute-force' attac on
          the key-pin, since its guarded by the download-pin

??? Isn't that the same (even worse) than just making the key-pin a bit longer? If you extend the key-pin by one number, you get 10x the security of the previous pin-length. If you introduce a "download-pin", it just adds a constant factor, that is usually smaller than the key-pin (unless you make it longer than the key pin, but that doesn't seem to make sense). With a download-pin at the same length as the key pin, you just get 2x the security instead of 10x by just adding one number to the key pin.

Greetings,

Georg


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