Hi,
The problem is not as much a counterfeit access point, as a counterfeit
RADIUS server.
A counterfeit access point might launch attacks such as distributing
rogue routing parameters through DHCP. However that would be true of any
Wi-Fi network you connect to.
A counterfeit RADIUS server might steal your identifiers, which in some
organisations are not specific to the Eduroam service.
Dimitri
Le 11/09/2024 à 05:29, Daniel Lenski a écrit :
Interesting. eduroam is the only 802.1x-using wifi network that I've
ever configured *for myself*.
But as an end user of eduroam, why should I actually be concerned if
I've connected to a "counterfeit" eduroam access point, as long as it
gives me real internet connectivity? The eduroam network doesn't
really give me access to any particular internal network. There isn't
really a trust boundary with eduroam. And if my device is sending any
non-e2ee'd-and-cert-validated traffic, it's already susceptible to
eavesdropping and MITM attacks by middleboxes on *any* network.
Am I missing something in this case?
I'd contrast this with a corporate or institutional wifi network
("BigCorp-Internal") where connecting to the internal network might
imply some actual trust boundary between inside and outside, and so a
forged AP would be of concern both to admins and to end users.
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