Darren, The Brasero case (LSARC/2009/201) is still open. So these issues can be addressed by both Brian (LSARC/2009/202) and Lin Ma (LSARC/2009/201).
Thanks, John Darren J Moffat wrote: > Brian Cameron wrote: >> So, much like brasero, the following lines will be added to >> exec_attr(4) >> to support this: >> >> Desktop CD >> User:solaris:cmd:::/usr/bin/rhythmbox.bin:privs=sys_devices >> Desktop CD >> User:solaris:cmd:::/usr/bin/sound-juicer.bin:privs=sys_devices >> Desktop CD User:solaris:cmd:::/usr/bin/totem.bin:privs=sys_devices > > How does this work on Linux kernel based systems ? How do these > programs get access to the devices ? > > Given what these programs do I suspect what what is really wanted is > read and sometimes write access to the CD/DVD device nodes. > > Running them with sys_devices to over come that feels really wrong. > Particularly given that "Desktop CD User" is ultimately being added to > "Console User". > > Can't we instead use logindevperm so that the CD/DVD devices are made > available with suitable unix permissions - just like we already do for > USB removable-media devices, generic usb devices, video devices etc. > > While there exists precedent for this hack I really don't like it and > having it proliferated further isn't a good idea. > > Sorry I didn't bring this up in the previous brasero case. > > -- > Darren J Moffat
