Someone that understands EAP better than myself should probably provide input. But my limited understand of EAP-FAST is it contributes to the master secret calculation used for the TLS session. See section RFC 4851 Section 5.1. My understanding is this logic applies to both new and resumed sessions. Hence, tls_session_secret_cb() is always in play for EAP-FAST.

On 03/26/2015 02:13 PM, Emilia Käsper wrote:


On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 2:01 PM, John Foley <fol...@cisco.com <mailto:fol...@cisco.com>> wrote:

    Trying again w/o PGP...  :-)

    Thanks for taking a look at this problem.  Regarding how to handle
    a failure in the session secret callback, the legacy logic would
    likely result in a "bad record mac" error because the master
    secrets on the client/server do not match.


But only in case we are actually resuming - no? Does the client always have a PAC available - I would guess not? Seems the legacy logic is such that it "happens to work", but I'd like to clear it up.

      It would be good to trigger an internal error to aid with
    troubleshooting.  Maybe something like:

            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            goto err;

It's debatable whether the alert needs to be sent to the server. Since this is an internal error, it should be safe to send the
    alert.  Therefore, maybe you would actually want to do something like:

            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
            goto f_err;




    On 03/23/2015 09:17 PM, Emilia Käsper wrote:


    On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 1:20 AM, John Foley (foleyj)
    <fol...@cisco.com <mailto:fol...@cisco.com>> wrote:

        We've found a way to recreate the scenario using
        s_client/s_server.  We're using the -no_ticket option on the
        server. Therefore, the ServerHello doesn't contain the
        session ticket extension.  It also doesn't send the
        NewSessionTicket message.

        To summarize the problem, when the client side is using
        SSL_set_session_secret_cb() and including a valid ticket in
        the ClintHello, then the logic in ssl3_get_server_hello()
        assumes the server is doing session resumption.  This puts
        the client-side state machine into the
        SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A.  However, since the server side is
        configured to not do resumption via the -no_ticket option,
        the server continues with a normal handshake by sending the
        Certificate message.  The client aborts the handshake when it
        receives the Certificate message while in the
        SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A state.


        As Erik identified earlier in the thread, the cause of this
        appears to be the addition of setting s->hit in the following
        code:

            if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
                SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
        s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
                if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
         &s->session->master_key_length,
                                             NULL, &pref_cipher,
         s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
                    s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
                        pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
                    s->hit = 1;
                }
            }

        Why does the client-side now assume the server is doing
        session resumption simply because the session secret callback
        facility is being used?


    Because a developer (me) introduced a bug. With OpenSSL client
    behaviour, peeking ahead is only required for EAP-FAST. I got rid
    of the peeking while tightening up the ChangeCipherSpec handling
    and in the process, got it wrong for EAP-FAST. Anyway, apologies,
    I see the problem and am working on a patch.

    While we're at it, you may be able to help me with the following
    question: how should the client handle callback failure? The old
    code (pre my refactoring which introduced the bug) did this

    #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
        /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared 
secret */
        if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
                {
                SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
                s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
                if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
                                             &s->session->master_key_length,
                                             NULL, &pref_cipher,
                                             s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
                        {
                        s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
                                pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
                        }
                }
    #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
    This is surely wrong as it's just ignoring the failure?
    Thanks,
    Emilia

        ________________________________________
        From: openssl-dev [openssl-dev-boun...@openssl.org
        <mailto:openssl-dev-boun...@openssl.org>] on behalf of Dr.
        Stephen Henson [st...@openssl.org <mailto:st...@openssl.org>]
        Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2015 11:49 AM
        To: openssl-dev@openssl.org <mailto:openssl-dev@openssl.org>
        Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] s3_clnt.c changes regarding
        external pre-shared secret seem to break EAP-FAST

        On Thu, Mar 19, 2015, Erik Tkal wrote:

        >
        > If I do not send a sessionID in the clientHello but do send
        a valid
        > sessionTicket extension, the server goes straight to
        changeCipherSpec and
        > the client generates an UnexpectedMessage alert.
        >

        Does the server send back an empty session ticket extension?

        Steve.
        --
        Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer.
        Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org
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