>
> The 'RAND_add()/RAND_bytes()' pattern is broken
> ===============================================
>
> In OpenSSL, the classical way for the RNG consumer to add his own randomness
> is to call 'RAND_add()' before
> calling 'RAND_bytes()'. If the new 'RAND_OpenSSL()' method (the
> "compatibility layer" hiding the public
> RAND_DRBG instance) is the default, then this does not work as expected
> anymore:
>
> The reason is that a call to 'RAND_add()' adds the provided randomness only
> to a global buffer
> ('rand_bytes'), from which it will be pulled during the next reseed. But no
> reseed is triggered. So the next
> RAND_bytes() call will be unaffected from the RAND_add(), which is not what
> the consumer expected. (The same
> holds for 'RAND_seed()', since 'drbg_seed()' only calls into 'drbg_add()')
>
> Reseeding of DRBGs occurs only at the following occasions:
>
> * immediately after a 'fork()' (new)
> * if the 'reseed_counter' exceeds the 'reseed_interval'
> * if 'RAND_DRBG_generate()' is called requesting 'prediction_resistance'
> * 'RAND_DRBG_reseed()' is called explicitely
>
> *Note:* Currently it looks like the situation is even worse: if 'RAND_add()'
> is called multiple times before
> a reseed occurs, then the result of the previous call is overwritten.
I just posted GitHub PR #4328 related to this issue
[openssl/openssl] WIP: Fix the RAND_add() reseeding issue (#4328)
Matthias St. Pierre
smime.p7s
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