I like this PR. Thank you!
> On Sep 3, 2017, at 17:53, Dr. Matthias St. Pierre
> <matthias.st.pie...@ncp-e.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> The 'RAND_add()/RAND_bytes()' pattern is broken
>> ===============================================
>>
>> In OpenSSL, the classical way for the RNG consumer to add his own randomness
>> is to call 'RAND_add()' before
>> calling 'RAND_bytes()'. If the new 'RAND_OpenSSL()' method (the
>> "compatibility layer" hiding the public
>> RAND_DRBG instance) is the default, then this does not work as expected
>> anymore:
>>
>> The reason is that a call to 'RAND_add()' adds the provided randomness only
>> to a global buffer
>> ('rand_bytes'), from which it will be pulled during the next reseed. But no
>> reseed is triggered. So the next
>> RAND_bytes() call will be unaffected from the RAND_add(), which is not what
>> the consumer expected. (The same
>> holds for 'RAND_seed()', since 'drbg_seed()' only calls into 'drbg_add()')
>>
>> Reseeding of DRBGs occurs only at the following occasions:
>>
>> * immediately after a 'fork()' (new)
>> * if the 'reseed_counter' exceeds the 'reseed_interval'
>> * if 'RAND_DRBG_generate()' is called requesting 'prediction_resistance'
>> * 'RAND_DRBG_reseed()' is called explicitely
>>
>> *Note:* Currently it looks like the situation is even worse: if 'RAND_add()'
>> is called multiple times before
>> a reseed occurs, then the result of the previous call is overwritten.
>
>
> I just posted GitHub PR #4328 related to this issue
>
> [openssl/openssl] WIP: Fix the RAND_add() reseeding issue (#4328)
>
>
> Matthias St. Pierre
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