On Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 4:26 PM, mclellan, dave <dave.mclel...@emc.com> wrote: > We are starting our FIPS implementation soon (FIPS OM 2.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.1) > and I’d like to test out this set of assumptions (or maybe they are > ‘assertions’) > > - In the context of OpenSSL, FIPS compliance is all about algorithm > choice. In FIPS mode (FIPS_mode_set() returns success), weaker algorithms > are disabled and OpenSSL returns an error if use of them is attempted in > FIPS mode. > > - As long as one side of the connection insists that FIPS-approved > algorithms be used, and as long as the other side is capable and agrees, > then the two negotiate only a FIPS-approved algorithm. > > o Both sides might be implemented with OpenSSL, but only one of them has > to be running in FIPS mode for the negotiation to choose a FIPS algorithm. > > o If one side is not implemented with OpenSSL, the same is still true: as > long as it can negotiate a shared cipher with an process running in > FIPS-mode, FIPS compliance is still achieved. > > - Technically the phrase ‘FIPS compliant’ refers to the software > capability; it does not describe the quality of an end-to-end connection. > That is, if a running program is ‘FIPS-compliant’ it will insure that a safe > connection will be negotiated, where ‘safe connection’ means ‘a connection > using a FIPS-approved algorithm’. > > Having written these, they now seem like dumb questions, but I’d rather have > affirmation of assertions and appear dumb than do the wrong thing based on a > wrong assumption. Steve Marquess makes it look easy. Don't be fooled. I often email him for a sidebar on FIPS questions.
Jeff ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List openssl-users@openssl.org Automated List Manager majord...@openssl.org
