1:
correct: you could still evesdrop on the connection, BUT we know who
is on there since we authenticated. (It is a storage system, not on a
public network and has an internal network for communicating between the
node (approx 30PB and 50 servers)
We know exactly who are on there and 'things' are tracked per user, it
wouldn't make sense to "sniff" other people's connections, besides we'd
know.
2:
It is for internal communication between nodes in a distributed storage
system (as I mentioned 30PB 50 servers). The users will never be
directly to the network (an IB fabric between servers) The users are on
a front end talking to several "connectors" data transfer nodes.
I want the authentication as if it was a Unix box with hard drives. Once
you're authenticated you have "unencrypted" access to the drives... the
stuff with your permissions. This networked cluster is nothing more than
a "cluster drive"
On 12/03/2015 03:32 PM, Jacob Champion wrote:
On 12/03/2015 01:50 PM, Richard Moore wrote:
If network is fully isolated you could use plain text. Using 'https'
and null encryption is basically just pretending to do security.
I've never done any work with the eNULL ciphers, so please correct me if
I'm wrong, but wouldn't they still prevent active tampering with the
HTTPS communication?
(I understand your point; most web applications today require
confidentiality to be secure, since sniffing cookies and passwords will
give you access to the system, but maybe the OP has a use case that
doesn't require it.)
--Jacob
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