On Jul 10, 2018, at 3:52 AM, Andrej Ota <and...@ota.si> wrote:
> 
> Could it be that we misunderstood each other as to what b) pertains to? a) is 
> obviously wrong as we certainly don't have to stop at documenting current 
> practices or even care about current practices if they result in an insecure 
> deployment.
> 
> For b) I don't find it controversial as long as we can agree that 
> "implementation" means "how clients and servers implement documented 
> protocol" and not "how do operators deploy clients and servers". I.e. 
> "implementation" and "practice" refer to two different things.

  The draft should document how to implement *and* deploy TACACS+ as securely 
as we know how.  If that "invalidates" current implementations and practices, 
too bad.

  Again, vendors and administrators are free to ignore the recommendations of 
the draft.  But they need to *know*.

  If the draft permits deployments we know to be insecure, then that's wrong.  
And yes, such practice *would be* "rubber stamping" existing practices.

  While the requirement is to document the historical protocol, that does *not* 
mean endorsing 20 year-old insecure practices.  The IETF has a responsibility 
to secure the Internet, among other things.  Where that responsibility 
conflicts with vendor / operator desire to do insecure things, then the larger 
Internet security will prevail.

> Then we can comb for ambiguous statements like "server MUST implement CHAP in 
> exclusion to PAP" and reword them to say "operators MUST use servers and 
> clients configured to disallow authentication methods other that CHAP".

  PAP is fine so long as (a) it's in a management network, or (b) it's 
"protected" by the obfuscation mechanism.

  The spec should just describe the requirements. How the implementors and 
administrators deploy it is up to them.

  e.g. "PAP MUST NOT be used outside of management networks, unless the packets 
are protected by the obfuscation mechanism."

  Alan DeKok.

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