Just to be clear. I'm on the fence.

SBOMs and security advisory information, although delivered separately, go
hand in hand.

I think this draft is pretty close to done. Adding security advisories to
it, in my opinion, would require changes to the introduction and security
considerations sections.

I think it's cleaner to leave security advisories out of scope for this.

Deferring to the WG sounds like a reasonable idea.

Thanks Eliot

On Thu, May 27, 2021 at 1:20 AM Eliot Lear <l...@lear.ch> wrote:

> I don't mind.  If it helps I can relabel some of the containers to
> generalize.  Also keep in mind, the extension does not REQUIRE any elements
> in the MUD file.  But I think the WG should make a call on this.  If it is
> a bit far aways from the SBOM, we could write another draft.
> On 26.05.21 13:46, Patrick Dwyer wrote:
>
> I agree with all of that. Perhaps not on whether it belongs here though.
> This draft, so far, is completely focused on SBOMs. Not on vulnerability
> information or advisories.
>
> Perhaps it would be better served as a separate MUD extension and
> well-known URI?
>
> On Wed, May 26, 2021 at 4:39 PM Eliot Lear <l...@lear.ch> wrote:
>
>> Hi Patrick,
>>
>> Snipping to the meat:
>> On 26.05.21 05:08, Patrick Dwyer wrote:
>>
>> True, although I wouldn't expect a CSAF reference in isolation in this
>> case.
>>
>> I think different manufacturers will hold different points of view on
>> this.  Some may simply be required to release an SBOM based on some
>> regulatory requirement.  Some not, and some may wish to release an SBOM
>> without using this mechanism.
>>
>>
>>
>>> > I also think this is one of those things that crosses a logical
>>> > boundary that is no longer about discovering and accessing an SBOM.
>>>
>>> That is true.  But not a huge stretch.
>>>
>>>
>> It's not a huge stretch. But this is also tied to a particular format for
>> this type of information. Personally I think CSAF is *the* format to
>> use. But that might not be the case in some particular industries and
>> countries.
>>
>> Yes.  I myself am hemming and hawing on this point a bit...  Let's just
>> delve into that a bit more:
>>
>> On the one hand, we have one really good candidate, CSAF.  On the other
>> hand, one might want to refer to the Old (more deployed) Stuff, which does
>> almost as good a job, CVRF.  On the third hand, it is possible that this
>> information could be included directly in a schema like CycloneDX, either
>> directly or as an extension.  On the fourth hand, the information could be
>> included as a reference by the underlying SBOM format, as you mentioned
>> earlier.
>>
>> So what are the principles here?  I think they are these:
>>
>>    1. If the information exists outside the context of an SBOM, it
>>    should be made known.
>>    2. Don't make the end device do work.  Leave that to the network
>>    management.
>>    3. When there's one really overwhelmingly good candidate, use it and
>>    don't overcomplicate the network management.
>>    4. Provide some flexibility for the idea that these formats may
>>    change.
>>    5. Don't duplicate information elements.
>>
>> Some of these principles conflict.  Here's what I suggest:
>>
>>    1. If the information is included in the SBOM there is no need for a
>>    MUD file to include the new element.
>>    2. If the information is NOT included in the SBOM, or the SBOM isn't
>>    available, there is a need to provide the new element.
>>    3. Let's change the name of the element from "csaf-location" to
>>    "vulnerability-info", and make use of the same mechanism we used for SBOMs
>>    to decide, with a suggestion that CSAF be the preferred initial format for
>>    consumers.  This splits the baby a bit, but perhaps covers your concern?
>>
>> Also note that with CSAF I am taking a certain liberty to constrain the
>> CSAF reference in this case to contain a single product, so that we don't
>> get into a naming fiasco.  Naming.  I hate naming.
>>
>> Eliot
>>
>>
>>
_______________________________________________
OPSAWG mailing list
OPSAWG@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg

Reply via email to