Howdy Roger, I thought the original question was asking about an alternative to torbutton.
No plans to include torbutton in future versions of xB Browser. The reason we took it out is because it is counter-intuitive to user behaviors. Most users don't want a browser for both "anonymous" and "public" sessions. As an analogy, you may find people prefer to feed their dogs with different spoons than they themselves use, and it isn't for lack of a sanitizing dishwasher. So the user seems to prefer an entirely different disposable session, instead of "states" as provided by TorButton. Because our focus is user- oriented instead of design-oriented, elimination of TorButton was obvious. This conveys many benefits, not the least of which being one less point of failure and zero learning curve for the user. A greater benefit is that this promotes and enables concurrent browser usage so the user does not have to give up the browser they are used to. I feel this significantly increases the chance that the user will keep on employing a "secure" browser, rather than being faced with the choice between between having to integrate and learn something new, or turning off the "warning lights" and going back to insecure browsing habits. Wow, poor English. However, a significant distinction has to be made so the users do not confuse the "secure" browser with their normal browser, so we introduced the XeroBank Modern firefox theme, based on the defunct Netscape browser. More good news, though. At 6.7m download requests, I think we are now getting a strong idea of the user, and the appropriate threat model, so it may be time to start writing some papers that establish the evolutionary principles of xBB. Steve