Excellent information.
 
Bruce
 
 
 

http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=6899
August 8, 2005
Europe's New Terror Profile and the State of Play in the Balkans

by Christopher Deliso
balkanalysis.com

The latest revelations from European terror "experts" hardly come as news
for us in the Balkans – that is, the confluence between terrorism and
organized crime, and the increasingly fluid, almost transient nature of
their organizational structures.

First of all, relays the IHT:

"'We are seeing a terrorist threat that keeps changing,' Pierre de Bousquet,
the head of France's domestic intelligence service, said in an interview in
Paris. 'Often the groups are not homogenous, but a variety of blends.

"'Hard-core Islamists are mixing with petty criminals. People of different
backgrounds and nationalities are working together. Some are European-born
or have dual nationalities that make it easier for them to travel. The
networks are much less structured than we used to believe. Maybe it's the
mosque that brings them together, maybe it's prison, maybe it's the
neighborhood. And that makes it much more difficult to identify them and
uproot them.'"

As usual, what is news to Western Europe has long been known here. Yet a
jittery "international community" has largely ignored it, being eager not to
rock the boat of alleged ethnic "confidence-building" by pointing fingers.
However, this public front does not mean that EU intelligence services have
been ignoring the issue, as we will see later.

Considering the vast amount of material already existing on the Internet
regarding Balkan terrorism, I will only discuss a few unique examples, and
provide links to or brief summaries of things I consider to be common
(enough) knowledge.

Nevertheless, for other exclusive info I've written on these topics – texts
that can only be found in one place – you'll want to see the special message
in the last section of this article.

The CIA Bears Down on the Balkans

IPS News reported on 25 July that in the wake of the London bombings, the
powers that be are looking at the Balkans with renewed interest – and
specifically, at the intersection of terrorism and crime here.

According to IPS, new CIA chief Porter Goss visited Sarajevo and Tirana last
month, in the words of British military and defense analyst Paul Beaver, "to
express grave concerns of Washington because of [these governments']
cooperation with radical Islamic groups." According to Beaver, "a part of
the investigation dealing with the London blasts is aimed at links between
radical Islamists in Bosnia and Kosovo with international terrorist groups"
in cahoots with powerful Albanian mafia clans. A Bosnian Serb news source
added that Goss handed the government a list of 900 names of potential
al-Qaeda-linked individuals.


Terror and Criminality

The contention that the former Albanian paramilitary group that fought
Milosevic in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, UCK in Albanian) was
connected with Islamic terrorist organizations has been fiercely contested.
The pro-Albanian lobby denies it vehemently, whereas the pro-Serb faction
upholds the thesis. The facts, however, lend at least partial support to the
latter, for the period up to and during NATO's 1999 intervention. The
argument that the KLA has always been funded by organized crime is also
beyond doubt.

Whether the post-1999 KLA continued to foster ties with foreign
fundamentalists is a more difficult question. After all, with the war
concluded victoriously, what use would the secular enough KLA have for such
people?

After NATO, the KLA was officially "decommissioned." A large number of these
former "freedom fighters" were assimilated into the Kosovo Protection Corps
(KPC), the heavy-handed police force that has served side-by-side with the
UNMIK police. But behind it all were the powerful warlords from various
clans, the most famous being Hasim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj, the erstwhile
Kosovo "prime minister" currently facing trial in the Hague. Even perceived
peaceniks such as President Ibrahim Rugova were said to have their own
"private armies," or at least a very substantial security detail.

Still, as in every post-revolutionary situation, not everyone could be
satisfied. Kosovo quickly descended into gangland murders as the numerous
factions and interests staked out their turf. The events of 9/11, and the
resulting crackdown on Islamic fundamentalists across the Balkans, only
exacerbated this splintering process, which has heated up over the past few
months.

A Whistleblower Emerges

http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/gambill.jpg
Former OSCE Security Officer Thomas Gambill:
"the UN didn't want to know" about Islamic terrorism in Kosovo.

By early 2002, the Albanian militant/criminal movement had divided into at
least three different groups, says Thomas Gambill, a former OSCE security
chief with responsibility for the eastern part of Kosovo. "You had the
hardcore nationalists; the common criminals, and the Islamic fanatics," says
the burly, silver-haired former Marine, describing the groups he was tasked
with monitoring.

A red-blooded American and spirited supporter of the "war on terror,"
Gambill worked in Kosovo from October 1999 until a tense departure in spring
2004, not long after the March riots. Throughout his tenure, he believed
that UNMIK was trying to avoid the escalating threat of terrorist attacks,
the increasing chokehold of the Mafia, and their connections with Islamic
fundamentalists. But when he started to blow the whistle, Gambill was
ignored, then reprimanded. "They just didn't want to hear it," he says. "For
them, I was a headache."

When I met with Tom Gambill last spring in Pristina, just prior to his
departure from the mission, he spoke with frustration of a series of e-mails
he had sent back to a State Department staffer, which apparently had been
received with little interest. Recently, Gambill repeated to me his claims
that OSCE superiors had "warned" him repeatedly regarding his habit of
"sending out 'unsolicited' reports to official sources concerning the
Albanian extremists' strategy, activity of the Islamic extremists, and other
bits of information that I had confirmed concerning criminal activity."
While it's difficult to prove, Gambill believes his whistleblowing had
something to do with his OSCE contract not being extended.

Factionalized Fighters

Aside from fighting over the loot, the KLA split was also caused by candid
assessments of what path would most satisfy common interests. But by early
2003, when the so-called Albanian National Army (ANA, or AKSH in Albanian)
started up a high-profile series of bombings, the camps were defined.

The nationalists were split between diehard ANA supporters and those less
keen on the "Greater Albania" project. Both sides were fearful of upsetting
their relationship with the United States, and they sought to distance
themselves from the Islamists, whom they correctly regarded as being
unhelpful in respect to winning their ultimate goal of an independent
Kosovo. The Islamists, however, were motivated by religion and supported by
foreign governments and their NGOs – chiefly those of Saudi Arabia, the
Emirates, and Iran. Many of these charities were shut down in the aftermath
of 9/11, though others hung on. The goal of these governments throughout has
been to proliferate their own brands of Islam in Kosovo, under the guise of
humanitarian relief and with the tangible result of mosque-building.

Both groups had a lot in common with the third, the armed common criminals;
in fact, this bunch was spawned by and predated both (along with those
recruits drawn by money and not ideologies). Now, the overlap is almost
total. The powerful Albanian Mafia has long had a large share of the
European heroin market and also trades in women, weapons, and stolen
antiquities, among other goods. By necessity, maintaining such an operation
in the global age involves "cooperation" with diverse and far-flung groups.
Foreign Islamists make up merely one.

Three Necessities

Contrary to what spirited defenders of the Serbs argue, it does not seem
that Islamic ideology has played the key role in drawing most Albanians to
fight. So why would the Albanians – nationalists, criminals, or otherwise –
need the Islamists?

For the answer to this question, we must keep in mind three things: global
trafficking routes; sustaining the rule of lawlessness; and unique services
provided by foreign Islamic factions.

One of America's enduring achievements in Afghanistan has been the
renaissance of poppy cultivation there. Britain's Sunday Telegraph revealed
two weeks ago that while Britain has been tasked to lead the eradication of
Afghanistan's drug trade, instead, "after 18 months, the level of opium
cultivation in Afghanistan has reached an all-time high of nearly half a
million acres."

The route of heroin trafficking continues strongly from that country through
Central Asia and Turkey. Indeed, as a Turkish professor once described the
country's huge foreign debt to his students, "50 billion dollars worth of
foreign debt is nothing – it is two lorry loads of heroin."

However, once the drugs cross into the Balkans, there is lawless Kosovo –
one of the epicenters of European heroin distribution and processing, with
spillover operations in border areas of neighboring states.

Take Macedonia's Albanian-populated village of Aracinovo, tucked into the
hills of the Skopska Crna Gora mountain range just over the border with
Kosovo. A former Macedonian special policeman involved in the botched raid
on Aracinovo during the 2001 war says that he was amazed but what he saw:
"there were heroin labs, a series of well-constructed tunnels, and better
Western medical equipment than even we have in the State Clinic! To this
day, I can't believe what I saw there."

The battle of Aracinovo descended into farce when NATO evacuated armed
Albanian militants, who clambered aboard the "fun bus" along with foreign
mujahedin and 17 American MPRI military advisors. While the U.S. denies this
covert involvement, a Dutch intelligence report from 2002 affirmed it,
claiming that the EU was furious. This damning 2001 report quotes another
soldier involved, who provides details regarding not only American
involvement but that of mujahedin on the Albanian side.

The second factor is that of lawlessness. Keeping Kosovo outside the rule of
law is key for both the Mafia and the Islamists. As long as it remains a
gray zone with indefinite borders, legislation, and competencies, not to
mention an international administration too timid to exert much authority,
organized crime can flourish. And, in the villages especially, the
vendetta-based rule of the clans trumps any so-called "Western" style of
governance.

Third is the issue of services rendered. One example, certainly not the
biggest, is "selling" money – old Kuwaiti dinars, stolen after Saddam's
invasion of Kuwait and returned to Yugoslavia by emigrant workers – to
Arabs. As one Arab with long experience of Kosovo told me, "to try and sell
that kind of money directly, you need to have connections with high bank
officials or others in the Arab world … otherwise they will be very
suspicious and ask where it came from."

The Reality Macedonia report above claims this practice occurred on a large
scale, and even involved Western banks, as far back as 1997. After 9/11,
it's getting harder to pull off. Yet to this day, Albanians (and other
former Yugoslavs) are still trying to trade in their old Kuwaiti assets –
and this is where the foreign Islamists come in. So far they have met with
mixed results, as establishing a level of trust (not to mention a favorable
exchange rate) has proven difficult. Nevertheless, the UN police have made
at least one arrest, of a Syrian, in conjunction with this trade.

Operational Failings

Nevertheless, UNMIK, KFOR, and other international security organizations
have fallen short repeatedly in their quest to stifle extremism in Kosovo.
In some cases, they have shut down charities that were probably benign; in
other cases, they have neglected potentially dangerous ones, despite the
objections of security officers such as Tom Gambill, who lists some by name.

A failure to cultivate good ties with Serbian intelligence has also been a
problem. Usually Serbian warnings of Islamic terrorist activities are met
with suspicion by a cynical West. However, they incontestably have the
experience, the knowledge, and the intelligence to make a contribution to
the fight against terror – if the West really is sincere about that
particular campaign.

A second major restriction on good policing efforts in the province is the
poor quality and limited mandates of security personnel in Kosovo. Most U.S.
personnel in the UNMIK police come on six-month to one-year contracts, hired
through domestic security contractors, with the previous experience of being
small-town, doughnut-shop cops. There are few Jean-Claude Van Dammes to be
found amongst the UNMIK ranks. And, given the high turnover rate since 1999
(very few officials from that time still remain), there is also little
chance for continuity or coordination of information-gathering, either in
terms of technique or of content.

Says Gambill, "they [the UN] didn't really understood what was going on –
and they didn't want to know. There was no continuity of mission, or pass-on
intel." According to him, despite repeated efforts to educate the American
authorities about the presence of al-Qaeda-related groups and their
connections with organized crime, "they weren't interested." However, before
returning to America, where he has established a trucking firm, Gambill made
sure to take his four-gigabyte collection of police reports, photos, and
other incriminating evidence about the presence of Islamic terrorist
factions in Kosovo. He is looking for a publisher for the book he is writing
about his experiences there.

A third restriction is a quite obvious one, and it in part explains the
timidity of most UN officials in Kosovo: that is, securing their own lives.
All internationals in Kosovo are sitting ducks; they live in the apartments,
frequent the restaurants, stay in the hotels, and shop in the stores owned
by locals. At any given moment, any of them, from the lowliest secretary to
the highest UN representative, can be killed. So where's the incentive for
these officials, waiting out their lavishly overpaid term before heading for
yet another peacekeeping mission somewhere else, to take on the Albanian
Mafia or the Islamic fundamentalists?

In one of those bizarre cases of blowback-in-waiting, celebrated illegal
alien/KLA weapons smuggler Florin Krasniqi recently vowed from New York that
if the UN does not vacate Kosovo and give it independence, "we will throw
the United Nations out … we have a team of snipers here in the U.S. ready to
be dispatched on very short notice."

Note that this is the same man who donates heavily to the Democrats and who
said, "with money, you can do amazing things in this country. ... Senators
and congressmen are looking for donations, and if you raise the money they
need for their campaigns, they pay you back."

Euro Interest Revealed; New Tensions in Macedonia and Beyond

Despite the seeming novelty of the latest Euro disclosures cited above by
the IHT, the possibility of the conjunction of Islamic terrorism, organized
crime, and other less-than-religious ruffians throughout Europe – part of an
evolving global phenomenon – has long been accepted by European experts,
though they've been somewhat reticent about discussing this in terms of the
Balkans, where it's still politically correct to laud the Muslims of Bosnia
through kitschy commemorations, and thus get off the hook of having to be
overly nice to Muslims back home. This we can see clearly enough; the real
question that emerges, however, is whether or not European and American
interests harmonize in this area.

http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/mosque-visitors.jpg
With mosques now attracting an increasingly younger crowd, the outcome of
the present power struggle between traditionalists and Wahhabists will be
crucial for the future of Islam in Macedonia.

Back in December 2004, we heard detailed comments from Claude Moniquet, a
counterterrorism expert with the European Strategic Intelligence and
Security Center in Brussels. At that time, he disclosed that "between 10 and
100 [presumably foreign] people who are dangerous and linked to terrorist
organizations currently reside in Macedonia." When asked about the
"financial link between local criminal gangs and al-Qaeda," Moniquet
responded:

"Yes, absolutely. It's something that we can observe in the last 2-3 years
everywhere in the world. The link between jihadis, the Islamist terrorists,
and the petty crime, even organized crime is quite important. The terrorists
use some criminal organizations to get false papers, arms, ammunition, and
explosives. They used them to travel, to infiltrate people in some
countries."

According to Moniquet, this phenomenon occurs in Macedonia. He mentioned the
case of Kondovo, the Albanian village near the border with Kosovo that was
taken over by militants last winter. The purported local leader, Agim
Krasniqi, threatened to bombard Skopje. Recently Krasniqi renewed these
threats, though since he is all of 25 years-old, this is probably just
politically-motivated sleigh-of-hand masterminded by the opposition DPA
party.

Nevertheless, Kondovo has a huge, foreign-funded madrassa that caters to
local and foreign Islamic students. According to Moniquet, "they have
enormous financial means provided by the Saudis" and should be watched
closely because "this kind of school is always which attracts the people
with problems, and people who think they can change the society, even
through violence" – in other words, secular criminals and militants whose
malleable minds can be guided towards other ends.

Indeed, one worrying sign in Macedonia is that foreign-supported Islamic
fundamentalism has for the first time entered strongly into the religious
debate within the country's Islamic community – something unthinkable only a
few years ago. Skopje daily Vreme, which recently reported on this struggle,
discussed it as part of a larger plan of the Wahhabists to unify "the
Islamic religious communities of Macedonia, Kosovo, Sandzak [in Serbia], and
Montenegro under the umbrella of the Sarajevo-based B-H Islamic Community,
as they used to function before the SFRY's [Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia] disintegration."

This recent statement just confirms what I reported over a year ago about
foreign extremists on Skopje's streets, exhorting Albanians to jihad through
promotional videotapes. In going into details and naming another extremist
imam, the Vreme piece also confirms what I disclosed back in October 2003
about the Sandjak border region of Serbia and Montenegro:

"[W]e may see a paradigm shift in how this part of the Balkans is perceived,
away from the east-west axis and towards a north-south one that would
provide the missing link between Islamic activity in Bosnia and Kosovo- the
two places now of most concern to Western governments. If the Sandzak
suspicions turn out to be justified, the Western view on Montenegrin
independence may shift, because any weakening of security services from
Belgrade can only expedite the potential for Islamic terrorism from Bosnia
and Kosovo- through a severed Sandzak. That is something for the Western
policymakers to think about."

Unfortunately, it looks like they have: the ICG, in its role of imperial
first infantry, released a little-publicized report a few months ago
entitled, "Serbia's Sandzak: Still Forgotten."

Considering the ICG's Midas touch for stirring up conflict, this new
interest means that another international showdown can't be too far away.
But while the arrogant international power-brokers always think they know
best, continuing this course of chopping up Serbia will only make things
worse for the EU, as a direct and undisturbed corridor for criminals and
terrorists is established from Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo straight
through to Bosnia, and from there into the West.

A Macedonian Smoking Gun, and (Alleged) Euro-Disinterest

Still, most admissions of Euro-investigative interest in Islamic terrorism
in the Balkans – perhaps with the exception of Bosnia – go unreported. Or,
as the experience of Tom Gambill shows, important trends are sometimes
hushed up so that the boat is not rocked unduly. So we have to seek them
out.

This led me earlier this summer to an interesting exchange (a rather
one-sided one, as it turned out) with the watered-down EU peacekeeping
mission in Macedonia. The successor to NATO's peacekeeping mission, the EU's
PROXIMA police force describes itself as being dedicated to police training,
confidence-building, and other "I'm okay, you're okay" activities of this
sort.

However, all things considered, one might also assume that such a presence
could serve as an attractive cover for intelligence-gathering efforts. When
I mentioned to a PROXIMA spokesperson that I would like to ask some
questions about PROXIMA investigations of organized crime and terrorism in
Macedonia, I was told that these were "sensitive" areas, but that my
questions would be redirected to someone who might be able to help – in
other words, that these kind of investigations were being performed, but
maybe they were not at liberty to discuss some of them. However, after
sending my questions, I received the following Bizarro World e-mail reply:

"[I] am sorry to inform you that due to our mandate that covers no
activities in the field of such kind of intelligence gathering, for
whomever, PROXIMA is not able to answer your questions."

Now this would all be well and good, had I not already had private
discussions with PROXIMA officers who apparently hadn't been sufficiently
briefed on the limits of their mandate. In fact, one officer who spoke with
me a few months ago, on condition of anonymity, mentioned a detailed
investigation that corroborated Moniquet's general assertions. Further, his
testimony specifically confirmed information I had received independently
from a Serbian source in April 2004; that is, of the presence of a foreign
Islamist "sleeper cell" in the wilds of southwestern Macedonia.

According to the PROXIMA officer, the cell contained approximately 100
foreigners (Arabs, Pakistanis, etc.) and was taking refuge in forested areas
west of the Macedonian Muslim villages of Oktisi and Labunista, for a unique
reason: "since the latter are Muslims, the [Orthodox] Macedonians don't want
them; and since they are Macedonian, the [Muslim] Albanians don't want them
either. Thus they accept the support of foreigners."

This area, located near the Jablanica mountain range that forms the border
with Albania, was also pointed out to me by the informed Kosovo Serbian
source as a staging post for Islamists operating on both sides of the
border. According to him, the small group had some relation to the Abu Bekir
Sidik Brigade, an Islamic terrorist group with a long history, based
throughout key Muslim Balkan cities but chiefly in South Mitrovica, Kosovo.
This city was mentioned specifically in the recent Vreme report mentioned
above as being the headquarters of a suspicious pro-Wahhabi charity, Kosovo
Islamic Relief, "run by a certain Ekrem Avdiu." While the newspaper failed
to make the connection, this Kosovo Albanian has long been identified with
Abu Bekir Sidik, and was once even arrested by Serb authorities when coming
across the Albanian border with jihad paraphernalia.

According to the Serbian source, the Macedonia-Albania border cell was
"laying low, because the area was quiet and allowed them to regroup before
transiting through Albania to Bosnia and, eventually, the West, which is the
real target." That the West is the target and the Balkans merely a
"springboard" was reiterated by analyst Zoran Dragisic in the IPS article
cited above. The Athens Olympics, then only a few months away, was another
possible target, said the Serb.

However, the Olympics came and went without incident, perhaps because Greeks
tend to be friendly to the Palestinian cause and also because they rejected
the Iraq war. The group, or parts of it, remained, however, and the former
PROXIMA officer turned in the results of a year-long investigation –
including photos and copies of passports – to his home intelligence agencies
as 2005 dawned. So the EU police force in Macedonia obviously does not
engage in intelligence activities; and experts such as Moniquet are
obviously pulling info out of their asses.

A few months after the March 2004 anti-Serb pogroms in Kosovo, I learned of
a heated argument within the Macedonian intelligence services, which were
debating whether to try and "infiltrate" the Jablanica cell by inserting a
presumed "friendly" Muslim into their midst. However, the plan was presumed
"too dangerous" and was shelved. As one military intelligence officer
reminded me:

"Because of the Ohrid Agreement, but even we had this problem before, the
order to hire more Albanians has compromised our service. … I might find
important information, but if I pass it up the chain of command, my
superior, or my superior's superior, might be an Albanian, and he can easily
ruin the investigation … and I'm sure they feel the same way about us
[Macedonians], because they of course have their own interests to protect.

"The point is that while some of us are trying – and I do have some good and
honest Albanian colleagues – the service as a whole is being compromised.
When NATO and the U.S. ask us to cooperate, we do our best, but if you can't
even trust your own colleagues, what can we do?"

Given this poisonous atmosphere, it's no surprise that the sensitive
counterterrorism operation was canceled. To my knowledge, it never even
reached ministerial level, and it was not considered again.

Macedonia's Ambiguous War on Terror

However, there were apparently two other counterterrorism operations that
did go down in Macedonia, and which now seem as impenetrable and opaque as
the blankets of fog that grip Skopje in winter.

The most famous was the police shooting of seven alleged Islamic terrorists
in March 2002. However, critics and the opposition immediately claimed that
the men were really hapless migrant workers killed on the orders of
then-Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski in an effort to win American favor.
The case culminated with an official accusation by the government against
the former interior minister, who had sought refuge in Croatia, where he
also holds citizenship.

Further politicization came when Carla Del Ponte, who already wanted
Boskovski for alleged war crimes committed during the 2001 war, used them to
proliferate a sort of "see what this man is capable of" guilt-by-implication
image of Macedonia's former top cop. While Boskovski was given up to the
Hague, several former policemen involved in the killings were acquitted in
May by a Skopje court, which found there was insufficient evidence to
convict them. The opposition praised the judiciary's freedom from heavy
political pressure as a sign of Macedonia's institutional strength, but the
government protested. The West was disappointed too. They had also hoped
that Boskovski would take the fall for the killings.

Can anything break this impasse? Recently, I spoke with one jaundiced
ex-journalist who "gave up," he said, "after seeing how corrupt and evil all
of our leaders were." Despite being no friend of Boskovski or of the former
government, what he claimed about the reason for the Pakistani killings
partially exonerates the former interior minister and, if true, is very
unsettling for the American "war on terror." "Come on!" he said. "It was a
setup! The Americans brought in [the Pakistanis], who were probably not
terrorists, and put them in the field. Then they tipped off the police. It
was a trap, and Boskovski walked right into it."

This highly unusual explanation cannot be independently confirmed; the
ex-journalist attributed it to police sources. Nevertheless, if true, it
would indicate a political motive: the U.S. wanted to bring down the
government, as they would help to do only a few months later in the
September 2002 elections. Whether or not they were really the product of
malicious deceit, the suspicious slayings generated a lot of bad press that
helped to further reduce the popularity of Boskovski and his government.

A completely opposite case of the American "war on terror," and just as
mysterious as the first, was the alleged abduction of Khaled el-Masri from
the Macedonian-Serbian border on Dec. 31, 2003. According to el-Masri (who
is a German citizen), he was simply coming via bus from Germany to Skopje
when he was removed at the border by police, held, kidnapped and beaten by
intelligence agents, and shipped to an American prison in Afghanistan where
he was interrogated for allegedly being an al-Qaeda member. After some time
there, he alleges, he was dumped somewhere in Albania and made his way home
to Germany.

The German government was indignant about this case, which even made it to
60 Minutes in the context of America's rogue "rendering" facilities
worldwide. But when I called a German embassy spokesman about it a few
months ago, he said he could not comment on the case – and, when pressed,
bizarrely stated that he could not comment about why he could not comment.

The whole case has been controversial from start to finish, with the U.S.
denying that it ever took place and the testimony of both el-Masri and the
Macedonian police being unverifiable. A policeman who claims he was working
the border checkpoint when el-Masri came through told me that, "I don't know
what happened to him, we just thought he seemed suspicious and turned him
over to the DBK [Macedonian Secret Service], who came right away. After
that, I don't know what happened to him."

However, this policeman also spoke of there having been a second Arab on the
bus, who was allowed to continue. Since el-Masri never mentioned coming with
a friend, it is hard to know what to believe.

Lands of Confusion

The purpose of retelling these two tales is merely to show how confusing and
elliptical the war on terror has become in the Balkans. The potential
disconnect here between the American cooperation with the old and new
Macedonian governments fits a pattern that is established and does not
depend on the verisimilitude of either story; it has long been clear that
the old, Boskovski-era government was perceived as an impediment to
stability and the new, SDSM-DUI government is regarded as the key to
securing peace and ethnic harmony. But if we should expect a fundamentally
different relationship with the two regimes in the economic and diplomatic
spheres, why not in the war on terror too?

And then there is the still-ambivalent nature of the Islamists' long-term
goals in the region. While the IPS report described the Balkans merely as a
"springboard" for attacks further West, Claude Moniquet in a November 2004
interview attested that in Bosnia, "the al-Qaeda network is active, but the
authorities in Sarajevo are lulled into a false sense of security by
thinking that the aim of the terrorists is not Bosnia-Herzegovina itself.
This is precisely their long-term goal."

These complex issues leave a general feeling of uneasiness when it comes to
America's policy on and awareness of Balkan terrorism. Regardless of Porter
Goss' visit to the region, the long legacy of America's Balkan policies –
from helping import the jihadis in Bosnia and Albania in the 1990's, to
tolerating the mujahedin in the NLA ranks in 2001, to the Boskovski affair
in 2002 and now the el-Masri case – show a worryingly fluid approach that
seems to contrast with the Europeans' more resolute and non-contradictory
approach to countering terrorism in the Balkans – which is, after all, their
own backyard. Further, as UPI's recent interview with Claude Moniquet makes
clear, the European strategy of promoting cultural acceptance and
assimilation of Muslims contrasts sharply with the American fondness for
maximum firepower

However, as Moniquet laments, one impediment to an EU crackdown on terror is
that "we have problems harmonizing anti-terrorist laws in Europe and finding
a common way to fight terrorism." The lack of any single blanket institution
comparable to the American Department of Homeland Security also slows
information-sharing.

And so in the end, one can't blame all the intelligence failures and radical
disconnects on American naiveté and their own unqualified staff. Even though
they share a single currency, European states still watch protectively over
their own intelligence services first. In this respect, the Balkans in 2005,
and particularly UN-controlled Kosovo, remain a tower of Babel, a refuge for
competing national and individual interests, a realm of unshared or ignored
data.

In such an environment, it's not hard to understand how terrorists and
criminals have the upper hand – and why patriots like Tom Gambill feel so
frustrated.





[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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