The aircraft that the LTTE used to attack the Sri Lankan Air Force a few
days ago are now confirmed as Czech-built Zlin Z-143 / -143L light aircraft.
 
 
 
http://www.us-aviator.com/EmailArticle.cfm?ContentBlockID=c7167df7-a80c-459d
-973d-34907eec4c0c#d
 
Terror Tigers of the Skies? 
Tue, 07 Jun '05
Sri Lankan Rebels Acquire A Modest Air Capability

Who the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are depends less on your point of
view than it used to do. Once, a case could be made that the LTTE, a violent
terrorist group fighting for a racial/ethnic homeland separate from Sri
Lanka, were freedom fighters. They claimed many grievances, and made a case
that they had been mistreated and subjugated by the majority Sinhalese of
the island nation. But their methods -- they're the guys who put suicide
bombing on the map 20 years ago -- and the nihilism of their target
selection turned many who usually flock to the side of the underdog against
them.
Now, we're getting word that the LTTE had an air force.
 
Do they? The group's spokesmen, in their safe havens in foreign countries,
are playing it coy. Like the US Navy with nuclear weapons, they'll neither
confirm nor deny. However, clandestine rebel radio stations have claimed
that the aircraft were used recently in a celebration to honor the Tigers'
dead, which number about 13,000 in 22 years of war (most of the war's 51,000
other dead were civilians killed in LTTE attacks).
 
The Sri Lankan government believes that the LTTE has smuggled parts and
assembled perhaps two light aircraft at an airfield in a rebel-held zone in
northern Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan officials raised that question at recent
meetings with Indian diplomats and with US Secretary of State Condaleeza
Rice during talks with Sri Lankan officials in Washington. Secretary Rice
reportedly told the Sri Lankans that the US takes such charges very
seriously.
 
Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh is not only convinced the planes exist,
he thinks that more are on the way.
 
UPDATE: LTTE Sources now identify the Tigers' air force as two Czech-made
Moravan Zlin Z-143 lightplanes. Commodore RS Vasan of the Indian Navy
(Retired) has published an extensive analysis, with more details (the
improved runway made by the Tigers is much longer than would be required by
the Zlin -- 1250 meters, or 4,100 feet).
 
The Zlin 143 (shown here in factory photos) is a four-seat,
Lycoming-powered, light GA utility plane, broadly similar to a Piper
Cherokee, Warrior, or Archer, perhaps a bit sportier. It has a conventional
aluminum semi-monocoque structure, and is certified under Part 23. It is not
aerobatic, unlike many Zlins, including the similar-looking 242 (which has
only two seats). The Z-143 is a popular plane in Europe, but has been slow
catching on in the USA, despite enthusiastic importers and Zlin's reputation
for quality and robust planes.
 
As we have frequently reported in these pages, such light aircraft pose a
relatively minor threat. As Cdre. Vasan points out, the threat is more from
the potential of larger aircraft using the clandestine airfield than
anything the Zlins can do.
 
India once supported the Tamil Tigers, but in 1987 made peace with the Sri
Lankan regime in Colombo. Since then, India has itself fighting against the
Tigers or subjected to Tiger terrorism; indeed, Colombo got its initial tip
about the nascent Tiger air wing from New Delhi.
Of course, the airfield is subject to monitoring by a Nordic UN group which
is supposedly keeping peace between the Sri Lankans and their restive
separatists. The war has been low-key since a 2002 cease-fire. On the ground
in Sri Lanka, the Nordic team can't tell if the Tamil Tigers have aircraft
or not. They won't land and look without permission from the rebels, and
don't want the government bombing any rebel air bases either. "If bombs
fall, we pull out," Monitoring Mission chief Hagrup Haukland told foreign
correspondents in Sri Lanka last Thursday.
 
FMI: www.slmfa.gov.lk (government site), www.tamilnet.com (rebel site)
Portions Copyright C 1999-2007 by Aero-News Network, Inc. All rights
reserved. 
 
 
 
----------------------
 
http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/03/30/fea02.asp
 

Neutralising LTTE air capability, vital for Sri Lanka, region 

  <http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/03/30/Defence%20Column.jpg> SERIOUS THREAT:
The two and half decade long conflict took a new turn in the wee hours of
Monday. It was a quite dramatic turn for the Sri Lanka Air Force which
fought a lonely battle in the air, playing a supportive but critical role to
the Army and the Navy. This time, the SLAF faced its first enemy threat from
the air. 
The Tiger terrorists, having formed its Air Wing nine years back in 1998,
with the leadership of Shanker, an aeronautical engineer who had served Air
Canada, launched its long awaited, first threat to the Sri Lanka Air Force,
the Sri Lankan state, the Indian sub-continent and as a whole to the entire
globe fighting against terrorism. 
It was not unexpected. The SLAF was aware that one day, the LTTE may show
the entire world of their air capabilities, probably to add one more feather
to its hat to qualify as the most ruthless terror outfit in the world. 
The Tigers launched their first air attack under the cover of darkness which
is the usual time for their air operations, according to the data gathered
about the Tiger air training sessions. It is also usual for a terror outfit.

The records collected by Police about the incident confirmed that the entire
drama had unfolded from 23.45 hours on Sunday to 1.45 hours on Monday after
two low flying ultra light aircraft crossed to the air space in the

  <http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/03/30/z_p07-Neutralising01.jpg> 
The entrance to the base
 cleared areas in Vavuniya from the Iranamadu airstrip. 
Many airmen at the Katunayake air base were asleep when men on duty heard an
unusual sound of an aerial vehicle roving around the airbase around 00.45
hours on Monday. 
Though they were suspicious about the sound emanating from the air, it was
not visible as the air craft had no lights on. 
Once they realised it was an enemy aircraft that was roving around the air
base they heard an explosion from the engineering service section, prompting
them to fire towards the flying object. 
The aircraft that entered the Air Base from the Eastern side of the airbase
took a sudden turn and flew towards the Negombo lagoon, as the gunfire of
the airmen on duty was directed towards the low flying light aircraft.
Within minutes it again appeared in the Air Base and dropped another two
bombs in to the hangar before flying across the air strip and disappeared
into the darkness. 
The two explosions that took place at the Air Force Base rocked theadjoining
Katunayake international airport prompting Airport Security to take the
passengers to safer areas. But it didn't take hours for them to realise what
the threat was and to resume normal operations at the airport. 
No sooner the two aircraft returned to their Wanni hideout, the Tigers
claimed the responsibility for the attack, publishing the pictures of their
air wing with leader Prabhakaran and the two aircraft believed to have
engaged in the air attack, in the pro-LTTE Tamilnet website. 
They officially declared that their mission was aimed at destroying the
newly acquired MiG 27 aircraft and the Kfir squadron. 
They failed in their endeavour as they could not take the precise target due
to resistance by the airmen who were on duty. 
According to reports, out of three bombs dropped by the light aircraft into
the air base, only two had exploded after being dropped - one into the
center of the hangar and other into the left end. 
The locally manufactured improvised explosive device using ball bearings
caused minor damage to five helicopters and one aircraft at the hangar but
no damage was caused to the fighter aircraft, according to the Air Force. 

  <http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/03/30/z_p07-Neutralising02.jpg> 
Aerial route taken by LTTE aircraft
Three Air Force men were killed. Eleven others injured due to these
explosions were admitted to the Negombo hospital. 
Though the radar system installed at the Air Force base could not detect the
path taken by these two light aircraft eyewitness accounts collected by the
Police following the incident had confirmed that the two air craft had come
from - and returned to - the Wanni. 
According to eyewitness accounts the two light aircraft had entered the air
space in the cleared areas in Wanni from Ganeshapuram on the Mannar-Vavuniya
road and proceeded towards Katunayake via the Wilpattu National Park,
Puttalam, Neelabemma, Koswatta Police Division, Marawila and Negombo. 
The two aircraft had flown at a low altitude without switching on lights to
avert Security Forces' attention. 
According to eyewitness accounts the two aircrafts had taken the same path
to return to the Wanni without taking a sea route. 
The sound of the two aircraft has been heard by the Chief Inspector at the
Ganeshapuram STF camp located on the Vavuniya-Mannar road at 23:50 hours on
Sunday. 
The STF personnel had informed the SLAF camp in Vavuniya at 23.50 hours.
However, they had not seen any of the aircraft and had heard only the sounds
of the two aircraft. 
The officers attached to the same camp on duty one kilometre away from the
Ganeshapuram STF camp towards Mannar had observed the two aircraft heading
towards the Wanni at 1.45 hrs exactly one hour after the air attack on
Katunayake air base. 
This confirms the fact that two aircraft had taken part in this mission
though it was not yet confirmed whether both had dropped bombs targeting the
hangar. 
People in and around Negombo area also had heard the unusual sound of the
two aircraft. A group of youth from Malingala, Marawila had informed the 119
Police hotline about the suspicious aircraft heading towards Koswatta area
and had made a statement to the Marawila Police station. 
According to reports the LTTE had used two Zlin Z-143 aircraft made in the
Czech Republic to launch this attack although it could not create a major
calamity in the country as expected by the Tiger leader. 
However, they could grab the attention of the international media and hoped
for an image boost through the incident. 
Many raised concerns why the SLAF couldn't detect the LTTE air craft and
destroy them prior to the attack through the Air Defence System. The answers
to these queries are yet to be found by the five member

  <http://www.dailynews.lk/2007/03/30/z_p07-Neutralising03.jpg> 
A search operation in the area
 committee appointed by Air Force Commander Air Marshal Roshan Gunatilleka
to probe into the incident. 
What should be highlighted here is that the SLAF alone cannot be blamed for
this as this was the first occasion the SLAF faced an air attack by the
LTTE. 
The SLAF alone could not independently handle the situation, as the
establishment of an Air Defence System to face such situations cannot be
handled solely by the Air Force. 
Many institutions are involved in the process of establishing and handling
the Air Defence system after studying threat assessments on LTTE air
capabilities. 
In this backdrop, the LTTE air attack on the Katunayake Air Base rang many
alarm bells in the region. Neighbouring India was the most disturbed nation.

But, the LTTE air capabilities should not be a surprising factor for the
Indian authorities as the Government of Sri Lanka has frequently briefed the
Indian authorities about the air capabilities of the LTTE. 
Former President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga raised the matter with
the Indian Government during her official visit to India in April 2003. 
President Kumaratunga drew the attention of the Indian Government to
confirmed reports of the LTTE developing infrastructure in a third dimension
taking cover under the Ceasefire Agreement. 
According to threat assessment by the Government, an airstrip at Iranamadu
of 1250 metres, up to five aircraft having a 600 nautical mile range with a
maximum speed of 200 knots capable of carrying 250 Kg of explosives and also
a few shoulder fired missiles and radar had posed a greater threat to the
national security. 
The threat perceived by the Government, based on the said LTTE capability,
Colombo and economic targets in and around Colombo and the national
leadership would be subjected to LTTE air attack at any moment. 
It has also been assessed that the LTTE could also use the aerial route to
bring in critical military hardware, perpetrate suicide attacks and parallel
attacks on VVIPS to undermine the morale of the people and to get their
demands accepted and threaten sovereignty. 
The need to have a National Air Defence System was felt for some time but
nothing happened during the UNF regime to fulfil this requirement to face
any impending LTTE air threat to the nation. 
It was only in April 2005 that an Indian Defence expert arrived in Sri Lanka
to do an assessment report on the impending air threats by the LTTE and to
make recommendations. 
According to the threat scenario which emanated from Iranamadu, the Indian
specialist recommended the deployment of a 3D radar in Colombo, a 3D radar
in the North and a 2D radar in the East. 
The need for 3D radar with a large coverage is to keep the Iranamadu
airstrip on a 24 hour surveillance basis and direct Sri Lanka air assets
effectively and rapidly to neutralise any air threat developing from
Iranamadu area. 
According to the threat perceived by the Government, the LTTE would be able
to use aircraft with 250 to 450 Kg of explosives to act as flying bombs to
carry out parallel attacks on selected targets in the country. 
The aircraft in possession of the LTTE has adequate range to do a tactical
routing from the sea to attack targets in Colombo, Southern Sri Lanka and
Eastern Sri Lanka but their desired target would be in and around Colombo. 
According to the assessment the runway at Iranamadu will be able to take on
C-130 type of aircraft which can carry 10 to 15 tons. 
The factor that has been highlighted is the possibility of the LTTE using
the jungle around the Iranamadu runway as it provides good concealment of
airborne assets while the straight road extending from the runway at
Iranamadu would allow take off and landing by Z 143 class of aircraft
acquired by LTTE. 
Despite the threat assessment and the keenness shown by the SLAF,
unnecessary political pressures had delayed the process of establishing such
an Air Defence system to counter challenges posed by the LTTE. 
It was only within the last 18 months that steps were expedited for the
establishment of the National Air Defence System by taking policy decisions
for the promulgation of a Government order for vesting Air Defence
responsibility with the SLAF, demarcate Air Defence Identification Zones
over Sri Lankan territory and for the integration of the SLAF and civil
aviation surveillance assets. 
Therefore, the SLAF cannot be entirely blamed for the situation as
everything had not fallen into place for them to take full control.
Successive Governments which neglected the situation should share the
responsibility for this. 
In the same manner some individuals opposed the plans put forward by the
SLAF to shift the SLAF air assets away from the country's sole international
airport following the internationally accepted standards. 
Though a policy decision was taken following the 2001 airport attack to
shift SLAF assets from the Katunayake international airport the court case
filed by certain individuals prevented the SLAF from shifting their assets
to a safer area without endangering the security of the international
airport. 
Therefore, the SLAF is now faced with the challenge of destroying the air
assets of the LTTE which has challenged the sovereignty of the country at
the highest level. The incident has given a licence for the SLAF to go all
out and attack and destroy the LTTE air capabilities. 
But they will have to wait until these LTTE aircraft come out from their
hard bunkers for training missions or any other operation, as it is
otherwise impossible for the SLAF to find them and destroy. 
Therefore, the support of the public will be extremely necessary under these
circumstances to detect these aircraft irrespective of the air defence
systems which can malfunction due to various reasons including climatic
changes and visual deficiencies. 
Therefore, the SLAF should go all out to destroy the air capability of the
LTTE irrespective of the large sum of money involved in the process as it
can create a major calamity causing much bigger losses to lives and
property. 
The international community which is closely monitoring the situation should
also come to their senses about the LTTE air capabilities, as this threat
will not be confined to Sri Lanka but extend to the entire globe. 
As Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa told the Colombo based diplomats at
the end of last year, LTTE would grow to the level of a global terror
network, if the Sri Lanka could not take control over the situation at least
at this stage with the support of the international community. 
On the other hand, the people should not disregard the role played by the
SLAF to suppress terrorism by taking precise LTTE targets in the North and
the East in the aftermath of this incident.
 
 


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