NATO's Diminishing Options in Libya 


STRATFOR    June 28, 2011 | 1715 GMT 

NATO's Diminishing Options in Libya

MAHMUD TURKIA/AFP/Getty Images

Moammar Gadhafi at the Rixos Hotel in Tripoli on March 8 

Summary

As the intervention in Libya continues, the International Criminal Court has
issued an arrest warrant for Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. This may
embolden NATO to continue using airstrikes in an attempt to assassinate
Gadhafi quickly, especially as domestic considerations could cause coalition
partners to begin to lose their will to carry out the mission. Should this
short-term push fail, however, the inevitable track will be one that leads
to a negotiated settlement, first dealing with Gadhafi's inner circle and,
failing that, eventually with the Libyan leader himself.

Analysis

As the Libyan intervention exceeds 100 days, there is still no end in sight.
A military stalemate persists in the east, while rebels from Misurata are
struggling to push much farther west than Zlitan, and Nafusa Mountain
guerrillas face a difficult task in advancing toward the coast. Moreover,
the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Libyan
leader Moammar Gadhafi on June 27, rendering his prospects for exile
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110511-europes-weak-hand-against-gadhafi
>  all the more unlikely. 

The warrant, however, provides added impetus to NATO's current strategy of
using air power to try to assassinate the Libyan leader as a means of
accomplishing the mission: regime change. The three countries currently
leading the Libyan intervention - the United States, the United Kingdom and
France - are also increasing their efforts to induce people close to Gadhafi
to betray him. But the longer the operation continues, the higher the chance
that the West will begin to grow weary of another drawn-out war, at which
point NATO will find it increasingly difficult to effect regime change. At
some point, reaching a negotiated settlement will become the best of a
number of unattractive options. Negotiations have already begun in an
unofficial capacity, but the fact that no country involved wants to deal
with a side that includes the Libyan leader will only prolong the process.


The Coalition: Weary of War?


NATO jets continue to bomb targets across Libya. In doing so, however, the
coalition has run into the inevitable problem of civilian casualties. This
has yet to make any demonstrable impact on public opinion of the war in
countries leading the campaign, which remains consistently in favor of
regime change in Libya, though against an escalation that includes the use
of ground troops. For example, a poll published June 20 regarding Western
countries' opinion of regime change in Libya showed a consistently high
level of approval. The longer the conflict continues, however, the higher
the chance for public opinion to turn against the war.

Notably, the country whose public is most opposed is Italy, which also
happens to be the first NATO country on the verge of withdrawing from the
operation. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini first intimated this
June 22. In response to multiple reports of civilian casualties due to NATO
airstrikes, he called for an immediate halt to the campaign so that
humanitarian aid could be deployed. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
reaffirmed the shift in the Italian position away from the airstrikes June
24, when he told an EU summit that Italy was "pushing for political
mediation which will deliver a final solution."

Rome's true motivation has more to do with domestic political pressures
placed upon the Berlusconi government by its main coalition partner, Liga
Norte, over the cost of the intervention rather than the fear of civilian
casualties. But the reason for Italy's objections is less important than
their potential consequence: the coalition of NATO countries that have
signed up to participate in Operation Unified Protector is in danger of
fracturing, albeit slowly, and the Italian exit could represent the first
crack.

The United Kingdom's discourse on Libya is emblematic of a deep-rooted
debate over the proper level of funding its military should receive. Recent
budget cuts to the armed forces have exacerbated the United Kingdom's
inability to spread its forces across multiple theaters, and the military is
using the conflict in Libya - and more specifically, the argument that its
forces are overstretched - as a political tool to justify its public
criticism of the budget cuts. Several leading military officials have made
public statements to this effect over the past three weeks, and Prime
Minister David Cameron has been quick to quash any rumors that these
statements reveal a faltering will to continue the mission. However, Defense
Secretary Liam Fox on June 27 admitted that the United Kingdom may have to
re-prioritize some of its armed forces to see the Libyan operation through.
This indicates that the complaints from the military have substance. 

In the United States, Congress rather than the military is showing is
resistance to the operation in Libya. The U.S. House of Representatives made
its stance known June 24 by voting down a bill that would have given U.S
President Barack Obama authority to wage war in the North African country.
Despite the fact that the House - paradoxically, perhaps - voted down a
separate proposal on the same day to restrict funding for the operation, the
fact that there is widespread opposition to the Libyan intervention within
both the Republican and Democratic parties sent a clear message: The
indefinite deployment of U.S. troops will cost Obama political capital at
home.

Another factor the White House may be contemplating concerns the June 23
U.S. announcement regarding the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve and other International Energy Agency countries, which both cited
the loss of oil output from Libya as the primary factor in their decision to
pre-empt an anticipated price increase in the summer. Washington - as well
as the other countries involved - thus has an interest in ending the
conflict soon, but only in a way that would allow oil production to resume
as soon as possible. (An anonymous British diplomat leaked to the media June
24 details of a British Foreign Office assessment which claimed that eastern
Libyan oil infrastructure had not been that badly damaged, and that it would
take three to four weeks for oil exports to resume after Gadhafi's fall. It
is unclear whether this is true or whether it is simply intended to serve as
an incentive for countries to keep pushing through until the end.)

France has the least domestic opposition toward regime change in Libya, and
it is one of the leaders of the air campaign as well. France was the first
country to recognize the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council, and
Paris would likely be the last country to abandon the mission that has
become, among other things, a point of personal pride for President Nicolas
Sarkozy. Sarkozy wants to avoid being perceived as weak ahead of the 2012
presidential election, especially as the race is beginning to heat up. One
of the main Socialist presidential nominee candidates, Martine Aubry, is set
to announce her candidacy June 28, and the Socialists may decide to put the
Libyan intervention - and the way it is being conducted - at the forefront
of their anti-Sarkozy campaign. 


A Failing Trust in the Rebels


The once-touted option of arming the rebel opposition to fight the Libyan
army on the ground has lost traction in NATO. The monthslong stalemate in
the east shows no signs of changing, while Misurata remains an island of
rebellion in the western coastal region - though some of the rebel fighters
from the city have been trying to push westward toward Tripoli despite
currently being blocked outside of the city of Zlitan. Nafusa Mountain
guerrillas, meanwhile, are making slight progress in terms of advancing
northward, with some fighters having descended from the mountains to battle
Libyan forces, but their chances of ever taking the capital are slim. 

The real problem continues to lie in the uncertainty that surrounds the
rebel council, which is officially recognized by a handful of countries as
the legitimate representative of the Libyan people - it is recognized by
even more countries in the West and by Russia and China as the de facto
government of eastern Libya. All of the countries that have begun to develop
ties with the council realize they will need to maintain good relations with
Benghazi if they want to conduct business in Libya in the future, namely in
the oil sector. Yet the West has been hesitant to fully arm the rebels or
deliver on the hundreds of millions of dollars of aid that has been promised
them in various international conferences since April. This suggests a
general lack of trust for the council that prevents full-scale Western
support, a distrust perhaps stemming from prior connections many of its
leaders held with the Gadhafi regime, the potential existence of jihadist
elements within the council, or the disbelief that any one faction truly
speaks for all of Libya's rebels.

NATO thus has few good options. The most attractive option, from NATO's
perspective, is to fulfill the mission as quickly as possible, while there
is still resolve in the West. This means it will either convince regime
insiders to push Gadhafi out, or increase its attempts to assassinate
Gadhafi from the air, dealing with the resulting power vacuum later. Whether
this strategy will work is unknown. But the longer it takes, the higher the
chance that a coterie of NATO countries will eventually be forced to fully
support a negotiated settlement to end the conflict. 

The council is opposed to any outcome that does not include Gadhafi's
ouster. For months, it was even opposed to any solution that did not involve
Gadhafi's being forced to leave the country. But as cracks within the NATO
countries participating in the bombing began to emerge, the rebels'
negotiating position began to weaken because their leverage with countries
such as Qatar
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110405-qatars-role-libya-and-beyond>
does not provide them much help in a military conflict with Gadhafi. This
has led to a slight easing of the council's position. During a June 24
interview in French media, a rebel spokesman said the council would be
satisfied with Gadhafi's retiring to a "Libyan oasis under international
control," provided he and his family are barred from participating in any
future government. The spokesman also said the council would be willing to
discuss the formation of an interim government with "any technocrat or
Libyan official who does not have any blood on their hands."


The Beginning of Negotiations


It is under these circumstances that official negotiations will likely
begin. Such a path will not immediately lead to talks between the rebels and
Gadhafi himself, however. The first attempt will be to separate Gadhafi's
inner circle from the regime - offering those without "blood on their hands"
a share of power in the new Libya in exchange for betraying their leader.
(Deciding who does and does not fall in this category will most likely be
subject to negotiation, not based upon a true examination of the personal
records of various regime officials.) Best positioned to lead any future
negotiations will be the Russians (via the African Union), who have
deep-rooted relations with both the West and Gadhafi and who have balanced
their support of Tripoli and Benghazi to ensure a future presence throughout
Libya. 

The rebel spokesman who broached the topic of negotiations said that
negotiations have, in fact, already begun through intermediaries in
countries such as France and South Africa. No country, however, wants to
negotiate with Gadhafi himself unless all other options have been exhausted.
If NATO jets are unable to kill the Libyan leader, then the alliance will
attempt to undermine him from within.

The problem with this approach is embodied in the ICC warrants. Though
Gadhafi, his son Seif al-Islam and his long-time intelligence chief Abdullah
al-Sannousi have been the only specific targets of this round of ICC
warrants, no one connected to the regime will enjoy a guarantee of continued
immunity from prosecution. This makes it difficult, though not impossible,
to incentivize a deal for them, especially when the rebel military threat is
low, and the NATO countries participating in the operations in Libya - which
are hesitant to deploy ground troops - have yet to show that their attempts
at assassinating Gadhafi will prove successful.


 

 


 

http://media.stratfor.com/images/clear.gif?n=198123&h=0&u=128209&t=130928744
6&j=199974



,_._,___



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



------------------------------------

--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic?  Head on over to our discussion list, 
discuss-os...@yahoogroups.com.
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
biso...@intellnet.org

http://www.intellnet.org

  Post message: osint@yahoogroups.com
  Subscribe:    osint-subscr...@yahoogroups.com
  Unsubscribe:  osint-unsubscr...@yahoogroups.com


*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has 
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of 
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT 
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the 
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, 
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other 
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes 
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material 
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use 
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' 
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtmlYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    osint-dig...@yahoogroups.com 
    osint-fullfeatu...@yahoogroups.com

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    osint-unsubscr...@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Reply via email to