At 18:19 15-10-2001, Chris Corrigan wrote:
I am dumbfounded by this article:
<http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109272330.htm>http://www.stratfor.com/home/0109272330.htm
It describes Al-Qaeda as, essentially, an Open Space Organization,
I think yours are very interesting questions, Chris. The hypothesis of
Al Qaeda being close to an Open Space Organization disturbs me.
My feeling is that somehow the answer must be "No". But the arguments
in favour seem convincing. I suppose I will need some more time before
I am able to understand my own thinking about that. But I am reading
very carefully all the messages on this thread, to see if some comments
will help my understanding.
In the meanwhile, I red all the article on the link you sent us to
understand the context. And I found other things very disturbing,
but in a completelly diferent direction.
First, it is clearly recomended that when fighting this enemy through
a coalison war, that war has no possibility of fulfilling the objectives,
unless a very special two-tiered strategy will be followed. One tier
is the "public war", that shall be conducted by the coalision. But it is
clearly recomended that the only way to fight Al Qaedaa is that the USA
alone conduct a second covert war that would include the killing
of individaul persons in any country, including allies - without the
knowing of no one (including the governments of those countries).
Indead, and according with the recomendation, the public war (that
we see every day on TV) is only to "cover" the real one.
This is very interesting: Is it my impression or the analysts recomend
to the USA that they become even more the "policies of the word", that
they assume even clearly an imperial stance that has been denied until
now? And that they make covert military operations even in the countries
of the allies?
[I am sure that some Roman strategic specialist must have made similar
proposals to the rulers of the Roman Empire, sooner before it collapsed.
Maybe preventing them to the terrible Open Space mouvement of
terrorists know as Christians...]
What I think about this analysis is that they have concluded that a
conventional coalison war will not solve the problem. But they are NOT
trying to change the paradigm and ONLY "addapt it" to conditions where
it is useless.
These analysts, contrarily to coronal Bowman, have not understand that the
cover WAR is creating milions of new terrorists in Islam and hundreds
of new "empowered cells".
And when they recomend that the USA intervene even within their allies'
countries,
they will make that many citizens of their allies (namely in Europe) will
become anti-americans themselves.
So the war can not be gained unless a strategy will be used that will not only
put islamic countries against USA, but even Europe.
The strategists are proposing what they think that can result. But for me - as
the proposed solution is impossible - this is a demonstration (by the
reduction
to the absurd) that the war can't be gained. Col. Bowman could
have explained that to these new "strategists"
Some quotations to foundament my interpretaction:
Quotations:
-
Part 4: The Intercontinental Theater of Operations
2330 GMT, 010927
Summary
Given the intercontinental nature of the threat of
terrorism, standard coalition warfare will not win the
battle. A coalition will limit the ability of the United
States to operate covertly on foreign soil, but
Washington cannot simply go it alone. A two-tiered
strategy is required. On one level, the coalition will
have its uses and will provide cover. But on another
level, the United States must control its own
intelligence war.
(...)
Thus a dilemma is embedded in the American
intercontinental strategy. The war that
the United States must prosecute is essentially an
intelligence war, designed to locate
and destroy al-Qa'ida in a number of countries. In
order to do this, the United States
must create a coalition of intelligence and security
organizations to provide the United
States with information, operational forces on the
ground ready to act on the intelligence
and the right for U.S. covert forces to take fairly
extreme actions on their soil.
(...)
In a police action, particularly in the United States,
the first requirement is not the
apprehension of the criminal, but rather the protection
of the rights of citizens. The
governing principle is that it is better for 10 guilty
men to go free than for one innocent
man to be convicted. In warfare, the reverse is the
case. In destroying enemy forces, it
is accepted and expected that innocent bystanders also
will die. The notion of guilt or
innocence is not really relevant to warfare.
Within the United States, the first principle will
continue to pertain. The rules of U.S.
operations overseas will be much more complex. In the
intercontinental intelligence war,
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt simply will
not surface. There will be no judges
and juries. Intelligence operatives will have to make
decisions -- sometimes in split
seconds -- concerning who will live and who will die.
In discussions about removing limits on state-sponsored
assassinations, American
thinking has focused on countries like Afghanistan or
Iraq. In these countries,
intelligence operations are a subset of military
operations, and the same rules ultimately
apply. The situation is fundamentally different in
Germany or Japan. The expectation
there is that those theaters will operate by the same
rules as North America: local
forces will have control and the legal system will
continue to govern.
If it is to have a chance of success, the United States
must be able to act decisively
and quickly, regardless of political considerations --
and also, by definition, operate in a
sphere not only beneath proof beyond a reasonable doubt
but also in which innocent
people will certainly become casualties.
Israel consciously decided that destroying certain
groups like Black September was
necessary, even if it meant turning Europe into an
intelligence battleground and even if,
on occasion, inevitable mistakes led to civilian
casualties. This is a critical choice the
United States faces. It is a choice that cuts against
the grain of the coalition warfare
strategy Washington is following. In a sense, it is
almost unthinkable that U.S. agents
would begin killing French citizens on French soil. But
given the flexibility and speed
that al-Qa'ida has shown, and given the limits that
rules of evidence place on
intelligence operations, it is difficult to imagine
another strategy.
The task is to identify those operatives and either
capture them -- questioning them
rigorously, as the saying goes -- or kill them. This is
a global operation, and it cannot be
shared with a coalition. Information can flow only one
way: from allies to U.S.
intelligence operations. On another level, the
coalition can function -- harassing
al-Qa'ida, capturing and trying lesser members, tying
up money and so on.
In other words, a two-tiered war is required. The
public war is a law enforcement
challenge, much like what will happen in North America.
A very secret war, perhaps
never confirmed, that limits itself to extremely
high-value targets and makes as few
mistakes as humanly possible also must be waged. The
coaliton will be able to tolerate
a small number of such operations, widely scattered in
time and space, of which all
sides deny knowledge. It cannot tolerate wholesale warfare.
The United States must unravel al-Qa'ida's network
without having the main effort
sapped by attacks on peripheral relationships. There
will be time enough for that later.
Rather, the task of U.S. intelligence is to look for
bin Laden's necessary vulnerabilities --
people, money, buildings. When those are found to be of
sufficient importance, they
must be destroyed using secret U.S. forces deployed
around the world, frequently
without the knowledge or permission of the host
country. And if these forces are
captured, Washington, like Israel does, will deny
everything. If they are killed, they will
be forgotten, except for a star on a wall in Langley, Va.
Am I seeing this incorrectly?
Regards
Artur
