On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 10:55:10PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote: > On 28 May 2014 19:57, Ian Goldberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 05:56:30PM +0100, Ximin Luo wrote: > >> Thanks! I suppose this is the same reasoning as the DH-commit to protect > >> the SAS in ZRTP[1]? > > > > Probably. > > > >> To clarify, does this mean the DH-commit is unnecessary if either: > >> > >> a. the session key is longer, say 128 bits or 256 bits (but this would > >> make it "less useable" for verification), or > >> b. we use a verification method that doesn't depend on the session id, > >> such as direct fingerprint verification > > > > At first glance, those seem plausible to me. > > Now I'm curious: why is the session ID short?
Usability of verification in the (long-since-deprecated) "compare session IDs" method, which works even if you *know* your private keys have been compromised (but only for the current session). _______________________________________________ OTR-dev mailing list [email protected] http://lists.cypherpunks.ca/mailman/listinfo/otr-dev
