On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:26 PM, David Barrett wrote: > > For example, assuming we already had some sort of mesh network > capability (via wifi or bluetooth or whatever), perhaps have nodes > synchronize their clocks such that they only agree to send/receive > according to some psuedorandom intervals? Even more interesting if it > combined GPS such that the broadcast periods could be derived from > actual physical location. So two nodes that have never communicated but > know some shared secret (eg, a password) could check their positions and > figure out "I don't know if anybody is around me, but if there *is*, > they'll be online for 60s at 5:23pm." >
I think all you need is something that can be turned on at specific times, to get a message out. Then shut it off. People will have their phones on, then all of a sudden they get service, a text message or two, after which the service promptly drops again. A station only needs to be on long enough to get the message out. A small portable unit could be in a car or on a roof, or it could sit next to your table in a bag as you sit and drink or eat. Or while you walk down the street. I don't think broadcasts need to be scheduled; simply turn it on when you have something to forward. So it's about creating a simple, cheap, lightweight station that can look like a 'real' mobile network, allowing phones to connect and that can send text messages. To distribute a message to a large number of people you'd have a topology where operators receive messages like anyone else and propagate it. It doesn't seem anything terribly complicated is needed, or even desirable. I think the main challenge is how to prevent a regime from hijacking the network. This will probably require an organized structure with isolation, redundancy, a revocation protocol, and careful safeguarding at the top. For instance, if operator A propagates messages from B or C, then B or C might be redundant. If C0 is compromised C1 is activates, and starts by notifying A of the compromise. (C2 is then activated if C1 is compromised.) Some sort of cryptographic protection is probably necessary to prevent regimes from simply creating their own stations. But I think security is a pretty minor point - just getting messages out while making everyone aware of the possibility of compromise is probably good enough. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
